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The Bolivarian government of Venezuela and the government of Cuba use the legitimate 
status of Bolivarian Missions in Colombia for both legitimate and illegitimate state 
activities. The overall aim is to undermine the Colombian state and increase the influence 
of political movements sympathetic to Bolivarianism in Colombian politics with the 
overall goal of weakening a historical international rival to Venezuela in Latin America. 
A comparative case study method is applied to four Venezuelan-sponsored Bolivarian 
missions in Colombia: Robinson, Milagro, Guacaipuro, and Identidad. A review of 
former Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez’s ideology of Bolivarianism is also included. 
The case study analysis is complemented by fieldwork in Colombia: interviews with 
many key figures including former insurgents, intelligence officials of both Venezuela 
and Colombia, as well as politicians and analysts who have direct and indirect knowledge 
of the missions. This constitutes a unique and up-close perspective on the true nature of 
Bolivarian missions in Colombia. The Bolivarian government of Venezuela and the 
government of Cuba consistently seek to expand their anti-U.S. influence throughout 
Latin America; understanding their ideology and mechanisms for doing so yields 
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During the past decade-plus, U.S. efforts in the Middle East have diminished the 
time, energy, attention, and diplomacy effort given to other regions of the world. Against 
this backdrop, the late Hugo Chávez Frías of Venezuela actively promoted his Bolivarian 
ideology throughout Latin America, working to build a coalition of like-minded 
governments, political parties, and social movements. One of the mechanisms Chávez 
used was the expansion of an infrastructure of “Bolivarian missions” (also known as 
Social Missions) that Chávez first established in Venezuela  to the rest of Latin America 
to work with civil society in ways that complemented and supported Venezuelan foreign 
policy. What this thesis seeks to understand is the purpose and scope of the Bolivarian 
missions as they conduct activities in Colombia, primarily along its northeastern border 
with Venezuela. While these missions have overt mission statements that focus on 
humanitarian objectives for civil society, some contend that they function as legal covers 
for Venezuelan government-sponsored illicit or covert activities. Based on the 
comparison of the overt purposes of the Bolivarian missions in Colombia with their 
actual activities, capabilities, and organization, we aim to establish whether these 
organizations have a covert purpose that is directed at undermining the Colombian state. 
A. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis examines the phenomenon of Venezuelan-sponsored “Bolivarian 
missions” within Colombia, and identifies their purpose. Are they legitimate social 
movement organizations, or are they “front organizations” to disguise covert Venezuelan 
activity in Colombia? Or is there a mix of overt and covert purposes for the “Bolivarian 
missions?”  
Although the social programs of the “Bolivarian missions” have been extended to 
many countries in Latin America,1 Colombia is a unique case for the following reasons: it 
                                                 
1 Javier Corrales, “Using Social Power to Balance Soft Power: Venezuela’s Foreign Policy,” The 
Washington Quarterly 32.4 (October, 2009), 98–100. 
 2 
shares a lengthy border with Venezuela (1,385 miles, or 2,216 km),2 it is not pro-Chávez, 
and it faces an internal threat from armed non-state actors in the form of the Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia or 
FARC) and the Ejercito de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army or ELN). In 
addition, the Colombian government accepts the presence of Bolivarian missions within 
Colombia,3 as do other countries in the region of Latin America and the Caribbean, 
simply because the aid comes “…with very few conditions.”4   
The purpose of this thesis is to understand the configuration, capabilities, 
activities and influence of the Bolivarian missions in Colombia as a way to identify their 
purpose. This thesis will conduct case-study analyses of four Bolivarian missions in 
Colombia: Misiónes Identidad, Milagro, Robinson, and Guacaipuro. In each case, the 
thesis will evaluate the mission’s activities and whether those activities are overt or 
covert in nature. Given continued U.S. government investment in Colombia and the 
continued close relationship between Colombia and the U.S., we will examine the 
circumstances under which the U.S. would find it necessary to respond to the Bolivarian 
missions in Colombia.  
Our initial hypothesis in framing the scope of our thesis was that the Venezuelan 
government established by the late President Chávez uses the legitimate status of 
Bolivarian missions in Colombia for both legitimate and illegitimate state activities. The 
aim is to undermine the Colombian state and increase the influence of political 
movements sympathetic to Bolivarianism in Colombian politics, with the overall goal of 
weakening a historical international rival to Venezuela in Latin America. However, 
through fieldwork conducted in Colombia, another hypothesis became plausible. 
Therefore, we consider three hypotheses that explain the activity of the Bolivarian 
missions in Colombia. These three hypotheses (H) are as follows: 
                                                 
2 Comunidad Andina, “Caracterización De La Frontera Colombo-Venezolana,” 
http://www.comunidadandina.org/documentos/docSG/Ayudamemoria14-4-05.htm#arriba (accessed 
February 28, 2013). 
3 Corrales, “Using Social Power to Balance Soft Power: Venezuela’s Foreign Policy,” 101, 109. 
4 Ibid., 101. 
 3 
1. H1: The Bolivarian government of Venezuela uses the legitimate status of 
Bolivarian missions in Colombia for legitimate state activities to support 
Venezuelan foreign policy. 
2. H2: The Bolivarian government of Venezuela uses the legitimate status of 
Bolivarian missions in Colombia for both legitimate and illegitimate state 
activities to support Venezuelan foreign policy. 
3. H3: The Cuban and Venezuelan governments use the legitimate status of 
Bolivarian missions in Colombia for both legitimate and illegitimate state 
activities to support Venezuelan and Cuban foreign policy. 
B. WHAT EXACTLY ARE “BOLIVARIAN MISSIONS?” 
During President Chávez’s presidency, he himself, government agencies, and 
Bolivarian supporters all defined the missions as an achievement of the revolution, as 
social projects “aimed at building a new nation, giving voice and prominence to the 
population.”5 They continue to be regarded this way. Within Venezuela, the missions are 
social assistance programs created to confront and defeat poverty, and provide basic 
services and support to the needy. The missions were created by the Venezuelan 
government in 2003 as a mechanism to operationalize its social plans and increase 
government capacity to provide social assistance to the Venezuelan population. Using the 
official name of Misiónes Sociales (Social Missions), these organizations are part of the 
Venezuelan executive branch and therefore report directly to the president through 
presidential commissions that run each of the missions. Although the missions are 
constitutionally mandated, the missions are not under constitutional or legal control in 
order to avoid bureaucratic obstacles.6   
Even Chávez’s detractors have recognized the efficacy of the social programs and 
the resulting positive impact on the population.7 Despite the apparent success of the 
                                                 
5 Liliana Perez Rico, “Las Misiones Sociales Del Gobierno Bolivariano: Un Logro Revolucionario,” 
Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, 
http://repositorio.mpd.gob.ve/index.php?option=com_remository&Itemid=103&func=fileinfo&id=49 
(accessed September 08, 2012). 
6 Yolanda D’Elia and Luis Francisco Cabezas, Las Misiones Sociales En Venezuela (Caracas: Instituto 
Latinoamericano de Investigaciones Sociales, 2008). 
7 Marcelo Justo, “BBC Mundo | A Fondo | 2009 | Chávez 10 | Entre Los Números y La Realidad “ 
BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/specials/2009/Chávez_10/newsid_7837000/7837964.stm (accessed 
Sep 9, 2012). 
 4 
missions in achieving their main goals (confronting and defeating poverty, and providing 
social services to the population), there is a debate about the effectiveness and purpose of 
the programs. The first is whether the money directed to the missions is being spent 
effectively and efficiently,8 and the second is the political purposes of the program 
insofar as it strengthened Chávez’s political fortunes.9  
The first Bolivarian missions were established in 2003, and by 2005 the Chávez 
administration began to promote Bolivarian missions outside Venezuela through the 
establishment of the Comisión de Enlace para la Internacionalización de las Misiones 
Sociales  (Coordinating Commission for Internationalization of Social [read: Bolivarian] 
Missions or CEIMS)10 under the Venezuelan Ministry of Foreign Relations.11 The 
CEIMS website identifies 23 Bolivarian missions total,12 and these missions address 
various social development areas such as anti-poverty programs, medicine, health, 
indigenous land rights, and education.13 Although these missions can be found 
throughout Latin America, this thesis limits its focus to their operations in Colombia, 
Venezuela’s closest neighbor. The Bolivarian missions in Colombia offer a particularly 
useful test of the covert and overt purposes of these organizations in support of the 
Venezuelan government because they operated at a time of highly antagonistic relations 
between President Uribe of Colombia and President Chávez of Venezuela. In such a case, 
we would expect the covert aspects of the missions, should they exist, to diverge notably 
from the overt humanitarian purposes due to the hostility between the two states.  
                                                 
8 Francisco Rodríguez, “An Empty Revolution: The Unfulfilled Promises of Hugo Chávez,” Foreign 
Affairs 87, no. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 2008), 56. 
9 Max G. Manwaring, Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, Bolivarian Socialsm, and Asymmetric Warfare 
(Carlisle, PA.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005), 10. 
10 Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, “Bienvenidos a CEIMS,” Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, 
http://ceims.mppre.gob.ve/ (accessed August 18, 2012, 2012). 
11 Even the name of the Ministry of Foreign Relations was changed to reflect Chávez’s preferences: it 
is now called Ministerio de Poder Popular para Relaciones Exteriores, or “Ministry of Popular Power for 
Foreign Relations.” All of the Venezuelan ministries have undergone similar name changes. 
12 Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, “Misiones Bolivarianas” Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, 
http://ceims.mppre.gob.ve/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=527&Itemid=66 (accessed 
Sep 09, 2012). 
13 Note that although in Chapter III, Overview of the Bolivarian missions, we identify a current total 
of 40 separate missions, we surmise that the 23 missions listed on the CEIMS website are those that the 
Venezuelan government has identified as “international” missions as well.   
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C. OVERT PURPOSES VERSUS COVERT PURPOSES OF 
INTERNATIONAL BOLIVARIAN INSTITUTIONS 
On the one hand, Venezuelan foreign aid benefits the recipient states, particularly 
the population benefitting directly from the aid, which is typically very poor. Javier 
Corrales cites such examples as Venezuelan support after Haitian food riots in 2008, cash 
donations to Bolivia, medical aid to Nicaragua, housing investment in Peru, even heating 
oil subsidies to more than one million U.S. consumers,14 which began in 2005.15  
Bolivarian missions, as a component of Venezuelan aid, have a similar track record of 
achievements. For instance, more than 34,000 international patients have allegedly been 
treated by Misión Milagro between 2005 and 2012, and the CEIMS website publicizes 
the latest international recipients.16 These examples demonstrate overt/legitimate 
intervention of international Bolivarianism through the mechanism of the Bolivarian 
missions. 
On the other hand, the question arises of what ulterior motives Venezuela may 
have in exporting Bolivarianism abroad. Although Harold Trinkunas discounts the power 
of international Bolivarianism to subvert governments or influence elections in some 
countries, he does acknowledge the possibility that Bolivarianism can create friction for 
governments critical of Chávez, and set up an effective network of supporters abroad.17 
A specific example of such activity is found in The FARC Files,18 which ties Misión 
Identidad to covert/criminal purposes by describing how some FARC operatives, 
including members of the International Committee of the FARC (the COMINTER), 
                                                 
14 Corrales, “Using Social Power to Balance Soft Power: Venezuela’s Foreign Policy,” 99–100. 
15 “CITGO-Venezuela Heating Oil Program,” CITGO Petroleum Corporation, 
http://www.citgoheatingoil.com/ (accessed May 24, 2013). 
16 Comisión de Enlace para la Internacionalización de las Misiones Sociales, “Estadísticas” Gobierno 
Bolivariano de Venezuela, 
http://ceims.mppre.gob.ve/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=232:estadisticas&catid=28&I
temid=100010 (accessed August 18, 2012). 
17 Harold A. Trinkunas, “International Bolivarianism and its Influence” (working paper, Western 
Hemisphere Security Analysis Center, Florida International University, FL, 2011). 
18 The FARC Files is a 2011 comprehensive report by the International Institute of Strategic Studies 
based on the files and records captured by Colombian armed forces in a March 2008 raid on a FARC camp 
inside Ecuador. 
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received Venezuelan citizenship through a simplified process.19 The same concern is 
expressed by the Colombian journalist Marisol Gómez who, in her article, points out how 
Colombian criminals receive benefits from the Bolivarian missions in return for their 
assistance in building the Bolivarian Revolution in Colombia.20 Taken together, this 
raises the question of the extent to which international Bolivarian missions have exceeded 
their overt, stated purposes to conduct covert activities in support of Venezuelan foreign 
policy. 
D. GAPS IN THE DEBATE OVER THE PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL 
BOLIVARIAN INSTITUTIONS 
Although an extensive literature has been written on Chavismo, Bolivarianism, 
and Bolivarian missions, the current literature generally treats the subjects separately. 
Furthermore, there is very little treatment of our thesis topic, Bolivarian missions in 
Colombia. In fact, aside from The FARC Files, an important resource in its own right, 
there is very little academic literature that specifically addresses Bolivarian missions in 
Colombia.  
There was initially a surge of interest in Bolivarianism soon after Hugo Chávez’s 
ascent to the presidency in 1998, such as Richard Gott’s In the Shadow of the Liberator: 
The Impact of Hugo Chávez on Venezuela and Latin America, written in 2000. The 
interest has since tapered somewhat; thus an updated look at Chávez and his Bolivarian 
ideals are warranted. Some researchers study Bolivarianism exclusively as a Venezuelan 
issue, as we found in The Resurgence of the Latin American Left, edited by Levitsky and 
Roberts. Others researchers, like Petras and Veltmeyer, address the socio-political 
foundations, ideology and achievements of Bolivarianism and its configuration as a social 
movement. Much of the current literature is dedicated almost exclusively to analyzing the 
challenges posed by the movement to regional stability by examining Venezuelan foreign 
relations, diplomatic attitudes, the increase in purchases of military equipment, and its 
                                                 
19 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, ed., The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the 
Secret Archive of “Raúl Reyes” (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011), 103. 
20 Marisol Gómez, “A Través De Siete Programas Sociales Bolivarianos Se Tejería La Revolución 
Chavista En Colombia - Archivo - Archivo Digital De Noticias De Colombia y El Mundo Desde 1.990-
Eltiempo.Com “El Tiempo, November 26, 2009. 
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links with violent non-state actors in some neighboring states, Venezuelan economic 
problems under Chávez’s government, “petro-diplomacy” and the shortcomings of the 
regime, have also been extensively studied.21 Trinkunas and Corrales have examined 
Bolivarianism as a whole, and have studied the connections between history, ideology, 
internal and foreign affairs and the prospective consequences.  
An excellent series on the Bolivarian missions is published by Instituto 
Latinamericano de Investigaciones Sociales (Latin American Institute for Social 
Investigation or ILDIS). ILDIS published their first report in 2006, “Social Missions in 
Venezuela: An approach to comprehension and analysis,” followed by “The Social 
Missions in Venezuela” and “The Actual Status of the Social Missions: Balancing 
Processes of Implementation with Institutionalization” in 2008, and finally, “The Social 
Missions: An Alternative to Overcome Poverty” in 2010.  
The International Crisis Group (ICG) also publishes extensively on Venezuela. 
Among their reports, three stand out for their analysis and treatment of dynamics within 
Venezuela prior to the missions’ inception in 2003, as well as in-depth analysis of social 
and political dynamics during the Chávez era. These reports are, “Venezuela: Headed 
toward Civil War,” in 2004; “Venezuela: Hugo Chávez’s Revolution,” in 2007, and 
“Venezuela: Accelerating the Bolivarian Revolution,” in 2009. 
However, throughout the body of literature, very little has been written on the 
specific topic of the Bolivarian missions as a subject in their own right, and even less so 
on the topic of Bolivarian missions in Colombia. In addition, the literature tends to follow 
major events, and as such there is a lack of recent literature that addresses the Bolivarian 
missions, and by extension, even less so those in Colombia. Therefore, a gap in the 
literature exists with respect to Bolivarian missions in Colombia, and this gap is even 
wider in the English language.  
                                                 
21 Francisco Rodríguez, “An Empty Revolution: The Unfulfilled Promises of Hugo Chávez,” Foreign 
Affairs 87, no. 2 (March–April, 2008). 
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E. METHODOLOGY USED IN THIS THESIS 
This thesis employs a comparative case study method, augmented by fieldwork 
that consists of interviews of people with direct and indirect contact with the missions, 
conducted in Bogotá and Cúcuta, Colombia. The cases we study are four Venezuelan-
sponsored Bolivarian missions in Colombia, Misiónes Identidad, Milagro, Robinson, and 
Guiacaipuro. These four missions were selected for case-study analysis because they are 
the most active and influential Bolivarian missions in Colombia. Of the approximately 40 
total missions created by the Venezuelan government since 2003, the previously-cited 
article by the Colombian journalist Marisol Gómez22 indicates only seven Bolivarian 
missions are active in Colombia.23 Among these seven, the four missions selected are the 
most active, and thus have the most potential for secondary source analysis and analysis 
of data gained from fieldwork in Colombia. The following brief mission summaries are 
based on descriptions from the Venezuelan government’s CEIMS website.24 
• Identidad: The stated purpose of this mission is to facilitate the process of 
obtaining a Venezuelan ID card. The Colombian and Venezuelan 
constitutions both allow dual citizenship. Thus, this mission operates in 
Colombia to assist Colombians who live near the border with Venezuela 
to obtain a Venezuelan ID card.  
• Milagro: The stated purpose of this mission is to attend to visual (ocular) 
health problems through free ocular surgery services, focusing on 
glaucoma and pterygium,25 among others. This is the most internationally 
represented mission. The Venezuelan government claims that more than 
34,000 foreign nationals have already benefited from this mission, 
Colombians among them. 
• Robinson: The stated purpose of this Bolivarian mission is to teach basic 
literacy skills of reading, writing and arithmetic to illiterate adults.    
 
                                                 
22 Rodríguez, “An Empty Revolution: The Unfulfilled Promises of Hugo Chávez.” 
23 For an interesting graphic on the Bolivarian missions in Colombia, see Colombian newspaper El 
Tiempo’s infographic at Marisol Gómez and Carlos Morales, “Hilos Ocultos Del Chavismo,” Casa 
Editorial El Tiempo, http://e.eltiempo.com/media/produccion/chavismo/index.html (accessed 5/18/2013, 
2013). 
24 Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, Misiones Bolivarianas.   
25 Pterygium is a non-cancerous growth in the eye, much more common in people living near the 
equator. Exact cause is unknown, and is more common in people with lots of outdoor exposure. 
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• Guaicaipuro: The stated purpose of this mission is to restore human rights 
and communal rights to indigenous communities. The presence of many 
indigenous tribes along the Colombian-Venezuelan border attracted this 
mission to activity on both sides of the border.  
To conduct this study, we analyzed the organizational structure, the resources and 
capabilities, and the activities of the four selected Bolivarian missions; in doing so we 
illuminate the overt versus covert purposes of the missions. The four Bolivarian Mission 
cases are analyzed in parallel to compare variation on the dimensions of organization, 
capability and activity. This allows us to better understand if and how they deviate from 
their stated purposes. We may also be able to infer the covert purpose underlying the 
deviation, which could range from support from Venezuelan foreign policy, to criminal 
activity, to simple inefficiency and corruption.  This allows us to determine whether or 
not their activities match their overt stated goals, or match up more closely to hidden 
(covert) purposes. The case study analysis of secondary sources is complemented by 
fieldwork in Colombia: interviews with civilians and government personnel who have 
first-hand experience with the missions. The fieldwork constitutes a unique and up-close 
perspective on the purposes of Bolivarian missions in Colombia, and as such are a new 
contribution to the field. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
This thesis is organized into nine chapters. The first chapter is the current chapter 
(Introduction), which introduces the reader to the topic of the thesis, organization of the 
thesis, methodology used, and the scope of the thesis. The next two chapters are primarily 
descriptive in nature. Chapter II provides a background for understanding the unique and 
eclectic Bolivarian ideology that Hugo Chávez instituted in Venezuela. Chapter III 
provides an overview of the Bolivarian missions: the general situation in Venezuela prior 
to the missions’ initial establishment, the financing of the missions, the 
“internationalization” of the missions, and a brief introduction to all of the current 
Bolivarian missions. Chapters IV through VII are devoted to each case study, with 
sections in each chapter that delve into the overt purpose of the missions, origins and 
development of the mission, its organizational structure and configuration, its resources 
and capabilities, activities of the missions, and discussion on the nature of the mission’s 
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activities. Chapter VIII is analysis and comparison of the case studies in parallel, in order 
to determine common elements among them, or any outliers among them, in terms of 
variation on the dimensions of organization, capability and activity. Chapter IX is the 
conclusion, and it serves to summarize the thesis findings, and provide policy 
recommendations and potential areas for further research. 
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II. THE IDEOLOGICAL BASIS OF BOLIVARIANISM AND ITS 
RELATIONSHIP TO CHAVISMO 
Hugo Chávez created a name for himself in the international arena. He has been 
increasingly recognized for his revolutionary and exotic ideas regarding Latin American 
politics since 1992, after his failed coup attempt to overthrow the constitutional president 
Carlos Andres Perez. Although the attempt was unsuccessful and Chávez was imprisoned 
for a bit more than two years, his imprisonment did not spell the end for Chávez but 
rather the beginning. After his release, he founded his own political movement and ran in 
the presidential elections in 1998, defeating the traditional parties and taking office in 
February 1999, fulfilling hopes of the Venezuelan people tired of the traditional political 
parties in Venezuela.26  
The contemporary Chávez phenomenon, known by the all-encompassing term 
Bolivarianism, is a melting pot of concepts and words that attempt to comprehensively 
define his political ideology and form of government: “Socialism of the 21st Century,” 
Bolivarianism, Latin-American Left, Bolivarian Revolution, participatory democracy, 
and Chavismo. Chávez’s system is a good example of an eclectic ideology, given that its 
main elements are derived from multiple sources on apparently unconnected issues. This 
amalgamation includes among others Marxist theory, a profound admiration for Simon 
Bolivar, and an intrusive authoritarianism that extends into every component of 
Venezuelans’ daily lives. The ideology also seeks to cultivate a wide popular base that is 
centered on the lower classes and a deep sympathy professed toward twentieth century 
rebel leaders like Ernesto “Che” Guevara and Fidel Castro. Finally, the ideology 
incorporates actions such as the formation of paramilitary organizations to “defend the 
revolution,” an offensive foreign policy intended to construct a solidly established axis of 
allies, old-fashioned anti-imperialist rhetoric, and diversion of oil revenues into spending 
both in social assistance and armament.  
                                                 
26 Viet Juan Felix. Venezuela Hacia el Socialismo del Siglo 21st (Cholula, México: Altres Costa-
Amic, 2008), 17–20.  
 12 
It is not possible to understand the Bolivarian missions that are the focus of this 
thesis without understanding the ideology of President Hugo Chávez. This chapter 
explains some of the most important features of Bolivarianism in order to clarify how 
Chávez’s eclectic ideology informs the activities and purposes of the Bolivarian missions.  
A. EXPLAINING BOLIVARIANISM 
The Bolivarian Movement is a nebulous concept that escapes precise definition. 
The Bolivarian Movement incorporates three concepts: support for Hugo Chávez as a 
leader (Chavismo), inspiration from a contemporary reinterpretation of Simón Bolívar’s 
political thinking (Bolivarianism), and Socialism of the 21st Century. The concept of 
Chavismo continues even after Chávez’s recent death in March, 2013, in the form of 
support for Chávez’s handpicked successor, Nicolás Maduro. Each of these concepts 
encompass a broad range of socio-political concepts in their own right, thus the 
Bolivarian ideology is difficult to pin down. According to Harold Trinkunas, 
“Contemporary Bolivarianism as expressed by Hugo Chávez Frías is a difficult concept 
to define due to its eclecticism.”27  
According to Margarita Lopez Maya of the Central University of Venezuela,28 
Chavismo can be understood as the group of political parties, organizations, movements 
and individuals who have followed and supported Chávez since his first appearance in 
the public arena, the failed coup led by him in 1992. This group of supporters has formed 
the core of Chavismo through Chávez’s presidential election in 1998, until the present 
day. Chávez’s sympathizers in Venezuela and abroad are a component of Chavismo. 
Lopez Maya defines Bolivarianism as the clandestine movement emerging in Venezuela 
in the 1980s that sought to replace the traditional elites that misgoverned the country for 
decades, with the majority non-elite population (pueblo) as the center of political 
issues.29  
                                                 
27 Trinkunas, “International Bolivarianism and its Influence,” 5.  
28 Margarita Lopez Maya, “Hugo Chávez Frías: His Movement and His Presidency,” In Venezuelan 
Politics in the Chávez Era, ed. Steve Ellner and Daniel Hellinger (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2004), 74. 
29 Ibid., 88–90. 
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However, any definition of Bolivarianism falls short without acknowledging the 
historical figure of Simón Bolívar and his overarching influence on South American 
politics. Gardner argues that Simon Bolivar’s thoughts and writings are the ideological 
motivation behind the contemporary movement of Bolivarianism. Thus, they continue to 
exercise powerful ideological influence in South America, to the extent that Bolivarians 
still espouse a desire for unification and independence of Gran Colombia30 as the 
materialization of Bolivar’s dreams.31  
According to McCoy, the principles of Bolivarianism that Chávez first described 
in his initial 1998 presidential campaign were somewhat vague, including “…notions of 
nationalism, participatory democracy, redistribution of oil wealth, and regional 
integration…”32 However, a decade-plus into Chávez’s regime, his vision of 
Bolivarianism ideals became more well-defined, and encompass contemporary leftist 
ideology. In 2006 the Chávez administration first proposed its “Socialism of the 21st 
Century.” This approach to government mixes an anti-liberal economic agenda, an 
updated concept of participatory democracy, changes in property rights, provision of 
social assistance to the poor, and diversion of oil revenues to influence neighbor 
countries.33 
In summary, we define the Bolivarian Movement as the socio-political movement 
that follows Hugo Chávez’s leadership, subscribes to the Simón Bolívar-inspired ideal of 
Latin American unity, and a more inclusive political economy that empowers those who 
are traditionally suppressed, the non-elites, and is expressly anti-U.S. in foreign policy.34    
                                                 
30 One interesting effect of Chávez’ turbulent relationship with contemporary Colombia is that he 
preferred the term, La Patria Grande as opposed to Gran Colombia when he refers to Bolivar’s vision of a 
unified state in northern South America.  
31 Hall Gardner, “Three Dimensions of ‘Montezuma’s Revenge:’ Hugo Chávez’s Bolivarian Vision, 
War on Drugs, and ‘Illegal’ Immigration,” In Averting Global War, ed. Hall Gardner (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007), 186. 
32 Jennifer McCoy, “Venezuela under Chávez: Beyond Liberalism,” In Latin America’s Left Turns, ed. 
Maxwell A. Cameron and Eric Hershberg. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), 81. 
33 Ibid., 94. 
34 Based on Jennifer McCoy, “Venezuela under Chávez: Beyond Liberalism,” In Latin America’s Left 
Turns, ed. Maxwell A. Cameron and Eric Hershberg (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), 85. 
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B. THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF BOLIVARIANISM 
The concept of Bolivarianism immediately implies a vision beyond the 
Venezuelan border; rather, it implies a regional vision. This latter dimension is addressed 
by Harold Trinkunas, who connects this with two issues: Venezuelan foreign policy 
under Hugo Chávez, and the transnationalization of civil society and social movements 
that allows them to impact in multiple countries simultaneously.35 Javier Corrales also 
argues that Venezuelan foreign aid is a way to maintain a balance of power through 
social power, a process made all the easier to accomplish given the huge amount of 
Venezuelan government funds invested in social assistance programs abroad, and the lack 
of conditions that such support comes with.36 In other words, Venezuelan aid coupled 
with very few restrictions enhances Chávez’ foreign influence.    
The Venezuelan government under Chávez adopted a policy of exporting the 
Bolivarian missions, which it sees as a necessary component of Bolivarianism. In 2005, 
the Comisión de Enlace para la Internacionalización de las Misiones Sociales 
(Coordinating Commission for the Internationalization of Social [read: Bolivarian] 
Missions or CEIMS) was established. Its stated purpose is to “be loyal to the ideas of the 
Liberator and the construction of 21st Century Socialism, obligated to carry the 
Bolivarian ideals beyond our borders, for the benefit of our sister nations …”37 Corrales 
asserts that “converting social policy into a primary foreign policy tool has brought 
Venezuela huge rewards.”38  
Part of the debate on the international dimension of Bolivarianism has been 
centered on its agenda and the degree to which the overt goals of Latin American 
brotherhood and solidarity are a mask for covert activities designed to extend Venezuelan 
influence in the region. On the one hand, Venezuelan foreign aid benefits the recipient 
states, particularly the population benefitting directly from the aid, which is typically very 
                                                 
35 Trinkunas, “International Bolivarianism and its Influence,” 10. 
36 Javier Corrales, “Using Social Power to Balance Soft Power: Venezuela’s Foreign Policy,” The 
Washington Quarterly 32 no. 4 (October 2009): 99,101. 
37 Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, “Comisión de Enlace para la Internacionalización de las 
Misiones Sociales,” November 18, 2005, http://ceims.mppre.gob.ve/ (accessed August 18, 2012). 
38 Corrales, “Using Social Power to Balance Soft Power: Venezuela’s Foreign Policy,” 101. 
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poor. Javier Corrales cites such examples as Venezuelan support after Haitian food riots 
in 2008, cash donations to Bolivia, medical aid to Nicaragua, housing investment in Peru, 
even heating oil subsidies to more than one million U.S. consumers.39 Bolivarian 
missions have a similar track record of achievements: for instance, more than 34,000 
international patients have been treated by Misión Milagro between 2005 and 2012, and 
the CEIMS website publicizes the latest international recipients.40  These examples 
demonstrate overt/legitimate intervention of international Bolivarianism. 
On the other hand, the question arises of what ulterior motives Venezuela may 
have in exporting Bolivarianism abroad. Although Trinkunas discounts the power of 
international Bolivarianism to subvert governments or influence elections in some 
countries, he does acknowledge the possibility that Bolivarianism can create frictions 
abroad for governments critical of Chávez, and set up an effective network of supporters 
abroad.41 In addition, The FARC Files specifically ties Misión Identidad to 
covert/criminal purposes by describing how some FARC operatives, including members 
of the International Committee of the FARC, received Venezuelan citizenship through a 
simplified process.42 The Colombian journalist Marisol Gómez also points out how 
Colombian criminals receive benefits from the Bolivarian missions in order to build the 
Bolivarian Revolution in Colombia.43  
C. INSTITUTIONS TO PROMOTE INTERNATIONAL BOLIVARIANISM 
Bolivarianism has been promoted beyond the Venezuelan borders by Chávez 
using multiple means: International Non-Governmental Organizations (IGOs), economic 
                                                 
39 Corrales, “Using Social Power to Balance Soft Power: Venezuela’s Foreign Policy,” 99–100. 
40 Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, “Estadísticas Comisión de Enlace para la Internacionalización 
de las Misiones Sociales,” November 18, 2005, 
http://ceims.mppre.gob.ve/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=232:estadisticas&catid=28&I
temid=100010 (accessed August 18, 2012). 
41 Trinkunas, “International Bolivarianism and its Influence,” 17. 
42 The International Institute for Strategic Studies. The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the 
Secret Archive of “Raúl Reyes” (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011), 103. 
43 Marisol Gómez, “A través de siete programas sociales bolivarianos se tejería la revolución Chavista 
en Colombia,” eltiempo.com, El Tiempo, November 26, 2009, 
http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-6677907 (accessed July 5, 2012). 
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agreements, and multilateral institutions. The Bolivarian missions are part of this group 
of institutions intended to promote Bolivarianism internationally, and we delve further 
into them later on.  
At the level of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), the most relevant to 
Bolivarianism are the Congreso Bolivariano de los Pueblos, the Movimiento Continental 
Bolivariano, and the Foro de Sao Paulo. The first and the second are briefly but 
accurately addressed by Harold Trinkunas who describes the Congreso as “focused on 
Bolivarian-identified civil society”44 and the Movimiento as “more explicitly 
revolutionary in identity.”45 In Colombia, some political parties such as Polo 
Democrático Alternativo and the Colombian Communist Party allegedly belong to the 
Congreso. The FARC is apparently an active member of the Movimiento, to the extent 
that at the summit that led to the creation of the Movimiento in 2009, the now-dead 
leader of the FARC, Alfonso Cano, sent a message greeting the participants through a 
video-conference.46  
The Foro de Sao Paulo conference is the umbrella group of all the leftist political 
parties and organizations throughout Latin America. This Foro was an initiative 
promoted by Fidel Castro and Lula da Silva as a response to the fall of the Soviet Union, 
wishing to find a new path for socialism.47  Currently, the Foro has a strong Bolivarian 
influence to the extent that Hugo Chávez became one of its crucial sponsors: Venezuela 
hosted the XVIII Foro’s Summit in Caracas in 2012. Interestingly, Marcha Patriótica 
(Patriotic March),48 the new Colombian social organization born in 2012 and which 
displays clear sponsorship and ideological identification with Chávez’ revolutionary 
ideas, petitioned for membership into the Foro at this event in Caracas.  
                                                 
44 Trinkunas, “International Bolivarianism and its Influence,” 12. 
45 Ibid., 19. 
46 Carlos Aznarez, “En Venezuela fue lanzado el Movimiento Continental Bolivariano,” Prensa Rural. 
December 9 (2009), http://www.prensarural.org/spip/spip.php?article3390 (accessed October 19, 2012). 
47 Carlos Fonseca, “La Izquierda Latinoamericana ante sus nuevos desafíos,” Foro de Sao Paulo. 
September 14 (2012), http://forodesaopaulo.org/?p=1853 (accessed October 26, 2012). 
48 Foro de Sao Paulo. “Documentos del XVIII encuentro del Foro de Sao Paulo,” Foro de Sao Paulo, 
August 7 (2012), http://forodesaopaulo.org/?p=1728 (accessed October 26, 2012). 
 17 
Another important factor that plays a central role at the international level of 
Bolivarianism is economics. The most important source of revenues for Venezuela is oil 
exports, and this contributes to under-development of other sectors of the economy, 
which creates a dependence on imports for necessary materials, such as foodstuffs and 
other resources. The oil revenues provide Chávez the ability to exert his influence 
throughout the region because he uses them to pay for programs in neighboring countries. 
Under Chávez, the Venezuelan government has signed agreements and created 
institutions to facilitate commerce and advance their economic ideals. The most relevant 
of these institutions is the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América 
(Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America and the Caribbean or ALBA), an initiative 
stimulated by Venezuela to counter the effects of the Área de Libre Comercio de las 
Américas(or ALCA, Spanish for the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas FTAA). 
According to ALBA’s advocates, this organization creates “cooperative advantages 
among nations to compensate [for] existent asymmetries among the hemisphere’s 
countries.”49  
Following the Bolivarian postulate of an integrationist and cooperative foreign 
policy, the ALBA claims to fight traditional neoliberalism dogmas with socialist concepts 
like prohibition of agricultural subsidies, limitations to free commerce with powerful 
nations, strong state intervention in the market, and an emphasis on regional integration 
where likeminded ideology plays a significant role.50 Indeed, ALBA facilitated new 
agreements in the economic field. One example is the Gasoducto Del Sur (Southern 
Natural Gas Pipeline), a project that would unite Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina as part 
of this energy interconnection.51 Petrosur is a strategic alliance that was promoted by 
ALBA, in which the state oil companies of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Venezuela 
create policies and incentives to avoid market speculation. A similar agreement, known 
as Petrocaribe, was signed between Venezuela and 13 Caribbean countries in 2005, an 
                                                 
49 Viet Juan Felix. Venezuela Hacia el Socialismo del Siglo 21st (Cholula, México: Altres Costa-
Amic, 2008), 53. 
50 Ibid., 68–69. 
51 Ibid., 70. 
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agreement that allows exchange of oil for goods and also provides flexible payment plans 
to the oil-purchasers.52 An additional agreement was reached in 2005 with the goal of 
boosting energy interdependence among the members of the Andean Community 
(Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela). This latter agreement is called 
Petroandina.53  
Not even the media market is exempt from Bolivarian influence. Telesur is the 
television channel initiated in 2005 with the cooperation of Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, 
Cuba and Uruguay (Bolivia and Nicaragua became partners in Telesur later on). 
Logically, this channel is very effective not only in spreading Bolivarian ideology 
throughout the continent but also in creating associations with controversial organizations 
like Al-Jazeera, which signed a cooperation agreement with Telesur in 2006.54 
Another international organization that has been skillfully used by Chávez in the 
promotion of Bolivarian interests is the Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (Union of 
South American Nations or UNASUR). This union was first conceived in 2002 as the 
Community of South American Nations, and adopted its current name in 2007. This 
entity was constituted with the main objective of building “integration and union among 
its peoples in the cultural, social, economic and political fields…strengthening the 
sovereignty and independence of the States.”55 
Hugo Chávez was actively influential within UNASUR to promote his Bolivarian 
ideals. The most relevant case occurred in 2009 when Colombia signed an agreement 
with the U.S to facilitate the use of military bases in Colombia by U.S military personnel, 
seeking greater effectiveness in combating terrorism and narco-trafficking. Chávez used 
his influence at UNASUR and attained a joint UNASUR declaration repudiating the 
agreement and arguing that the treaty threatened the stability and peace throughout the 
                                                 
52 Felix. Venezuela Hacia el Socialismo del Siglo 21st, 73. 
53 Ibid.,75. 
54 Ibid.,78. 
55 UNASUR. “Constitutive Treaty.” unasur.org, December 06, 2011, 
http://www.unasursg.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=290&Itemid=339 (accessed 
November 2, 2012). 
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region.56 Indeed, the current General Secretary of UNASUR is Ali Rodriguez Araque, a 
Venezuelan citizen closely associated with Chávez and known as a former communist 
activist and member of the insurgency during de 1960s.57  
D. CONCLUSION 
During Chávez’s presidency, his governing philosophy was Bolivarianism, and as 
we have shown previously it is a curious hodge-podge of philosophies; it defies precise 
definition, but the precise definition is perhaps less important than what it actually aspires 
to, or the actions that it inspires in other individuals or organizations. If nothing else, 
Chávez’s unique brand was certainly ambitious, spawning such terms as Chavismo—all 
things Chávez—and “Socialism of the 21st Century”—a “brand new” form of socialism. 
Not only has Chávez’s political movement promulgated profound change within 
Venezuela, it has also shaped its foreign policy with some aggressive moves that seek to 
“export the revolution.” Among these moves, some notable ones are: Misión Milagro’s 
health projects in other Latin American countries, promotion of alternative alliances 
explicitly to counter U.S. influence in Latin America, economic agreements such as 
Petrocaribe, and the establishment of Telesur as an alternative to mainstream media 
channels in Latin America.  
It is worth noting here that the concepts of Chavismo, Bolivarianism, and 
Socialism of the 21st Century continue within Venezuela, as well as beyond its borders, 
even after Chávez’s death. His personality and charisma were a key component of his 
leadership and his capacity to inspire others, traits which many observers consider were 
essential to his ability to rule and to attract supporters. By handpicking Nicolás Maduro 
as his successor, he sought to “transfer” this allegiance that his supporters felt for him, to 
Maduro. The Maduro regime is thus an extension of the Chávez regime, with constant 
references to Chávez as the “eternal leader” of the country.    
                                                 
56 Secretaria General UNASUR. “Declaración de Bariloche.” unasur.org. August 28, 2009, 
http://www.unasursg.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=657:declaracion-bariloche-
agosto-2009&catid=96:declaraciones (accessed November 2, 2012). 
57 Secretaría General UNASUR. “Hoja de Vida Dr. Alí Rodríguez Araque.” unasur.org. n.d. 
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Among Bolivarianism’s most important principles are its Chávez -centric focus, 
its near-deification of all things Simón Bolívar, and ideals of inclusiveness that translate 
to explicit support to traditionally-ignored lower classes of Venezuela, and an ideal of 
Latin American unity that is expressed through Venezuela’s foreign policy. As well, 
Chávez’s Socialism of the 21st Century reflects these principles through a transformative 
vision of democracy as a “participatory democracy,” and an economic system guided by 
socialist principles rather than capitalist principles, and an explicit focus on the 
“traditionally excluded” classes of Venezuela. 
The concepts and ideals expressed within Bolivarianism find one expression 
through the mechanism of the Bolivarian missions. The next chapter examines in more 
detail the context in Venezuela that led to the missions: the conditions in Venezuela at the 
time, the political pressures confronting Chávez, as well as an overview of the missions 
themselves. 
 21 
III. OVERVIEW OF THE BOLIVARIAN MISSIONS 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an introduction to the Bolivarian 
missions. This chapter argues that the origins of the missions were originally developed 
by Chávez as an important part of his campaign to win the 2004 presidential referendum 
vote that would determine whether or not he would stay in office. The first section of the 
chapter provides context for the missions by describing social and economic conditions 
within Venezuela prior to the August 2004 referendum. The next section orients the 
reader to the origins of the Bolivarian missions, with an emphasis on Chávez’s own 
recollections of the dynamics within the country at the time. The next section describes 
how the missions are financed by the Venezuelan government. The final section provides 
a brief summary of each of the missions, organized by date of inception, as well as some 
commentary on selected missions, followed by a chapter conclusion.  
A. CONTEXT FOR THE MISSIONS: A DIVIDED AND CONTESTED 
COUNTRY 
The Venezuela of 2003, the year the missions were first conceived and 
established, was a country divided and contested. The events within the country stand 
testament to the friction and “pushback” Chávez’s administration experienced as a result 
of the changes imposed by his administration since he first won election in 1998. Thus, 
the purpose of this section is to describe the context within which the missions were 
initiated in Venezuela in 2003, describing the social context in Venezuela prior to the 
missions.  
By 1998, the year of Chávez’s first election victory, Venezuela was reeling from 
an “economic and social implosion that the country experienced as a consequence of the 
long term decline in oil fiscal revenues in the 1980s and 1990s.”58 Penfold cites figures 
that underscore the extent and magnitude of the economic decline. “GDP per capita in 
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1998 reverted to the same levels as in the 1950s,” and from 1989 to 1998, “the share of 
households in poverty conditions [increased] from 20.07 percent…to 28.8 percent.”59  
Another set of statistics also sheds light on the challenges that Venezuela faced in 
1998–2003, the first years of Chávez’s administration: 
Venezuela entered 1998 with critical problems in the economic situation 
of domestic households and with large structural deficits in the health care, 
well-being and social security of the population. [For 1998] poverty 
affected 40% of the population, inflation was at 20% annually, and 
unemployment was estimated at 15%. These figures increased 
dramatically in 2003. Furthermore, 70% of the population didn’t have 
regular health check-ups, nor were covered by health insurance; the 
majority of adolescents and youth of both sexes dropped out of the 
education system, the informal sector [of the economy] employed more 
than 50% of workers, lack of adequate housing affected close to 60% of 
households and approximately 80% of the population could not count on 
any sort of retirement security [or retirement plans, either public or 
private].60 
Little wonder, then, that the electorate of Venezuela voted Chávez into power in 
1998, given that the two-party system in place since 1958, the Punto Fijo pact,61 had 
failed to deliver good governance. Thus, Chávez came to power in 1998 amid a profound 
sense of desperation and loss of trust for the existing system among the Venezuelan 
population.  
According to Elia: 
Venezuelans of all social classes showed their frustration for government 
dysfunction and the poor quality of public service, inflation, 
unemployment, civil disorder, violence and civil insecurity, lack of 
governance, galloping corruption, as well as general criticism that the 
governments didn’t hold themselves accountable for satisfying citizens’ 
demands.62  
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Chávez had as his central campaign promise a sweeping vision for reform: 
“constitutional reform through the seating of a new National Constituent Assembly.”63 
1. The Attempted Coup d’État of 2002 
As of 2002, the Chávez administration had been in place for five years (inclusive 
of 1998–2002). During that period, Chávez progressively implemented his election 
promises, as well as tightened his control of the various organs of government, essentially 
increasing the strength of the executive branch of government (especially the office of the 
president) at the expense of the legislative and judicial branches of government. 
It is important to note that some of these changes were in fact campaign promises 
by Chávez, and were therefore voted for by the Venezuelan voters themselves. For 
example, Chávez promised during his 1998 campaign to create a new constitution, which 
he in fact did in 1999 soon after taking office.64 
A significant change Chávez wrought via the constitution is the change from a 
bicameral Congress to a unicameral Congress (the National Assembly), a significant 
structural change for the legislature. The essential point here is not the structural change 
itself, but rather that the change reflected Chávez’s philosophical shift away from 
“representative democracy”—democracy via a party system and elected 
representatives—to a “participatory democracy” that enshrines “popular sovereignty as a 
fundamental right.”65 In addition, one could argue that a unicameral Congress is easier 
for an autocratic president such as Chávez to control and influence, and a unicameral 
body enabled Chávez to symbolically have more of a “direct link” with the people, 
especially the lower classes. 
The concentration of power in the presidential office that Chávez achieved was 
substantial. In sum, from taking office in 1998 until 2002, he effectively pushed through 
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a new Constitution as mentioned above, and appointed a Supreme Court and Electoral 
Council loyal to him. The powers granted his office under the new constitution reflect 
this concentration: the term of office increased from five to six years, re-election of the 
president became possible, special leyes habilitantes (enabling laws)66 granted the 
president wide-ranging powers previously in the legislature, and approval of promotion 
of military officers in the rank of colonel and above transferred from the legislature to the 
president.67 The leyes habilitantes are especially noteworthy because they granted 
Chávez sweeping powers to decree laws with very little legislative or judicial review, and 
thus are significant in the manner they increased Chávez’s power.  
Perhaps predictably, the opposition became increasingly agitated and nervous 
over what they perceived to be a loss of rights as well as the increasing autocratic bent of 
the Chávez administration. Over the time period of approximately 2000–2002, a series of 
opposition activities, such as demonstrations, strikes, press releases, etc., reflected their 
growing concern and strong disagreement with Chávez’s government reforms.  
The changes sought by Chávez during this time period served to unite the 
disparate opposition groups into a unified organization, and this galvanizing effect had 
important consequences. Among the various changes, “the catalyst [that drove the 
opposition to unite] was a November 2001 law passed by the National Assembly, where 
the government coalition held 101 of 165 seats, which allowed the president to issue 49 
social and economic decrees.”68 These 49 laws were passed under the leyes habilitantes 
power granted to Chávez, and the wide scope of their subject matter suggests the 
extensive scale of change Chávez was after. Among the 49 laws, there were laws on land 
and rural development, hydrocarbons (oil), fishing, “special zones of sustainable 
                                                 
66 Leyes Habilitantes are essentially “judicial tools of constitutional-level authority that enable the 
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68 Ibid. 
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development,” and social security.69 “The business sector believed that the new laws 
threatened property rights in the agricultural and hydrocarbon sectors.”70 The growing 
unrest finally culminated in the attempted coup on 11-13 April 2002, which would prove 
short-lived.  
Notwithstanding the failure of the coup d’etat, the coup itself serves important 
functions. Among them, the coup is evidence of the deeply divided nature of Venezuelan 
society during Chávez’s first administration. The events leading up to the coup 
demonstrate the deep reservations within much of Venezuelan society to many of the 
changes sought by Chávez, best exemplified by the strong resistance to the 
implementation of the “49 laws” of November 2001 passed under the leyes habilitantes 
provision. But, perhaps the most important functions of the coup are as follows: 1) 
Chávez was “clearly shaken by the coup [and therefore adopted] a more conciliatory 
tone”71 for some months after the coup, at least until the national and oil strike of 
December 2002; and 2), the coup is an indicator of the capacity of the opposition to come 
together and act in a unified manner. By this point, the opposition to Chávez consisted of 
a wide cross-section of Venezuelan society, such as some trade unions, media companies, 
business executives, the Frente Institucional Militar (Institutional Military Front), 
opposition parties, and the Chamber of Commerce Federation, Fedecameras. The 
opposition coalesced and organized under the umbrella group Coordinadora Democrática 
de Acción Cívica (Democratic Coordinating Body for Civic Action or CD). In summary, 
the military officers who actually led the coup felt strong enough, with enough support 
from throughout Venezuelan society, with a high-enough likelihood of success, to go 
ahead and act on their convictions to unseat Chávez. The failure of the coup forced the 
now-unified opposition to continue their efforts, which led eventually to the national and 
oil strike of December 2002, as detailed in the next section. 
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2. The National and Oil Strike of December 2002 
Having been unsuccessful at unseating Chávez via the attempted coup, the CD 
attempted to force Chávez to turn power over via a national strike. The basic logic behind 
the strike was that Chávez would be forced from power if PDVSA (Petróleos de 
Venezuela S.A., or Petroleum of Venezuela, the Venezuelan state-owned oil and natural 
gas company) stopped producing oil, and therefore, revenues. The impetus of the strike 
began on in early December of 2002 within PDVSA. This is significant, as the national 
oil company of Venezuela PDVSA produces the overwhelming majority of GDP. The 
strike quickly gained momentum, and other sectors of the economy quickly followed suit 
with strikes of their own. Thus, what was just an oil strike became a national strike.  
Although the strike was in fact devastating to the national economy, and although it did 
last until February 3, Chávez emerged emboldened by the strike, essentially because he 
had outlasted it. Furthermore, the strike allowed Chávez to finally consolidate control 
over PDVSA, because it gave him the opportunity to lay off thousands of anti-Chávez 
striking workers, and to install pro-Chávez management throughout the organization.72 
B. ORIGINS OF THE BOLIVARIAN MISSIONS 
The following quote summarizes, in President Hugo Chávez’s own words, his 
recollections of how the Bolivarian missions came to be. President Chávez delivered 
these comments in November, 2004 at Fuerte Tiuna, the military headquarters of 
Venezuela, at a seminar on “The New Strategic Map of Venezuela.”73 The quote is 
instructive and insightful because it encapsulates many of the dynamics Venezuela was 
going through in 2003, the time of the missions’ inception. Furthermore, it highlights 
many of the concerns that preoccupied Chávez at the time, as well as his initial responses 
to them, one of which was the establishment of the missions. 
You should all recall that, as a product of the coup d’état and all of that 
friction, the ungovernability that reached alarming levels, the economic 
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crisis, our own errors, there was a moment in which we were on par with 
[the opposition], or even a little below. There was an international polling 
agency recommended by a friend who came to Venezuela mid-2003, spent 
about two months here and came to the Palace and gave me the 
bombshell: ‘Mr. President, if the referendum [the 2004 referendum] was 
held today, you would lose.’ I remember that that night for me was the 
bombshell, because you all know that many people don’t tell you such 
things, so much as they try to ‘polish it up.’...Well, it was then when we 
began to work with the missions, we designed the first one here and first 
asked for support from Fidel [Castro]. I told him: ‘Look, I have this idea, 
attack from the bottom with all of our strength,’ and he told me: ‘If I know 
anything it is about this [attacking from the bottom], so you can count on 
all my support.’ And the doctors began to arrive by the hundreds, an aerial 
bridge, airplanes go, airplanes come, as well as the search for resources, at 
this point the economy improved....And that avalanche of people that 
arrived on top of us,...we began to combine our efforts together,...all of the 
PDVSA team, the Francisco de Miranda Front, we formed the political 
command, we adjusted a little bit more, and that is how we began to climb 
in the polls, and the polls never fail, ... it’s politics, it’s not magic, and 
look how far we have come.74     
Thus, as the referendum (scheduled for August 2004) approached, the original set 
of missions was established: Misión Barrio Adentro (Mission Inside the Neighborhood) 
in April 2003; Misiónes Robinson I and Sucre in July 2003; Misiónes Robinson II and 
Miranda in October 2003; Ribas in November 2003; Milagro and Mercal in January 
2004; Identidad in February 2004; and Vuelvan Caras in March 2004. These ten missions 
were established prior to the presidential referendum vote in August of 2004, and 
therefore can be considered as the “original” or “founding” missions. (Note: see table in 
Section E of this chapter for summary of all of the missions organized by date of 
establishment.)  
International Crisis Group explained that government spending to benefit the 
population via the missions ramped up as the referendum approached: “As the recall 
referendum approached, spending increased.”75 The following quote provides a glimpse 
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into the explosive growth of the missions’ activities prior to the August 2004 referendum, 
with apparent results in approval ratings commensurate with the increased spending. 
Between July and December 2003, the doctors attached to the Barrio 
Adentro mission increased from 303 to 9,179. In June–July 2004, [the 
number of] Mercal markets increased from 3,869 to 8,299. The number of 
beneficiaries also increased from 1,025,814 at the end of 2003, to 
3,834,600 in mid-2004. A survey showed that people who agreed Chávez 
helped the poor increased from 53 per cent to 62 per cent between March 
and June 2004; those who disagreed dropped from 44 to 36 percent.76 
Worth emphasizing in the preceding quote is the dramatic, seemingly exponential, 
growth of the size of the missions. For example, the increase in Barrio Adentro doctors 
from 303 to 9,179 is approximately a 3000 percent increase in a six-month period. The 
missions were seemingly building on the momentum created by such growth: “The social 
missions were gathering speed and had proved their political worth.”77 In other words, 
the establishment of the missions, and their activities prior to the referendum, played a 
significant role in Chávez’s campaign to win the presidential referendum of August 2004. 
This is reflected in his recollections of the run-up to the referendum vote, as well as in the 
actual numbers behind the missions. 
C. FINANCING OF THE MISSIONS 
The Bolivarian missions are financed by the Venezuelan government, this much is 
clear. However, the mechanisms that are used to finance the programs are opaque and do 
not offer clear and transparent views into the money spent on the various missions. 
Therefore, it is difficult and a challenge to report accurate and correct budgetary numbers 
that make up the financing of the missions. Nevertheless, some figures exist that allude to 
the magnitude of spending on the missions as a national-level project.  
Penfold explains the opaque nature of the funding for the Misiónes this way:  
One reason for this lack of information is that the programs were 
expanded by accessing non-budgetary means from the oil windfall 
managed by PDVSA. These resources were not under the direct oversight 
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either of the National Assembly or the Central Bank. The financing of the 
“misiones” were conducted as off-balance spending and in order to 
increase the amount of financial resources available for the programs the 
government violated established budgetary and even monetary rules.78 
The actual mechanisms to manage the “windfall” create a veritable “alphabet 
soup” of fund names and agency names. The initial budget mechanism to support the 
missions was created in 2004 as a component of the ordinary budget with the name 
Programa Social Especial, or Special Social Program. However, subsequent funding 
came from various sources that were not necessarily reflected in the national budget. 
Additional funds came from the Impuesto al Debito Bancario (Bank Debit Tax or Bank 
Transaction Tax), Banco Nacional de Desarrollo Economico y Social (National 
Economic and Social Development Bank or BANDES), and directly from the state-
owned oil company, PDVSA. The funds directly from PDVSA were managed through 
three official funds: Fondo para el Desarrollo Economico y Social del Pais (National 
Economic and Social Development Fund or FONDESPA), Fondo de Desarrollo 
Endogeno (Endogenous Development Fund or FONENDOGENO), and the Fondo de 
Desarrollo Nacional (National Development Fund or FONDEN).79  
A Reuters report from 2012 describes FONDEN as:  
The largest of a handful of secretive funds that put decisions on how to 
spend billions of dollars in the hands of Chávez…Since it’s founding 
seven years ago FONDEN has been funneling cash into hundreds of 
projects personally approved by Chávez but not reviewed by Congress—
from swimming-pool renovations for soldiers, to purchases of Russian 
fighter jets, to public housing and other projects with broad popular 
appeal.80   
The report goes on to state that “The fund now accounts for nearly a third of all 
investment in Venezuela and half of public investment, and last year received 25 percent 
of government revenue from the oil industry. All told, it has taken in close to $100 billion 
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of Venezuela’s oil revenue in the past seven years.”81 Another way to put this dollar 
amount in perspective is that for the time period of 2005-2012, FONDEN received a bit 
over $14 billion per year from PDVSA to fund the missions. 
The values from the Reuters report appear in line with recent official reports from 
Venezuelan government sources. In a 2012 report, Elias Aljuri, President of Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística (Venezuelan Institute of Statistics or INE), stated that during the 
Bolivarian Revolution the government has spent around $500 billion dollars in social 
investment, which represents 61% of the total revenues received by the country, which is 
$770 billion dollars.82  In another recent example, PDVSA’s president claimed in the 
FY2011 annual report that PDVSA’s spending was distributed in three programs: Gran 
Misión Vivienda Venezuela (Great Mission Venezuela Housing), $4 billion dollars; social 
missions, $11.6 billion dollars; and contributions to the FONDEN (National 
Development Fund) with $14.475 billion dollars.83   
The story of how FONDEN was established reflects that it was intended to ensure 
Chávez’s direct control of funding for the missions from its inception. Chávez founded it 
as a corporation owned by the finance ministry, rather than as a state agency. This status 
“…lets it disburse billions of dollars in state money while subject to few of the reporting 
and disclosure requirements that apply to government entities.”84  How the money is 
spent does not require approval from Congress, but rather, “…FONDEN outlays begin 
with Chávez’s approval and are viewed by a board of directors made up of his closest 
allies.”85  
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International Crisis Group characterized the state spending by Chávez as a 
promotion of state spending to “…unprecedented levels with the implementation of the 
“missions,” and that such spending is part of an “…uncontrolled parallel budget used to 
keep pro-Chávez groups content and increase military spending.”86  The parallel budget 
refers to the off-balance spending described in previous paragraphs, and primarily 
consists of the components of the budget outside Congressional control, and essentially 
are directly under the control of Chávez. 
The nature of the Venezuelan state spending on the missions combines with the 
“Dutch Disease”87 that most resource-wealthy states suffer from, to create a unique 
condition that Corrales and Romero dub, “Bolivarian Disease.”88 One of the unique 
aspects of “Bolivarian Disease” is the mismanagement of the state-owned oil sector, 
wherein revenues necessary for capital upkeep and reinvestment into oil production 
capacity are diverted to social spending, especially the Bolivarian missions. This revenue 
deviation severely impacted the necessary reinvestment in maintenance and exploration.   
Penfold perhaps summed it up best when he wrote,  
These “misiones” were financed through opaque and non-budgetary 
mechanisms, namely by transferring oil revenues directly from the state-
owned oil enterprise (PDVSA) to a special fund managed by the 
presidency. According to several accounts, the fund in 2003 and 2004 
managed each year more than 2 billion dollars (close to 2.5% of GDP.) 
Measured by size, the “missions” were probably one of the largest social 
fund experiment[s] administered in Latin America in the last decades.89   
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D. TAKING THE MISSIONS INTERNATIONAL 
The Chávez administration began to operate some of the Missions abroad 
beginning in 2005. The office responsible for internationalization of the Missions, La 
Comisión de Enlace para la Internacionalización de las Misiones Sociales (Liaison 
Committee for the Internationalization of the Bolivarian missions or CEIMS) is a 
component of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and it was established 07 September, 2005. 
The missions that are most active internationally are: Misión Milagro (ocular health 
care), Robinson (literacy), and Identidad (provision of government IDs). 
1. Mission, Vision, and Objectives of the CEIMS 
According to the official CEIMS websites, its mission, vision, and objectives are 
as follows.90 
Mission: Offer to the national-level organizations in charge of the Social 
Missions the necessary knowledge, capacities and technical support found 
within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and through the missions in 
operation outside of Venezuela; to successfully bring about the process of 
internationalization of the missions. 
Vision: As one of the pro-active offices of the Chancellery, consolidate the 
process of strengthening Latin American and Caribbean integration under 
the fundamental principles of solidarity, humanism, and cooperation with 
all the peoples of the world. 
Objectives:  
• Serve as a line of communication between the Venezuelan embassies in 
the exterior, and the various entities in charge of the Social Missions. 
• Contribute to the internationalization of the Social Missions. 
• Promote the New Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean, based 
on the principles of cooperation, solidarity, complementarity, and respect 
for the sovereignty of every state. 
• Strengthen the Integration of the Peoples of the ‘Great Fatherland.’ 
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The mission statement, vision, and objectives are at first glance fairly perfunctory 
and straightforward. The mission statement is functionally-oriented and serves the 
purpose of a “single point of contact” for Venezuelan embassies abroad to coordinate 
mission activities, rather than coordinate directly with what would otherwise be many 
individual missions.  
However, within the objectives of the office, the phrases “New Integration of 
Latin America and the Caribbean,” and “the principles of cooperation, solidarity, 
complementarity, and respect for the sovereignty of every state” trace their roots back to 
founding principles of the Bolivarian state. Within the preamble of the Constitution of the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the terms “cooperation,” “solidarity,” 
“complementarity,” and “respect for the sovereignty of every state,” and the idea of Latin 
American integration are all referred to, either word-for-word or the idea is expressed.91 
Thus, we see that the office identifies two of its objectives as functional, and two of its 
objectives as aspirational—contributing to the export of Bolivarian ideals across Latin 
America and the Caribbean.   
Further examination of the CEIMS website displays a map that highlights the 
countries where the missions are active, as well as contacts for the missions in the 
respective Venezuelan embassies located within those countries.92 The countries listed 
are: Argentina, Belize, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Paraguay. The main point here is that the CEIMS website 
does not list Colombia, whereas we purport to show in this thesis that the missions are 
indeed active in Colombia.  
Given that the Chávez administration did go ahead and establish an office to 
“internationalize” the missions, it follows that the missions fit into the foreign policy of 
the Bolivarian government of Venezuela. Of course, as with the concept of Bolivarianism 
itself, a Bolivarian foreign policy is rather nebulous: “To the extent that it can be defined, 
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President Chávez’s Bolivarian foreign policy seeks to defend the revolution in 
Venezuela, promotes a sovereign and autonomous leadership role for Venezuela in Latin 
America, opposes globalization and neoliberal economic policies, and works towards the 
emergence of a multipolar world in which U.S. hegemony is checked.”93 The timing of 
the CEIMS office establishment itself provides some insight into this proposition. As a 
result of the “… domestic tranquility in the wake of his victory in the 2004 referendum 
on his leadership …,”94 Chávez gained room to maneuver, so to speak, to go ahead and 
communicate his Bolivarian ideology abroad. Thus, the timing of the CEIMS office 
opening infers that Chávez was comfortable enough domestically, to “export” his 
ideology. “What is new about President Chávez’s Bolivarian foreign policy is that it has 
moved beyond Venezuela’s traditional efforts to maintain strategic independence and 
maximize oil revenue to one of explicitly seeking out allies in a bid to check U.S. power 
and influence in Latin America.”95 This latter aim of “seeking out allies” is a solid fit for 
the missions.  
E. OVERVIEW OF THE BOLIVARIAN MISSIONS 
Rodriguez frames the missions as the Chávez administration’s new approach to 
social programs in Venezuela: “… the government has carried out a complete overhaul of 
social policy, replacing existing programs with a set of high-profile initiatives—known as 
the Misiónes, or missions—aimed at specific problems, such as illiteracy or poor health 
provision, in poor neighborhoods.”96  
In order to provide context for the four missions that constitute our four case 
studies (Misiones Milagro, Identidad, Robinson, and Guaicaipuro), this section 
introduces the reader to all of the missions in chronological order, from the first mission, 
Barrio Adentro, to the most current missions, up to and including a mission that is only in 
                                                 
93 Harold A. Trinkunas, “What is Really New about Venezuela’s Bolivarian Foreign Policy?” 




96 Francisco Rodríguez, “An Empty Revolution: The Unfulfilled Promises of Hugo Chávez,” Foreign 
Affairs 87, no. 2 (March–April, 2008), 52. 
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the proposal stage. This mission is Gran Misión Eficiencia o Nada, or Great Mission 
Efficiency or Nothing, which is intended to combat inefficiency, bureaucracy, and 
corruption throughout the Venezuelan state.97 Due to the number of missions (40), they 
are presented in table format in Table 1.98 In the “Mission” column, the name of the 
mission is listed in Spanish in italics, followed by the English translation as necessary. 
(Missions named after proper nouns, such as a name, are not translated because such 
translations are unnecessary.)  
                                                 
97 “Nicolás Maduro Ofrece Una Misión Para Atacar La Corrupción - Nacional y Política - El 
Universal,” http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-politica/130409/Nicolás-maduro-ofrece-una-mision-
para-atacar-la-corrupcion (accessed April 25,2013). 
98 In addition, a brief summary description of each of the missions is listed in Appendix 1. 
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Table 1.   List of Missions by Date of Establishment99  
Mission Date est. Area of Action Associated Ministry 




Neighborhood Access to 
Public Health Health 
Robinson I Jul-03 Basic Literacy Education 
Sucre Jul-03 
Undergraduate & 
Graduate Education Higher Education 
Robinson II Oct-03 
Primary Education  
(to 6th Grade) 
Education 
Frente Francisco de Miranda 
/ Miranda Front 
Oct-
03 Reserve Militia Office of the President 
Ribas Nov-03 
Remedial High School 
Education Petroleum & Mining 
Milagro / Miracle Jan-04 
Vision / Ocular Health 
Care Health 
Mercal / Market Jan-04 
Subsidized Food & Basic 
Goods Food 
Identidad / Identity Feb-04 
Provision Of National ID 
Cards (Cédulas) Interior & Justice 
                                                 
99 Based on “Cronologia de las Misiones” table in D’Elia and Cabezas, Las Misiones Sociales En 
Venezuela, 8, and updated with information from “Gobierno De Venezuela: Misiones,” Centro Nacional de 
Tecnologías de Información, http://www.gobiernoenlinea.ve/home/misiones.dot (accessed April 15, 2013). 
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Mission Date est. Area of Action Associated Ministry 







Communes & Social Protection 





Rights Indigenous Affairs 
Piar Oct-04 
Support To Small-Scale, 
Independent Miners Petroleum & Mines 
Zamora Jan-05 
Land Reform & Land 
Redistribution Agriculture & Land 
Barrio Adentro II / Inside the 
Neighborhood II 
Jan-
05 Secondary Health Care Health 
Cultura / Cultural Education Jul-05 Cultural Education Culture 
Barrio Adentro III / Inside 
the Neighborhood III 
Aug-
05 Advanced Health Care Health 
Robinson III Oct-05 
Bolivarian Reading 
Circles Education 
Ribas Técnica y Social / Ribas 
Technical & Social 
Oct-
05 
Remedial High School 
Education, Technical & 
Social Emphasis 
Petroleum & Mines 
Negra Hipólita Jan- Homeless Assistance Communes & Social Protection 
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Mission Date est. Area of Action Associated Ministry 
06 
Ciencia / Science Feb-06 Science Education Science & Technology 
Madres del Barrio / Mothers 
of the Barrio 
Mar-
06 
Support To Female Head-
Of-Household (Hoh) 
Families 
Women & Gender Equality 
Árbol / Tree Jun-06 
Sustainable Management 
Of Forests Environment 
Barrio Adentro IV / Inside 
the Neighborhood IV 
Oct-
06 Specialty Health Care Health 






Sonrisa / Smile Nov-06 Prosthetic Dental Work Health 
Villanueva Mar-07 Urban Planning Housing 
Alma Mater May-07 
Creation Of New 
Universities Higher Education 
Che Guevara Sep -  07 
New Name For ‘Vuelvan 
Caras’ Communes & Social Protection 
Música / Music Nov-07 
Music Education For At-
Risk Youth Office of the President 
José Gregorio Hernández Mar-08 
Health Program For The 
Disabled Communes & Social Protection 
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Mission Date est. Area of Action Associated Ministry 
13 de Abril / 13th of April Apr-08 
Barrio Improvement & 
New Social Commune 
Construction 
Communes & Social Protection 






Output Via Support To 
Small-Scale Farmers 
Food 
Niño Jesús / Baby Jesus Dec-10 
Maternity And Prenatal 
Health Care Health 
Gran Misión Vivienda 




End Housing Shortage In 
Venezuela Housing 
Gran Misión en Amor Mayor 
Venezuela  / Great Mission 
Love for the Elderly 
Venezuela 
Dec-
11 Social Security Mission Labor & Social Security 
Gran Misión Hijos de 
Venezuela  / Great Mission 
Children of Venezuela 
Dec-
11 
Welfare For Families In 
Poverty with Children Communes & Social Protection 
Gran Misión Saber y Trabajo 
/ Great Mission Knowledge 
& Work 
Jan-
12 Employment Education 
Gran Misión Eficiencia o Nada 
/ Great Mission Efficiency or 
Nothing 
TBD Fight Corruption TBD (Note: Mission Proposed by Maduro in April ‘13) 
The missions are associated with 17 of the 25 current ministries of the 
Venezuelan government (as of April 2013). In addition, there are a few notable 
concentrations of missions in ministries that are associated with social services. For 
example, seven missions are associated with the Ministry of Health, four with Education, 
six with the Ministry of Communes and Social Protection, and three with Housing. Some 
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of the links between mission and associated ministry are at first glance, tenuous. For 
example, the link between Misión Ribas and Misión Ribas Técnica y Social (Mission 
Ribas Technical and Social) which purposes are remedial high school education and 
remedial high school education with a technical and social emphasis, respectively, are 
associated with the Ministry of Petroleum and Mines. Yet, their topic areas seem to “line 
up” more closely with the Ministry of Education, as they in fact have “remedial high 
school education” in their name.   
A general pattern observed with the missions is a trend toward extreme subject 
area specialization as time progressed. For example, the ten founding missions—those 
established prior to the presidential referendum of 2004—addressed social problems with 
wide applicability, such as health care, literacy, defense, development, and education. 
Whereas, some later missions seem to address social problems of a very narrow scope—
the term “niche market” comes to mind. Examples of this type of mission are: Misión 
Piar (support to small-scale, independent miners), and Misión Revolución Energética 
(promotion of energy efficiency).  
Another mission of note is Misión Musica, which achieved worldwide fame under 
its original name of El Sistema (the System). In fact, this mission has a long history that 
predates the Bolivarian missions, going back to 1975, when it was first founded by José 
Antonio Abreu. The System in effect became Misión Musica in 2007 when it was 
essentially co-opted as a mission by President Chávez. The most famous alumnus of the 
program is clearly Gustavo Dudamel, who is currently the conductor and Music Director 
of the Simón Bolívar Symphony Orchestra of Venezuela and the Los Angeles 
Philharmonic. The System itself has achieved worldwide recognition, and has inspired 






notable U.S. examples are the Youth Orchestra of Los Angeles (YOLA),100 and the 
Youth Orchestra Salinas of Salinas, California,101 both of which use the El Sistema 
method. 
In addition, the actual efficacy of the missions is under debate. This debate is 
understandable as a result of the opaque reports of, and grandiose claims by, the 
Venezuelan government regarding the missions. This behavior is similar to the opaque 
nature of finance and budget reporting by the government, as discussed in Section C, 
Financing of the Missions. For example, on 28 October 2005, Chávez famously declared 
Venezuela as free of illiteracy, due to the efforts of Misión Robinson. This declaration 
gained currency especially after recognition from UNESCO. However, Francisco 
Rodriguez and Daniel Ortega “… found that there were more than one million illiterate 
Venezuelans by the end of 2005, barely down from the 1.1 million illiterate persons 
recorded in the first half of 2003, before the start of the Robinson program.”102 Another 
glaring inconsistency from the same source is that the government claimed employment 
of 210,410 trainers in the mission, “… yet there is no evidence in the public employment 
data that these people were ever hired or evidence in the government budget statistics that 
they were ever paid.”103 
F. CONCLUSION 
Chávez was elected into power in 1999 due to deep divisions within Venezuela, 
deep dissatisfaction among a large portion of the population, and a sense among the 
majority of the population that the government was not functioning in providing good 
governance, nor basic social services. After a period of tumult within Venezuela, to 
include direct challenges to his rule in 2002 and 2003 via an attempted coup and a 
nationwide strike, Chávez was feeling intense pressure on his administration. As his 
                                                 
100 “Youth Orchestra LA (YOLA) | LA Phil,” Los Angeles Philharmonic Association, 
http://www.laphil.com/education/yola (accessed May 9, 2013). 
101 “Welcome to Youth Orchestra Salinas | Youth Orchestra Salinas,” 
http://www.youthorchestrasalinas.org/ (accessed May 9, 2013). 
102 Rodríguez, “An Empty Revolution: The Unfulfilled Promises of Hugo Chávez,” 55. 
103 Ibid., 55–56. 
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extensive quote from Section B shows, Chávez felt a need to take action to ensure his 
victory in the upcoming 2004 referendum on his presidency, and the Bolivarian missions 
proved to be a significant and effective component of his victorious strategy.   
Thus, from the beginning of the missions, we see evidence of political motivation 
behind them, not just the altruistic aims of their respective overt mission statements. The 
budgets of the missions are difficult to pin down owing to the same nebulous budgetary 
mechanisms Chávez used throughout the government, especially after gaining solid 
control over PDVSA, the state-owned oil company. They have been “internationalized” 
by the Bolivarian government via the CEIMS, the agency within the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs charged with taking the missions “beyond the borders.” They have also expanded 
in number from the original ten to approximately forty today. The missions continue to 
play an active and significant role in Venezuelan government and society. In the 
following chapters, we delve into more detail on four missions that constitute our case 
studies: Misiónes Identidad, Milagro, Robinson, and Guaicaipuro. 
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IV. MISION IDENTIDAD AND THE POLITICS OF INCLUSION 
Social exclusion is one of the social problems that the Bolivarian government 
claims to fight against, almost to obsession. According to the revolutionary rhetoric that 
is a trademark of the Venezuelan government, wide segments of the population, 
especially the poor, have traditionally been prevented from exercising some of the most 
very basic rights of citizenship and meeting their basic human needs. Among these rights 
is the right to proper identification as a citizen. Thus, Misión Identidad (Mission Identity) 
became a vehicle for the Venezuelan government to solve the long-lasting inequality in 
the provision of legal identification (i.e., government ID cards) to traditionally under-
served classes and groups of Venezuelans and resident foreigners in the country.  
We assert in this chapter that the mission’s activities in Colombia go beyond its 
overt mission statement and contribute to the strengthening and expansion of the 
Bolivarian revolution in Venezuela and abroad, with a particular emphasis on the 
consequences that the mission’s activities bring to Colombia. This chapter explains and 
describes Misión Identidad’s mission, its origins and development, its organizational 
structure and configuration, its resources and capabilities, and its activities, and concludes 
with an examination into the mission’s activities in Colombia.  
A. OVERT PURPOSE OF THE MISSION 
Misión Identidad is a project created by the Venezuelan government in order to 
accomplish the Bolivarian Constitutional mandate (Article 56)104 which states that every 
person has the right to his own name, to be included in the government’s registration, and 
to possess the necessary public documents to corroborate their own identity.105 Following 
the Bolivarian logic of the Venezuelan government, the mission satisfies the right to 
                                                 
104 Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Public Law 2013 (2006): Article 56. 
University of Minnesota Human Rights Library.  
105 Servicio Administrativo de Identificación, Migración y Extranjería, “Misión Identidad,” Gobierno 
Bolivariano de Venezuela, http://www.saime.gob.ve/Mis_ident/mision_ident.php (accessed February 4, 
2013). 
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existence that is guaranteed in the United Nations’ Declaration of Human Rights.106 
Proof of identity is recognized through an identification card or document that is known 
in several Latin American countries—including Venezuela—as the cédula. The primary 
purpose of Misión Identidad is to facilitate the issuance of cédulas to all Venezuelan 
citizens living in the country, as well as foreigners residing in Venezuela who wish to 
gain Venezuelan legal identification. Accordingly, the mission statement for Misión 
Identidad is as follows:107 
1. To complete the Constitutional mandate to grant the status of legal 
citizenship with all rights thereof, to thousands of forgotten, [historically] 
excluded Venezuelans, and without the legal protections that legal 
identification documents confer. 
2. Guarantee social justice to those sectors of the population, 
indigenous and rural, who have traditionally been denied these rights.  
3. At the same time, the mission proposes to transform the old 
bureaucratic structures into a new public institution, thus enabling 
application of efficient tools for management of the state.  
B. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT: FROM RHETORIC TO 
IMPLEMENTATION 
As well as the other missions, Misión Identidad was born in the aftermath of the 
failed coup against Hugo Chávez in 2002.108 Chávez perceived his power to be 
undermined not only by the coup attempt but also by the 2002 oil strike109 and the 2002-
2004 campaign to revoke his presidency through a referendum.110 In response, he created 
the Bolivarian missions in an effort to regain public support. The first wave of the 
                                                 
106 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights Public Law 2013, Article 6, 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#atop. 
107 Servicio Administrativo de Identificación, Migración y Extranjería, “Misión Identidad: Mission 
Statement,” Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, http://www.saime.gob.ve/Mis_ident/mision.php (accessed 
February 4, 2013). 
108 Yolanda D’Elia and Luis Francisco Cabezas, Las Misiones Sociales En Venezuela (Caracas: 
Instituto Latinoamericano de Investigaciones Sociales, 2008).  
109 Annie Schleicher, “NewsHour Extra: Venezuelan Oil Strike—Jan. 22, 2003, “MacNeil-Lehrer 
Productions, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/features/jan-june03/venezuela.html (accessed March 2, 
2013). 
110 Mary Beth Sheridan, “Chávez Defeats Recall Attempt,” Washington Post, washingtonpost.com, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A4208-2004Aug16.html (accessed March 4, 2013). 
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missions was created in 2003 and Misión Identidad followed in February 2004, with a 
mandate to correct a shortfall in legal identification where “seven out of every ten 
Venezuelans do not have a laminated identification card, and 90 percent of them belong 
to the lower classes.”111  
The emergence of the mission is closely associated with what is known as the 
Plan de Cedulación (Identification Plan), a decree issued by the Venezuelan government 
in 2004 under the name Plan Nacional de Regularización y Naturalización de Extranjeros 
y Extranjeras (National Plan of Regularization and Naturalization of Foreign Citizens).112 
The plan allocated the responsibilities and resources between the executive branch and 
Dirección de Identificación y Extranjería (Office of Identification and Identification 
Affairs or ONIDEX),113 to carry out the task of providing citizenship and identification 
documents not only to Venezuelans that lacked legal identification documents, but also to 
aliens. Misión Identidad emerged parallel to this process under Chávez’s creation of the 
missions.  
C. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND CONFIGURATION  
More recently, in 2009, ONIDEX changed its name to Servicio Administrativo de 
Identificación, Migración y Extranjería (Administrative Service for Identification, 
Migration and Immigration Matters or SAIME). The name change occurred to reflect “a 
fundamental structural change…wherein the necessary procedures will be totally 
automated and simplified.”114 Regardless of the name change, Misión Identidad 
maintains the same organizational relationship to SAIME as it did to ONIDEX, which is  
 
 
                                                 
111 Viet Juan Felix, Venezuela Hacia El Socialismo Del Siglo 21st (Cholula: Altres-Costa Amic, 
2008), 145. 
112 Servicio Administrativo de Identificación, Migración y Extranjería, “SAIME: Reseña Historica,” 
Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, http://www.saime.gob.ve/resena.php (accessed February 4, 2013). 
113 Ibid. 
114 Radio Nacional de Venezuela, “La Onidex Ahora Se Llamará Saime,” Noticias24.com, 
http://www.noticias24.com/actualidad/noticia/58755/la-onidex-ahora-se-llamara-saime/ (accessed February 
4, 2013). 
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essentially one of parallel responsibility for provision of cédulas, with the caveat that the 
mission is intended to extend the reach of government to those “previously excluded 
classes” as much as possible. 
Although the Constitutional referendum sought by the Chávez administration in 
2007 did not pass,115 or perhaps because of its failure to pass, the Chávez administration 
built up multiple mechanisms and stratagems to put into practice what the failed 
referendum was intended to. Part of this reform effort was to elevate all of the Bolivarian 
missions to a constitutionally recognized status. D’Elia and Cabezas assert that this 
structural change represents a complete conversion of the concept of public 
administration, “placing the institutions under the tutelage of the revolutionary powers 
and not vice versa, the government organs under the rule of law.”116 The main objective, 
in effect, was to assign to the Bolivarian missions a special administrative category 
completely subordinate to the executive branch, and thus on par with, and therefore 
independent of, the ministries of the Venezuelan government.117   
Misión Identidad, therefore, despite the failure of the constitutional reform, was 
placed under the administrative control of the Ministry of Popular Power for Internal 
Relations and Justice. At the same time, however, the mission acts in cooperation with 
SAIME, and enjoys administrative support from SAIME, as previously mentioned (see 
page three). Interestingly, the SAIME website for Misión Identidad describes it as “a 
project where the National Executive can be seen working with SAIME in order to 
provide improved service to all Venezuelans.”118 The same web page mentions that 
thousands of Bolivarian Revolutionary youths of the Francisco de Miranda Front support 
the operation of Misión Identidad.119  
                                                 
115 “BBC NEWS | Americas | Chávez Defeated over Reform Vote,” BBC News, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7124313.stm (accessed February 4, 2013).  
116 D’Elia and Cabezas, Las Misiones Sociales En Venezuela, 8. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Servicio Administrativo de Identificación, Migración y Extranjería, Misión Identidad. 
119 Ibid. 
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It is unclear to what extent the mission overlaps the SAIME’s responsibilities; 
nevertheless, the operation of Identidad is obviously closely associated with that agency. 
Considering that the principal mission of Identidad is providing identity cards, and that 
one of the principal missions of SAIME is “to guarantee the right of identity to all 
citizens,”120 it is curious that virtually the same activity is carried out throughout the 
country by two agencies through what seems to be a co-equal operating relationship.  
D. RESOURCES AND CAPABILITIES: FIGHTING BUREAUCRACY 
FROM THE BUREAUCRACY 
1. Budget  
A Venezuelan government document, Las Misiónes Sociales del Gobierno 
Bolivariano: Un Logro Revolucionario (Social Missions of the Bolivarian Government: 
A Revolutionary Achievement) states that from the establishment of the mission, until 
2009, the financial support from PDVSA, the state oil company of Venezuela, was $45 
million dollars.121 This works out to roughly nine million dollars per calendar year from 
2004 until 2009.  
2. Facilities and Infrastructure 
The mission uses the facilities of the SAIME, which has 129 locations evenly 
distributed among the Venezuelan states, but the locations are identified as part of Misión 
Identidad.122 The SAIME website provides one web page that lists the 129 locations of 
the agency throughout the country;123 and a subsequent Web page that lists the points of 
                                                 
120 Servicio Administrativo de Identificación, Migración y Extranjería, “SAIME: Misión—Visión,” 
Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, http://www.saime.gob.ve/mision_vision.php (accessed February 4, 
2013). 
121 Liliana Pérez Rico, “Las Misiones Sociales Del Gobierno Bolivariano: Un Logro Revolucionario,” 
Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, 
http://repositorio.mpd.gob.ve/index.php?option=com_remository&Itemid=103&func=fileinfo&id=49 
(accessed March 4, 2013). 
122 Servicio Administrativo de Identificación, Migración y Extranjería, “SAIME: Módulos Fijos A 
Nivel Nacional,” Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, 
http://www.saime.gob.ve/general/noticias_sec/modulos_fijos.php (accessed February 4, 2013). 
123 Ibid. 
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contact for Misión Identidad in every Venezuelan state.124 According to Viet Juan Felix, 
another service of the mission is to provide mobile facilities, currently numbering around 
190, to improve ease of access for citizens to procure government identification.125  
3. Staff and Personnel  
The mission enjoys support from the personnel of SAIME, and as well as unpaid 
volunteers of the Frente Francisco de Miranda, to accomplish its mission. In addition, 
employees of Misión Identidad itself work in conjunction with the personnel from the 
other agencies. Yet, as will be explained, the mission staff apparently do not enjoy all of 
the benefits of full employment. A few days before the 2012 presidential elections, there 
was a hint of a crisis when around four thousand workers of the mission circulated a 
document threatening the government with going on strike until their employment status 
was definitively resolved. The workers’ claim was that they were performing the same 
tasks that SAIME is responsible for, such as “issuing identification cards, passports, birth 
certificates, immigration processes, and staffing of the [SAIME] border offices across the 
nation. We perform the functions that they generate within SAIME.”126 Despite this 
importance, the mission’s workers do not have an official contract with SAIME; they 
function as contractors that can be fired or laid off without any compensation.127 It seems 
that the revolutionary mission of “transforming the old bureaucracy into a new public 
institution machine” does not necessarily translate into job security for the workers of 
Misión Identidad. Instead, it appears that Misión Identidad operates to complement the 
“old bureaucracy” of SAIME with lower-cost labor provided by the mission, but with no 
real benefits for the mission’s employees.  
                                                 
124 Servicio Administrativo de Identificación, Migración y Extranjería, “SAIME: Directorio Misión 
Identidad,” Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, 
http://www.saime.gob.ve/general/noticias_sec/directorioMision.php (accessed February 4, 2013). 
125 Felix, Venezuela Hacia El Socialismo Del Siglo 21st, 147. 
126 “Casi 4 Mil Trabajadores De La Misión Identidad Exigen La Asignación De Cargos Fijos,” 
noticias24.com, http://www.noticias24.com/venezuela/noticia/128823/casi-4-mil-trabajadores-de-la-
mision-Identidad-exigen-la-asignacion-de-cargos-fijos/ (accessed February 4, 2013); Adriana Rivera, 
“Encargados De Cedulación Trabajan Como Tercerizados,” El Nacional, http://www.el-
nacional.com/politica/Encargados-cedulacion-trabajan-tercerizados_0_54594625.html (accessed March 3, 
2013). 
127 “Casi 4 Mil Trabajadores De La Misión Identidad Exigen La Asignación De Cargos Fijos.”  
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E. MISSION ACTIVITIES: PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY OR 
ELECTORAL AMBITION? 
The Comisión de Enlace para la Internacionalización de las Misiónes Sociales 
(Coordinating Commission for the Internationalization of Social Missions or CEIMS) 
website asserts:  
In sum, more than 18 million citizens of the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela have benefited from Misión Identidad, and they now possess an 
identification document that facilitates their access to education, health, 
credit, and to the most clear and tangible expression of a participatory and 
democratic people: voting.128  
Recent reporting about the performance of the mission suggests the very fast pace 
that SAIME and Misión Identidad worked at before the past elections when, according to 
SAIME’s director Dante Rivas, almost three million people received their identity cards 
from January until September 2011. In the same declaration, he announced that the 
mission was re-launched to allow the population easy access to the identification and the 
right to vote.129  
The mission’s activities are not restricted to Venezuela. Besides successfully 
providing legal identification to foreigners living in Venezuela (akin to “green cards” in 
the U.S.), Identidad has also supported similar documentation programs in other 
countries. The most publicized such program occurred in the country of Bolivia, under 
the name, Existo yo, existe Bolivia (I exist, therefore Bolivia exists). The program that 
was carried out under the banner of “Bolivarian solidarity,” supporting Bolivia with 
technical training as well as material and personnel resources to give an identification 
card “to the last Bolivian citizen.”130 
                                                 
128 Comisión de Enlace para la Internacionalización de las Misiones Sociales, “Misión Identidad,” 
http://ceims.mppre.gob.ve/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=43:mision-
Identidad&catid=23:misiones-bolivarianas&Itemid=66 (accessed February 4, 2013). 
129 Prensa VTV, “Más De 2 Millones De Venezolanos Han Sido Cedulados Entre Enero y 
Septiembre,”  SAFONACC: Servicio Autónomo Fondo Nacional de los Consejos Comunales, 
http://www.safonacc.gob.ve/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1987&Itemid=80 (accessed 
February 4, 2013). 
130 Felix, Venezuela Hacia El Socialismo Del Siglo 21st, 148. 
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F. MISIÓN IDENTIDAD: OVERT VERSUS COVERT PURPOSES 
Up to this point, Misión Identidad awakens more questions than answers. Why is 
the mission duplicating, or at least supporting, SAIME’s responsibilities? Was it really 
necessary to create an entire mission dedicated to the purpose of providing cédulas? Was 
the identification problem as bitter and brutal as the government presented it, with its 
colorful revolutionary language characterizing “forgotten, excluded sectors of the 
population, indigenous and rural,” which were previously denied “social justice and other 
rights?”131 What are the real benefits of receiving a Venezuelan cédula—the laminated 
national identification card? Why this apparently hybrid structure simultaneously within 
and outside the traditional bureaucracy? Why is the naturalization of the foreign residents 
within Venezuela so important? In this section, we attempt to answer these questions as 
concisely as possible.  
As previously mentioned, the primary task, the raison d’être, of Misión Identidad 
is clear: to facilitate the issuance of cédulas to all Venezuelan citizens living in the 
country. And, as also previously pointed out, a government agency already existed that 
executed this task: the ONIDEX, which later became SAIME. The main question then 
becomes: why did it become necessary to create a Bolivarian Mission to duplicate a core 
task of an existing government agency or at the very least, to complement it? One 
possible explanation is derived from a statement made by reporter Adriana Rivera in her 
article on a potential strike by Misión Identidad employees: “the cédula is the only valid 
document to exercise the right to vote.”132 In essence, then, increasing the number of 
Venezuelans with cédulas is therefore increasing the pool of eligible voters. It could be 
argued, then, that the core interest of Misión Identidad is to increase the number of 
potential voters that ultimately are going to support the Chávez regime during elections.  
It appears that Identidad is at least equally or more politicized than the other 
Bolivarian missions because, according to the government, the core of the workers of the 
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mission come from the Francisco de Miranda Front.133  The Front is best defined as a 
uniformed militia loyal to Chávez and the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (United 
Socialist Party of Venezuela or PSUV); a “disciplined political organization, anti-
imperialist, dynamic and organized;…an instrument that supports the Missions and 
contributes to the successful development of the programs promoted by the Bolivarian 
Government…corresponding to Bolivarian ideology and Commandant Chávez’s 
thought.”134 All else being equal, it appears that Misión Identidad, the organization in 
charge of providing identification documents legally required to vote, is an organization 
entirely politicized and embedded with the ideals of one specific ideology and one 
specific man, Chávez. 
The importance of Misión Identidad to the regime’s electoral machinery is also 
inferred by the emphasis placed on providing cédulas to foreigners residing within 
Venezuela. Presidential Decree No. 2823 initiated a campaign to “pay the ‘historic 
Venezuelan debt to immigrants,’”135 by facilitating provision of cédulas to immigrants 
who were previously undocumented.136 This dedicated effort to document foreign 
residents of Venezuela, and therefore provide them the document required for voting, 
suggests electoral interests lie behind the apparent humanitarian decision to grant cédulas 
to foreign residents of Venezuela. 
Another group of Venezuelans who are eligible to receive cédulas are those that 
enjoy dual-citizenship with other countries. Of this group, the largest number is those 
citizens who enjoy Venezuelan-Colombian dual citizenship. Both constitutions, 
Venezuelan and Colombian, allow the right to double citizenship (Articles 34 and 96, 
respectively). This enables a large portion of the population to move freely between the 
two countries, as well as to participate in the political processes in both countries—that 
is, to vote.  
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Although the number of Venezuelan-Colombian dual citizens who have received 
their Venezuelan cédulas during the Chávez’ government is unknown, it is well known 
that the number has increased exponentially since 1999, the year when the Bolivarian 
Constitution was signed.137 Some recent estimates assert that there are a million and a 
half Colombian voters within Venezuela who were eligible to vote in Venezuelan 
elections, which would represent the third largest population in Venezuela in terms of 
states, even surpassing the number of voters in Caracas, the capital city. The group 
Nacionalizados Con Capriles (Nationalized with Capriles) confirmed 170,000 votes to 
support the opposition’s candidate, Henrique Capriles. On the other hand, an organization 
named Colombians in Venezuela Association, claimed to have organized half a million 
voters for Hugo Chávez’s campaign.138  
The situation with Colombians living outside Venezuela, but who are eligible to 
vote in Venezuela, particularly along the shared border, is slightly different. The most 
influential journal in Colombia, El Tiempo, analyzed the impact of the 2012 Venezuela 
election on bi-national relations.139 This report highlights the situation in the Colombian 
city of Cúcuta, the main border crossing from Colombia to Venezuela, and which has a 
historic, influential, and long-lasting relationship with Venezuela. In Cúcuta, two groups 
organized to gather voters to support Chávez’s campaign. The first group, called 
Colombians with Chávez, is led by a Colombian citizen named Ramon Tamara. Tamara 
asserts that he is one of the “patrolmen” that work for the “red dots,” concepts 
implemented by the complex Bolivarian electoral structure. According to his description, 
patrolmen need to fulfill the following requirements: 
He has to have double citizenship (Venezuelan and Colombian), convert 
his house to a ‘red dot’ to ‘provide information to the electorate,’ and 
being a link in a kind of electoral pyramid where every ‘patrolman,’  
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properly certified by the Chávez party, must bring at least a dozen voters 
with Venezuelan identification cards to vote for the President’s reelection 
on October 7th.”140 
Tamara also describes how, the day before elections, the Colombian voters were 
transported to the Socialist House in the Venezuelan village of Ureña (the Venezuelan 
town just across the border from Cúcuta), where they received lodging and dinner, and 
went the next day to vote in support of Chávez. According to him, there were no 
additional benefits from supporting Chávez, although the voters did receive some 
information about “how to get a retirement salary in Venezuela or medical treatment 
without any cost”141 The other Chavista faction in Cúcuta is led by David Corredor and 
is apparently less organized than Tamara’s group, but which constitutes another “red dot” 
in support of Chávez’ cause. Corredor has been claiming a “place at the negotiating 
table” in La Habana between the Colombian government and the FARC.142  
G. MISIÓN IDENTIDAD IN COLOMBIA: BEYOND THE OVERT 
PURPOSES 
Our field research in Colombia, which consisted of interviews in the cities of 
Bogota and Cúcuta in the two-week period prior to the Venezuela presidential election in 
April 2013, strongly suggests that Misión Identidad goes far beyond its overt 
humanitarian purposes (that of providing Venezuelan cédulas to eligible people). We 
assert that this mission provides a reciprocal benefit to a “triad” of organizations, 
composed of the Venezuelan Bolivarian Regime, a segment of the Colombian population, 
and the terrorist groups in Colombia, primarily FARC or ELN. Moreover, although we 
cannot claim that this is its primary task, the operation of the mission suggests that the 
purely humanitarian mission is co-opted by the above organizations for their own benefit 
- a sort of quid pro quo style of delivery of humanitarian assistance. 
To summarize briefly, this quid pro quo system of reciprocal benefits works as 
follows. The Venezuelan Bolivarian Regime provides cédulas to Venezuelans and/or 
                                                 




Colombians in Colombia along the border region, thus assuring themselves a larger 
electorate that is going to support the regime by voting for it when needed. The segment 
of the Colombian population that receives the cédula thus gains access to additional 
benefits via the other missions, such as medical attention, educational programs, 
retirement pensions, etc. The FARC or ELN function in this process as an intermediary 
between the Bolivarian Regime and the population. In so doing, they exercise influence 
over the target population because they determine who is eligible or not to receive the 
cédula. The benefits the groups derive are the following: they guarantee themselves safe 
haven in Venezuela, they obtain Venezuelan identification for their members, and they 
exercise leverage over the vulnerable population within Colombia who desire the 
Venezuelan cédula. For example, they promise to assist a poor Colombian campesino 
who desires a cédula, but in return they “ask” for assistance from him, or ask him to 
attend one of their lectures, as an “introduction” to their philosophy. 
A member of the Colombian intelligence services and ELN expert interviewed for 
the purpose of this thesis relates how easy the process to gain a cédula is. For example, 
any Venezuelan citizen can go to a Registry office in Venezuela and register somebody 
as a son or daughter without providing documentation of such a relationship such as a 
birth certificate, and regardless of the ages of the people involved. So, for example, a 22-
year old person may register a 20-year old as their son or daughter. Such a farcical 
situation suggests this is done with at least the tacit knowledge and consent of the 
authorities, given the impossibility of such a scenario (that a 22-year old may be a 20-
year old’s biological parent.)   
This Colombian intelligence official also relates the story of a Venezuelan woman 
known as “the Mother of 100 Guerrillas” because she proudly asserts that she registered 
more than 100 ELN operatives as Venezuelan citizens.143 Another intelligence official 
relates the story of alias Bigotes (Moustache), who is currently the liaison between the  
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Venezuelan government and the ELN Central Command. One of his functions is to 
provide Venezuelan IDs to the members of ELN, or the people selected by the 
organization.144  
The relationship between Identidad and terrorists is not exclusive to ELN. 
According to a former FARC operative who was responsible for providing logistical 
support in a Colombian-Venezuelan border area for seven years, one of her missions was 
recruitment of people eligible to receive the cédulas. As part of this recruitment, she 
personally brought the recruit to the mission’s office to receive the document. The only 
pre-requisites were the desire to receive the ID, and attendance at “revolutionary talks” 
provided by members of the Bolivarian Circles.145 It was not even necessary to provide 
photo ID or other proof of identity, because the whole process was done there at the 
office, and the document was issued only three days later.146 This contrasts with the 
process to get a Colombian cédula, a process that can take anywhere from six months to 
one year.147 This demobilized FARC operative also indicated that some of the 
Colombians who received the cédula were granted a small farm on the Venezuelan side 
of the border, a place that would often be used as a FARC training and/or “rest and 
recuperation area.”148  
Señor Martinez, a Colombian citizen who has lived in Cúcuta for the past 25 
years, describes that it is common knowledge in the city that the Venezuelan cédulas 
received through the Bolivarian Circles (read: Identidad) are necessary in order to vote 
and to receive benefits such as medical assistance and retirement benefits. However, the 
cédula is immediately deactivated if the cédula-holder does not participate in elections.149 
One of the Colombian intelligence officials corroborated Mr. Martinez’s views when he 
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described a process that assured votes for the regime. The process described is essentially 
as follows: the cédula-holder votes in Venezuela, receives the voting receipt, takes a 
picture of the receipt, and then sends the picture to their respective boss demonstrating 
that they voted for the regime’s candidate. This same source asserts that people are 
threatened with losing their jobs if they do not participate in the vote, or do not send the 
required proof-of-voting image.150 This process of voter assurance appears to be part of a 
larger system of manipulation of the electoral process by the Venezuelan government. 
In addition to the voter assurance process, another component of electoral 
manipulation is selective closing of the border with Colombia. According to Mr. 
Martinez, many exiled Venezuelans (that is, anti-regime Venezuelans) living in Colombia 
cross the border during the elections and vote for opposition candidates. As a result, the 
Táchira and Zulia states were in the hands of the opposition. (Táchira state is situated 
directly across from Cúcuta in Colombia, the largest border crossing between Colombia 
and Venezuela. Zulia state includes Maracaibo, Venezuela’s second-largest city, and is 
directly across the border from La Guajira state. Thus, these two states account for the 
bulk of border crossing between the two countries, as the rest of the border runs through 
very sparsely populated areas.) This situation compelled the government to close the 
border with Colombia at least 5 days prior to the elections without notice, thus preventing 
the border-crossing and subsequent voting by those opposition voters. Mr. Martinez said 
that this is a tactical move that enabled the Bolivarian Regime to win the elections in 
those disputed border states, and thus negate the votes of opposition-leaning Venezuelan 
exiles residing in Colombia.151  
First-hand experience corroborated this tactic of no-notice border closing. On the 
Sunday prior to the latest presidential elections, April 7, 2013, 14 buses transported 
people to Ureña, the Venezuelan city across the border from Cúcuta. A taxi driver 
explained that the buses transport Colombians who would vote for Nicolás Maduro 
(Chávez’s hand-picked successor in the 2013 presidential elections) in Venezuela, and 
that they had to move one week in advance because the border would be closed anytime 
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that week; ostensibly, the buses were coordinated with the Venezuelan government. The 
border was in fact unilaterally closed (and without any advance notice to the Colombian 
government) the following Wednesday, 10 April. (Needless to say, Maduro was elected 
President by a very narrow margin.) This pattern conforms to that described by the 
interviewees: facilitation of pro-Chávez voters across the borders, along with 
unannounced closing of the border to prevent border crossing by anti-regime voters. This 
is eerily similar to Venezuelan government actions in the run-up to the August 2004 
presidential referendum vote: “During the process, the government closed the border with 
Colombia and several private airports in Caracas apparently to impede citizens living or 
staying in the neighbouring country from returning. It did not allow citizens abroad the 
opportunity to deposit signatures at embassies.”152  
The events described above comport with previous reporting on Venezuelan 
government behaviors—this is perhaps the most significant finding from our fieldwork. 
An International Crisis Group report from February 2007 reported that “The Chávez 
campaign blatantly used state resources to ensure that voters reached the polling stations 
and to encourage them to vote for the president when they got there.”153 The movement 
of the fourteen buses across the border from Cúcuta prior to the unannounced closing of 
the border fits into this category. The same report indicates that Identitad “…may also 
have prepared the ground for [election] victory. It was carried out by Chavista groups 
who in some instances urged citizens both to get a new ID card and to vote for the 
president.”154 Again, the interviews we conducted in 2013 indicate the same behavior—
that the issuing of a cédula by Identidad carried with it either an implicit or explicit 
expectation to vote for Chávez’s successor, Maduro.  
Interviews and observations for this thesis occurred in the largest border crossing 
between Venezuela and Colombia, Cúcuta. However, the shared border between the two 
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countries is much longer and not limited to just this one border crossing, so it is possible 
similar events occurred at other sites. La Guajira, the northernmost mainland Colombian 
state along the Venezuelan border, and hence imbued with strategic location, seems to 
play host to similar patterns. Maria Luisa Ruiz, a speaker of the Wayúu  ethnic 
community, observed that during elections in Venezuela “La Guajira is emptied”155 
because most of the members of her community cross the border to vote on the 
Venezuelan side in support of the Bolivarian regime. Other related videos show how 
members of the Wayúu tribe proudly say, “Chávez gave us the cédula, so we vote for him 
and for his people.”156  
H. CONCLUSION 
In summary, although initially engineered to operate outside the traditional 
bureaucracy, Misión Identidad became a hybrid organization that operates in 
coordination with the “traditional bureaucracy” of the SAIME, in order to provide 
identification cards to Venezuelan citizens. The impact of Identidad on growing the 
Venezuelan voter rolls appears significant. International Crisis Group reports numbers 
from the Venezuelan National Electoral Commission: “The electoral roll grew from 12.3 
million in February 2004 when Identidad was launched to 16.08 million in September 
2006.”157 This particular task, and its importance in increasing the number of voters who 
are likely to be pro-Chávez, and by extension, pro-Maduro, qualifies this mission as a 
fundamental piece of the Bolivarian electoral machinery. 
Domestically, Misión Identidad is a very effective mechanism used by the 
Bolivarian government to remain in power. Besides the apparent humanitarian intent of 
providing people with the basic right of identification and public recognition, the issuing 
of the identification documents allows the government to manage distribution of cédulas 
for its own benefit, serving the particular interests of the “revolution.” Our provided 
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evidence supports this claim, as does the pattern of behavior observed prior to the 2006 
presidential election and the April 2013 presidential election. 
Internationally, specifically talking about the Colombian case, we observed a 
similar pattern of electoral system manipulation. Colombian citizens receive the cédula 
that enables them to cross the border, vote and gain access to further benefits. These 
citizens, in turn, benefit the Bolivarian regimes by voting for their candidates. Finally, 
either wittingly unwittingly, this same bloc of voters benefits those groups which helped 
them to get the document; either the Venezuelan authorities, or FARC and ELN 
operatives, or some combination thereof. 
The FARC and ELN structures benefit from the mission by giving citizenship to 
their operatives, families, and people chosen by them. In exchange for their commitment 
to support the Venezuelan regime ideologically, these groups gain access to safe haven in 
Venezuelan soil.  
In sum, the Bolivarian regime is singularly focused on remaining in power and 
actively internationalizing the revolutionary process. Therefore it invests significant 
amounts of money in supporting the mission’s function; in effect turning over a blank 
check to the mission’s officials, terrorists groups, and foreign population, expecting in 
return the necessary votes to retain power and spread its revolutionary ideals throughout 
the region, but particularly in Colombia. Our evidence, gathered through interviews and 
fieldwork, is consistent on this point, as is the comparison of electoral system 
manipulations across time, 2006 and 2013. As Penfold explained, “Chávez’s ability to 
link the social benefits of the programs with his need to assure the political mobilization 
of his popular base through the Misión Identidad became the cornerstone of his political 
strategy.”158  
Thus, among the candidate hypotheses reviewed in the Introduction chapter, 
Misión Identidad supports Hypothesis 2: The Venezuelan government of President 
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Chávez used the legitimate status of Bolivarian missions in Colombia for both legitimate 
and illegitimate state activities to support Venezuelan foreign policy. This was due to the 
organization of the mission as parallel to the Ministry of  Internal Relations and Justice, 
but able to take advantage of the resources from that ministry without any accompanying 
bureaucracy that impeded Chávez’s control of it; the capability of the mission to employ 
“volunteers” from the Francisco de Miranda Bolivarian militia; and the documented 
activities of the mission in both Venezuela and Colombia to use state resources in 
partisan fashion to mobilize voters on both sides of the border, with a clear bias toward 




V. MISION MILAGRO: A COMMON VIEW OF THE WORLD 
One of the most high-profile Bolivarian missions that the Venezuelan government 
supports is Misión Milagro (miracle mission). This chapter demonstrates that, besides the 
overt and noble purpose of this mission - to help people with vision problems - there is a 
covert purpose as well: spreading Chávez’s Socialism of the 21st Century throughout 
Latin America. The chapter describes the mission’s overt purposes, its origin and 
development, its organization, resources, capabilities and activities, and then analyzes 
this mission’s activities in the country of Colombia. By describing the mission and its 
activities in Colombia, it is possible to make a solid evaluation of the mission’s essential 
character; whether it is a wholly overt health care mission, or whether it purports to 
advance the Bolivarian Revolution domestically and internationally, or some combination 
thereof.  
A. OVERT PURPOSE OF THE MISSION 
According to the Venezuelan government, Misión Milagro is a humanitarian 
program created to provide free medical care (specifically, ocular health care) to 
populations with scarce resources that suffer vision problems, and is a program carried 
out as part of the cooperative agreements under the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos 
de Nuestra America (Bolivarian Alternative for Latin American and the Caribbean or 
ALBA).159 The Venezuelan government states that the original motivation for the 
mission arose from a desire by the executive branch to correct the historic difficulties that 
the “excluded classes” had in receiving ocular health care, and providing such health care 
in order to reintegrate them into everyday life as productive citizens.160 The mission’s 
website states the mission has three core objectives:161  
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1. Enhancing the skills and abilities of people with visual impairment, thus 
integrating them into social life in Venezuela and other Latin American 
countries. 
2. Execution of social policies promoted by the national government to 
involve citizens who have their vision problems treated, therefore 
facilitating individual and collective development. 
3. To settle the social debt of the Venezuelan state to this segment of society, 
in the search for social justice and equal conditions for all Venezuelans. 
Some of the pathologies attended to by the mission include “pterygium [non-
cancerous growths on the surface of the eye], cataracts, strabismus, retinopathies, 
glaucoma, myopia, ptosis, and difficulties in the cornea,”162 and “[t]he programme (sic) 
provides free eye operations, including correcting and restoring eyesight as well as 
providing free consultations and glasses.”163 
B. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT: FROM CUBA TO THE REST OF THE 
CONTINENT 
Misión Milagro was not an original idea of the Chávez administration. The 
program traces its roots to Cuba, which began receiving Venezuelan patients in order to 
treat their ophthalmological problems in Cuba rather than in Venezuela.164 Then, in 
2005, during a summit in the Cuban city of Sandino, Fidel Castro and Hugo Chávez 
signed what is known as the “Sandino Pact,” which stated purpose is to alleviate visual 
problems for up to six million Latin American and Caribbean inhabitants over a period of 
10 years. Thus, Misión Milagro was an internationally-oriented mission from its 
beginning. This international orientation is reinforced by other international movements 
of patients since December 2005, when the first group of international patients from 
Ecuador arrived in Venezuela for treatment.165 Although Misión Milagro traces its 
origins to Misión Barrio Adentro (Mission Inside the Neighborhood), which purpose is to 
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bring medical assistance to poor neighborhoods throughout Venezuela (with heavy 
Cuban support in materiel and physicians), Milagro quickly grew in popularity with the 
population and the government, to the point that it became its own standalone mission, 
and is currently one of the most high-profile missions of the Bolivarian government.166  
C. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND CONFIGURATION  
The mission’s structure is composed of two branches, the domestic and the 
international. Regarding the domestic organization, Milagro’s structure is as eclectic as 
the Bolivarian ideology: it is directly dependent on the office of the Vice-President of 
Venezuela, but it also has a subordinate relationship to the Ministry of Popular Power for 
Health. The mission also functions as a non-governmental foundation whose president is 
appointed by the Venezuelan President. Currently, this is Lenys Alberto Contreras Rojas, 
who formerly was the director of the Comisión de Enlace para la Internacionalización de 
las Misiones Sociales (Coordinating Commission for the Internationalization of Social 
Missions or CEIMS).167 The international branch of Misión Milagro is organized under 
the office of the CEIMS, and each individual country that it operates in is designated a 
point of contact for the CEIMS program.  
1. Resources and Capabilities  
According to the Venezuelan government, there are 52 facilities within Venezuela 
that participate in the program. 28 of the 52 are dedicated to serving international 
patients; among this group, 13 belong to the Ministry of Health, 12 belong to the 
Venezuelan Institute of Social Security, and three are Venezuelan military hospitals.168 
Further examination of the geographic distribution of the facilities reveals some 
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irregularities in their distribution. For example, in the state of Miranda, where the 
governor is the former opposition presidential candidate, Henrique Capriles Radonski, 
there is only one facility affiliated with Misión Milagro, despite the size of the state’s 
population, almost three million inhabitants. Conversely, the state of Maracay, with a 
population of about 1.3 million inhabitants, and whose governor is a member of the 
PSUV, has four facilities affiliated with Misión Milagro. In addition, the state of Táchira 
with a population of about 1.5 million (half of Miranda’s population) has 4 facilities 
affiliated with the mission, including one military hospital. All of these are located in the 
city of San Cristóbal which is only 20 miles from the Colombian border city of Cúcuta, 
the main border crossing between Venezuela and Colombia. The geographic dispersion 
of the medical facilities affiliated with Misión Milagro suggests two factors at play in the 
location of Misión Milagro installations: one, the political affiliation of the governor 
seems to play a larger role than size of the population within a given state; and second, 
the large concentration of facilities in San Cristóbal, near the busiest border crossing 
Cúcuta (Colombia) y San Cristóbal (Venezuela) between Colombia and Venezuela.169 
The latter suggests a strategic interest in supporting beneficiaries of Misión Milagro who 
are crossing the border from Colombia, and therefore influencing them to empathize with 
the Venezuelan government, as the provider of this specialized health care via Misión 
Milagro.  
D. MISSION ACTIVITIES 
Some of the figures provided by the Venezuelan government indicate substantial 
numbers of patients served. The total number of patients attended to between 2005 and 
2012 is over 1.5 million, of which more than 30 thousand are international citizens (that 
is, non-Venezuelans). Among non-Venezuelans, the largest number of patients comes 
from Ecuador, with the smallest number from Bolivia, Cuba, and Italy, with only one 
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patient each. 1,177 Colombian citizens have also received the benefits of Milagro. In 
Figure 1, we display the charts obtained from the CEIMS Web page:170 
 
 
Figure 1.  Total Patient Treatments Completed in Misión Milagro, 2004–December 2012 
                                                 
170 Comisión de Enlace para la Internacionalización de las Misiones Sociales, “Estadísticas” Gobierno 
Bolivariano de Venezuela, 
http://ceims.mppre.gob.ve/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=232:estadisticas&catid=28&I




Figure 2.  Misión Milagro Patient Treatments Completed by Venezuela, 2005–December 
2012 
 




Figure 4.  Latin-American and Caribbean Patients Treated in Venezuela’s Misión Milagro, 
December 2005–December 2012 
Figure 1 indicates that the total number of patients treated through Misión 
Milagro for the time period 2004–2012 is approximately 1.6 million, an average of about 
182,000 patients treated per year. Thus, the stated goal of the Sandino Pact—treatment of 
six million Latin Americans who have vision problems by 2015—is likely to be unmet. If 
the current trend continues, the estimated number of patients treated will likely be closer 
to 2.2 million (calculations by the author).  
The mission’s international operations vary across the international countries it is 
present in. Essentially, the international operations consist of four basic functions: 
recruitment of international patients, transport of international patients to Venezuela for 
care, provision of Misión Milagro care in other countries, and transport of Venezuelan 
citizens to Cuba for care. The main tool to recruit international patients is Venezuelan 
diplomatic missions, either embassies or consulates. For example, the CEIMS Web page 
displays 14 embassies with a Venezuelan point of contact for the mission, who a 
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prospective patient may contact for further information.171 However, Misión Milagro’s 
official website, which is different from the CEIMS website, displays additional points of 
contact for the mission in 15 countries, including Colombia and the U.S. These countries 
do not appear in the initial list of embassies provided by CEIMS on its website.172 
Sometimes the recruited international patients are brought to Venezuela to be treated at 
the expense of the Venezuelan government, while in other cases the medical staff of the 
mission visits other countries to provide care. In a third category, Venezuelan citizens are 
transported to Cuba in order to receive the medical care there.173  
As has already been shown in this chapter, Milagro is far from achieving its stated 
goal of treating 6 million patients with vision problems in ten years. Through the official 
statistics provided by the CEIMS’ web page, it is clear that the stated goal is beyond the 
capacity of the facilities and resources available to achieve it. Given these numbers, a fact 
sheet for Misión Milagro provided by the Venezuelan Embassy in the U.K. raises 
suspicion with some of the ambitious figures it provides. The document, “Fact Sheet 
Misión Milagro” cites the following numbers of patients treated by the mission:  
Hundreds of thousands of people have also been treated across Latin 
America: 17 million people have been treated, 75,000 operations in 
Nicaragua, 110,000 operations in Ecuador, 50,000 operations in Haiti, 
82,000 operations in Bolivia, 1,400 operations in Peru, 29,000 operations 
in Argentina, 12,000 operations in Guatemala, 40,000 operations in 
Guyana. Mission Milagro has also treated thousands in Costa Rica, 
Uruguay, Paraguay and El Salvador, Suriname, Brazil and the Dominican 
Republic, Mexico. 174  
It is uncertain if the inflated data on the fact sheet has been placed intentionally or 
accidentally.  
                                                 
171 Comisión de Enlace para la Internacionalización de las Misiones Sociales, “Misión Milagro En El 
Mundo,” Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, 
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The above data widely contradicts the original information published by the 
Venezuelan government shown earlier in this chapter in the graphs, given that the graphs 
account for just 34,000 international patients treated since 2004 until December 2012, 
and not 17 million total patients as the fact sheet claims. A couple of arguments seem 
plausible for the wide variation in figures provided by the Venezuelan government. The 
first is simple miscommunication or misunderstanding among various agencies of the 
same government. For example, given that the websites of CEIMS, which is an office 
within the Venezuelan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the websites of Misión Milagro, 
which reports directly to the Venezuelan Vice-President’s office but also to the Ministry 
for Public Health, report differing numbers of total patients treated by Misión Milagro, it 
stands to reason that the Venezuelan Embassy in the U.K. might suffer confusion and 
report inflated numbers. There is also the possibility that the numbers reported are not 
fact-checked with due diligence and are intended to impress the casual reader who is not 
likely to double-check the figures provided in an official government press release.  
To summarize and clarify the number of patients treated by Misión Milagro, the 
CEIMS website claims a total of approximately 1.6 million patients treated by Misión 
Milagro from 2004-2012;175 the Misión Milagro website claims a total of 733,000 
surgical interventions since the inception of Misión Milagro;176 and the “Fact Sheet 
Misión Milagro” published by the Venezuelan Embassy to the U.K. claims 17 million 
people treated in total across Latin America by Misión Milagro.177 The significant 
disparity in claims by agencies of the same Venezuelan government calls into question 
the validity of any of the figures provided by the Venezuelan government.  
Regarding the argument that the performance of Milagro is suffering from poor 
execution, Venezuelan analysts Yolanda D’Elia and Luis Francisco Cabezas, in their 
report published by the impartial, independent organization Instituto Latinamericano de 
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Investigaciones Sociales (Latin American Institute for Social Investigations or ILDIS) 
convey some solid arguments about the likely reasons for the alleged underachievement.   
According to their analysis, the reasons for the weakening of the mission are rooted in the 
variety of problems faced by the Milagro’s “mother mission,” Barrio Adentro. This 
study, titled Las Misiónes Sociales en Venezuela178 (the Social Missions in Venezuela) 
explains several probable difficulties that brought that mission to a stalemate:  
1. Lack of medical infrastructure: Only 40% of the initial goal of 
6,500 health centers was constructed by 2006. By 2007, 
approximately 30% of the completed health centers were closed or 
deactivated because of multiple types of deficiencies. The 
construction of related health facilities like diagnostic rooms, 
emergency rooms, and rehabilitation rooms also achieved similar 
modest completion rates; only 50% of the initial construction goal 
for these facilities was achieved. 
2. Cuban advisors: The medical performance by Cubans has not been 
certified nor regulated by the Venezuelan academic authorities. 
The official data shows a reduction of Cuban medical personnel in 
Venezuela of about 20% from 2005 to 2007 (from 15,000 to 
12,000), a situation that severely impacts the medical care 
available to patients, and disrupting the different activities initially 
programmed. One possible explanation the report posits is an 
inadequate rotation system to replace departing Cuban medical 
professionals, whose time of service is capped at three years. 
In summary, the lack of facilities, and human and material resources, represents a 
serious handicap for Misión Milagro’s purposes. But, despite the apparent 
underachievement of Misión Milagro, as compared with its initial goals, the mission 
continues to function not only in Venezuela but throughout Latin America, including 
Colombia.  
E. MISIÓN MILAGRO IN COLOMBIA: OVERT VERSUS COVERT 
PURPOSES 
Misión Milagro seems to be the most popular and well-known of all of the 
Bolivarian missions, or at least to have the most name recognition, both within Venezuela 
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as well as internationally. This popularity is due to its humanitarian raison d’être, its easy 
access for patients, as well as for the generous and effective assistance it provides to the 
beneficiaries in Venezuela, as well as throughout Latin America. On the other hand, the 
mission, after being scrutinized through our fieldwork, no longer appears as solely a 
humanitarian mission. It benefits from a complicated network that allows its operation in 
Colombia. Among the nodes that support Milagro in Colombia, we find a myriad of 
organizations and individuals ranging from NGOs to criminal organizations, and 
activities that range from selfless aid to others, to unabashed support to insurgency 
groups. This section elucidates the network of Misión Milagro in Colombia through our 
fieldwork conducted in Colombia in April 2013. 
1. Interviews 
Two prominent Colombian politicians and analysts we interviewed for our 
research, posit differing hypotheses to explain the underlying reasons for the presence of 
Milagro (and the other missions studied) in Colombia. Rafael Guarín, former Colombian 
Vice-Minister of Defense and expert in defense and security matters, argues that the 
presence of the mission in Colombia is “a new dimension of irregular conflict, and that 
dimension is social assistance where the state’s presence fails,”179 adding that the 
missions represent “a new level of war, the delivery of essential services.”180 Dr. Guarín 
considers that Milagro and the other missions are part of the machinery used by the 
Bolivarian Government to develop social control and consolidation policies, and 
therefore the mission’s presence in Colombia is the “combination of political action and 
violent action.”181 Or in other words, the mission’s presence is able to provide a 
legitimate “cover” for violent action.  
Fernando Londoño Hoyos served as the first-ever Colombian Minister of Interior 
and Justice from 2002 to 2004 during President Uribe’s first term. He is also a victim of a 
FARC terrorist attack in 2012.  Londoño reaches further afield than does Guarín in his 
                                                 





rationale for the missions in Colombia. He asserts that the missions were designed in 
Cuba as one of the instruments to expand socialism and communism. Dr. Londoño 
devalues the Venezuelan involvement in the missions, arguing that the real motivations 
of them is found in Cuba, in Fidel Castro’s ambition to develop communism in 
Colombia, because of Castro’s belief that Colombia’s geo-strategic position is vital in 
order to export communism further—to the north and south.182  
A similar view is shared by Isidro Perez, a retired Colonel of the Venezuelan 
Army currently exiled in Colombia. Colonel Perez asserts that there is no difference 
between the Cuban and the Bolivarian revolution of Venezuela, and furthermore that the 
missions are considered as a vital element to “subjugate the population domestically, and 
export the revolution internationally.”183 Colonel Perez supports his argument through 
his personal experience as a Colonel on active duty in Venezuela. In 2001, he carried out 
orders from Hugo Chávez to conduct a review of the border areas between Colombia and 
Venezuela along with Cuban experts to “study the social problems along the border,” 
during which he observed an intense interest by the Cubans in understanding the 
problems on the Colombian side of the border, particularly the presence and activities of 
FARC.184   
In Cúcuta, the local citizens (Cucuteños) do not know Misión Milagro by its 
name, but the visual and multiple medical services that the Cubanos provide is common 
knowledge. In other words, Misión Milagro is commonly known among the local 
population—taxi drivers, waiters, merchants, and so forth—not as “the Venezuelan 
medical assistance program that provides visual health care to the population,” but rather 
“los Cubanos,”—the Cubans, or just by its area of action, ocular (visual) health care. It is 
also common knowledge in the Cúcuta area that it is very easy to receive this type of  
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medical care just by crossing the border and dropping into the medical clinic in Ureña, 
and that los Cubanos sometimes come into Colombia, ostensibly to provide medical 
care.185   
In fact, access to the mission is easy. Señor Martinez, a local Cúcuta citizen, 
remarked that several of his neighbors have received attention; all they have to do is sign 
up or register for the medical care, up to and including surgeries. The only payment 
expected of the patients is through the process of signing up, “the people [become] 
committed to support the revolution because they are registered with address and 
personal information so they can be reached by the Bolivarian Circles.”186  Martinez adds 
that the service is considered excellent, and sometimes even includes trips to Caracas and 
Cuba, depending on the particular patient’s condition. The easy availability of the 
medical care is confirmed through many interviewees, including a Colombian 
intelligence official who asserts that the patients receive attention no matter their 
nationality, and that they often receive not only temporary assistance or delivery of 
lenses, but also comprehensive treatment to solve the root cause of their visual 
problems.187 According to this official, it is during the medical checkups when the 
patients are invited to “socialization talks” that ultimately may lead them to become 
members of the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (United Socialist Party of 
Venezuela or PSUV), the Bolivarians party of Hugo Chávez.  
The previous views generally accord, and converge on a view of Misión Milagro 
as expansionist in intent and in practice. However, a Venezuelan Dirección de 
Inteligencia Militar (Directorate of Military Intelligence official or DIM) interviewed for 
this thesis vehemently rejects this view on the missions in general. He argues that 
“…Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua have benefited [from the missions] and it does not 
mean that we are going to conquer those countries.”188  He argues that the mission has an 
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exclusive humanitarian purpose to the extent that patients receive attention just by 
showing either their Venezuelan or Colombian cédula. Questioned about the socialization 
talks with political purposes, he said that the medical attention is not conditioned on the 
attendance of those lectures, but that obviously the people are invited to voluntarily 
attend, if they so choose. He offered a hypothetical scenario to explain this distinction: 
that if someone were to come in with a broken arm, the treatment of the arm wouldn’t be 
held up by first asking the person whether or not they’d attend a lecture, but he did 
acknowledge that invitations to talks are made after immediate care is provided, such as 
at an appointment for follow-up care. Finally, he acknowledges that given its open 
humanitarian mission, some members of the FARC or ELN could have benefited from 
the mission without the Venezuelan government’s knowledge.189 
The possible involvement of FARC and ELN operatives in Misión Milagro is a 
“wicked problem.” That is, it is difficult to determine whether or not there even is a 
problem, and if so, exactly what that problem is. For example, if a Colombian citizen 
who is also a FARC member receives medical care from Misión Milagro, does this 
somehow constitute a formal link between the mission and FARC? A counter-example is 
whether or not FARC or ELN members receive medical care via Misión Milagro because 
of formal agreements between the organizations, be they written or unwritten, transparent 
or opaque. The following interviews provide some insight to whether or not these 
organizational relationships exist.  
A former FARC operative stated in one interview, that by 2005 there was a health 
clinic in Cúcuta that was set up specifically to attend to members of the FARC and their 
relatives, as well as the local civilian population that was attracted by the mission’s 
benefits (i.e. free health care). This particular former operative was in charge of finances 
and logistical support in her region, and therefore she was responsible for paying 
physicians, nurses, and buying medicine with the FARC’s resources.190 This health clinic 
is a legal facility in a category under the Colombian health system that is known as an 
Empresa Promotora de Salud, or Health Promotion Company. Regardless, this former 
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FARC operative stated that this was just the legal “front organization” to cover the 
clinic’s real purpose—medical care to FARC members and their relatives.191 
A Colombian intelligence official who is an analyst of FARC’s Front 33 (the 
FARC unit that operates in and around the Norte de Santander border region) provided 
information on the FARC-Milagro relationship. He asserts that within Milagro, there is a 
program specifically created for providing medical care and training to FARC operatives, 
and that it has the capability to move wounded or sick FARC members to San 
Cristóbal—three hours travel time from Cúcuta—or to Caracas, depending on the 
patient’s condition.192 As an example, this official cited an August 2012 attack by 
Colombian troops on a FARC camp in the Catatumbo region, near the border with 
Venezuela. The operation killed an important operative, alias Danilo Garcia, and some 
FARC members were wounded. One of those wounded terrorists was transported to 
Venezuela and subsequently received life-saving medical care from both Cuban and 
Venezuelan specialists. Currently (as of April 2013) this terrorist (whose alias was not 
revealed because it is classified information) is recovering in the Venezuelan state of 
Táchira under the supervision of a Cuban woman known as Antoniela. Antoniela is 
apparently not only the supervisor and coordinator of Milagro in Venezuela, but also the 
person in charge of care for Colombian terrorists receiving medical care in Venezuela, all 
of this within the auspices of the Bolivarian Government.193  
Another individual with firsthand experience with the missions through her job as 
a consultant to various NGOs, says that Milagro is affiliated with two NGOs that operate 
in Colombia, ACVC (Asociación Campesina del Valle del Cimitarra, or Peasant 
Association of the Cimitarra Valley), and ASCAMCAT (Asociación Campesina del 
Catatumbo or Peasant Association of the Catatumbo Region).194 This NGO consultant 
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also states that one of the selection criteria to determine which patients will benefit from 
the health care services of the missions is that the patient is between 15 and 25 years old, 
or has family members in their household who are that age. The idea behind this criterion 
is that the 15 to 25 year olds fit the FARC’s profile to be politically educated later, when 
the mission or its organizers require.195 The NGO consultant also asserts that most of the 
people from rural areas who receive medical care by Misión Milagro are chosen by the 
FARC. During treatment and travel for the treatment, which averages five days, the 
patients must attend political and revolutionary lectures. And finally, she states that 
peasants and farmers who refuse to attend these activities are usually fined with money or 
community service, and in extreme cases even ordered to move away, and all of these 
actions are ordered or controlled by FARC members. (This description is in line with a 
legal complaint detailed in the next section of this chapter, Section E2.)  
The geographic regions referenced above in the names of the NGOs, the 
Cimitarra valley and the Catatumbo region, bear further examination. Both regions are 
adjacent to the Venezuela-Colombia border, within the Norte de Santander department. 
The Cimitarra valley is part of the Magdalena River basin, and is located where four 
Colombian departments converge. Cúcuta is located within the Catatumbo region, which 
is in the northern half of the department of Norte de Santander. Both of these areas play 
host to heavy FARC influence which generally resist outside influence, but Misión 
Milagro functions there without any harassment from the FARC.  
2. Documents 
There are also criminal complaints against members and activities of the 
aforementioned NGOS, ACVC and ASCAMCAT, that link these NGOs with the 
FARC.196 This criminal complaint in particular originates with a peasant, Hernando 
Naranjo, who used to live in the Cimitarra region, in a remote village, Puerto Matilde. In 
the complaint Naranjo stated he was a victim of forced displacement by members of the 
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ACVC, arguing that the ACVC is just a branch of the FARC, and that the ACVC is 
empowered by the FARC to control coca plantation, cultivation, commerce, and even 
taxation in the region. In all, the criminal complaint provides 39 pieces of evidence that 
demonstrate a close relationship between ACVC and the FARC. Within the criminal 
complaint document against the ACVC, a 2007 report by the ACVC states the following: 
“We carried out a census of 370 people in the villages...from where we sent out 150 
people...For the scholarships to Venezuela there are 10 candidates, we are waiting ‘green 
light’ to let them leave.”197 
The International Institute for Strategic Studies references documents that 
demonstrate links between the FARC and Misión Milagro in its book, The FARC 
Files,198 that analyzed and reported the information captured by Colombian troops in a 
military operation against alias Raul Reyes, the second in command within FARC at the 
time. Alias Timochenco—the FARC’s current leader—explicitly reports to FARC’s 
Secretariat about Misión Milagro, a letter referenced as I2340 of April 2007:199  
We got an agreement with the ones who manage Misión Milagro in 
Venezuela (eyes’ problems) (sic) to attend initially 150 people from the 
region. The first group has been already evacuated. The idea is to amplify 
the attention to other health problems.  
In the very same document, alias Timochenco praises the relevance of ACVC in 
achieving the work of the masses in the region of the middle Magdalena, and states that 
they are trying to implement a sister organization in the Catatumbo region,200 a project 
that seems to have  materialized a few years later with the creation of ASCAMCAT as an 
NGO. The letter is dated 2007, and ASCAMCAT was established as an NGO in 2009. (In 
official documents ASCAMCAT was founded in 2005 as a farmers’ cooperative, but its 
transition to an NGO with pro-FARC sympathies appears to have occurred in 2009.) 
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Misión Milagro operates upon three fundamental principles: Cuban support; 
government affiliation (it is an official sub-agency of the Venezuelan government); and 
party affiliation (with Chávez’s Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela, United Socialist 
Party of Venezuela or PSUV) of the employees of the mission and its beneficiaries. 
These operating principles of Misión Milagro show that there is a heavy ideological and 
political component to the mission, and therefore it is not purely humanitarian in nature. 
In the international arena, those ideological and political components are reflected 
in the evidence collected. Even though there is an undeniable social purpose that 
facilitates easy access to many patients regardless of their nationality or ideological 
orientation, it is also true that Milagro pursues clear political objectives.  
The organization of the mission is heavily dependent on Cuban medical health 
professionals. The Sandino Pact of 2005 demonstrates this, because it formalized a 
relationship between Cuba and Venezuela specifically for ocular health care, the subject 
area of this mission. In addition, the organization of the mission demonstrates a large and 
well-developed coordinating infrastructure via Venezuelan diplomatic missions abroad; 
this is in line with the status of the mission as the most high-profile of the missions 
internationally. Interesting to note is that this coordinating infrastructure includes the 
Venezuelan consulate in Chicago as one of the points of contact for prospective 
international patients of the mission. 
The capabilities of the mission are robust, featuring 52 facilities within Venezuela 
that are affiliated with the mission, and a geographic concentration of the facilities in San 
Cristóbal, the nearest large city to the Cúcuta border crossing. In addition to these 
facilities, the coordinating infrastructure is capable of arranging for transport, care, and 
recuperation of international patients, as well as treatment in Cuba for some Venezuelans 
via the program. Within Colombia, the activities of the mission demonstrate both overt 
and covert intent. Although the Colombian population is generally apathetic to the ideas 
of the Socialism of the 21st Century, there are groups within Colombia that demonstrate 
open sympathy toward this revolutionary doctrine, primarily the FARC and ELN and 
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their sympathizers. The evidence provided in this chapter strongly implies a systematic 
pattern of reciprocal cooperation between the Bolivarian government of Venezuela, the 
FARC and ELN and sympathizing NGOs, and vulnerable populations in Colombia. The 
Venezuelan government supplies medical care via Misión Milagro, while the FARC and 
ELN, and some NGOs facilitate the mission to extend its reach into Colombia. The 
FARC benefits from the medical care provided to them, and from increased influence 
over the population that results from its role of choosing which Colombian citizens will 
receive medical care from the mission. This latter activity is carried out in close 
coordination with the peasant association NGOs, Asociación Campesina del Valle del 
Cimitarra (Peasant Association of the Cimitarra Valley or ACVC), and Asociación 
Campesina del Catatumbo (Peasant Association of the Catatumbo Region or 
ASCAMCAT). 
The interviews conducted show an established organizational relationship 
between the Venezuelan government and the FARC. Reference is made to a clinic set up 
ostensibly as a local clinic, but in reality as a clinic in direct support of FARC members 
and their families; to a network within Venezuela to provide advanced medical care to 
FARC members; and to the influence FARC and ELN have over which Colombians may 
enjoy access to Misión Milagro health services. This demonstrates a humanitarian 
mission co-opted by organizational interests.  Misión Milagro in Colombia facilitates 
Venezuelan government support to FARC and ELN via provision of medical care, and 
the Colombian state is de-legitimized because it is portrayed as incapable of assisting its 
own citizens, while at the same time the mission legitimizes the FARC and ELN with 
local segments of the population because they are able to provide an essential service, 
medical care. We conclude therefore the activities of Misión Milagro in Colombia 
support Hypothesis 3: the Cuban and Venezuelan governments use the legitimate status 
of Bolivarian missions in Colombia for both legitimate and illegitimate state activities to 
support Venezuelan and Cuban foreign policy. 
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VI. MISION ROBINSON: LITERACY OR INDOCTRINATION? 
To those unfamiliar with the history of Latin America, non-Hispanic names 
appear out of place, and therefore the name Misión Robinson may inspire confusion and 
curiosity: how does a Venezuelan mission acquire such a seemingly out-of-place name? 
Additionally, the name itself doesn’t connote what type of Bolivarian mission it is. 
However, within Latin American history, there are a few notable figures with non-
Hispanic names that allude to the diverse societies and cultures that have impacted Latin 
America, for example Bernardo O’Higgins, one of the founding fathers of Chile, William 
Brown, the founder of the Argentine Navy, or Alberto Fujimori, a recent president of 
Peru. In a similar fashion, the name “Robinson” is derived from Simón Rodriguez, one of 
the tutors of Hugo Chávez’s hero, Simon Bolivar. Rodriguez adopted the English 
pseudonym Samuel Robinson after leaving from Caracas as a dissident in 1797 to take a 
trip that would bring him to visit the United States and Europe.201 Rodriguez is allegedly 
the most influential tutor and mentor of the liberator Simon Bolivar, and Bolivar himself 
acknowledges that Robinson “taught me reading and writing, and grammar”202 and 
“formed my heart for liberty, for justice, for the great, for the beautiful.”203 Thus 
inspired, Chávez adopted the name Robinson for the first educational mission of the 
Bolivarian missions.  
This chapter analyzes the Bolivarian Mission Misión Robinson, and argues that it 
is a two-edged sword. On the one hand, the mission pursues the noble and altruistic goal 
of bringing literacy to a population historically forgotten and without the possibility of 
access to basic education; an area in which the mission has demonstrated results, albeit 
with some controversy. On the other hand, the darker and more problematic one, we 
argue that the mission is used as a vehicle to instill radical ideology and perpetuate the 
ideas of Chavismo, and spread the Bolivarian revolution throughout other countries, 
particularly Colombia. We do this by addressing the mission through the same pattern 
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that we have used to analyze the previous missions: the mission’s overt purposes, the 
origins of the mission, organizational structure and configuration, resources and 
capabilities, mission activities, and a look at the mission’s possible covert dimensions, 
with an emphasis on the mission’s activities in Colombia through firsthand research. 
A. OVERT PURPOSE OF THE MISSION 
The revolutionary government of Chávez identified a social problem, in this case 
the “[social] exclusion caused by not knowing how to read and write,”204 and therefore 
the mission’s raison d’être became clear: provide literacy programs as an avenue to 
inclusion for the previously illiterate, in order that they might become productive 
members of society. The mission statement of the Fundación Samuel Robinson is as 
follows: 
Eradicate illiteracy and achieve completion of the sixth grade in Basic 
Education in youth and adult populations, to a national and international 
level, guaranteeing political, social, and economic inclusion, with the 
purpose of obtaining higher levels of development and welfare in the most 
needy social groups of the country.205 
The original mission eventually became known as Misión Robinson I, with the 
motto Yo si puedo (Yes I can).206 According to the Venezuelan government, Robinson I’s 
objectives are defined as follows: 207 
1. Eliminate illiteracy in the youth and adult population nationwide. 
2. Improve the reading comprehension skills of all of the beneficiaries of the 
mission. 
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3. Inspired by the principles of equality, gender equality, and respect for all 
ideologies, develop the creative power of every human being, as well as 
the full exercise of one’s personality in the midst of a democratic society. 
Subsequent phases of the mission, Robinson II and Robinson III, have their own 
specific mission statements that further develop the basic literacy skills from Robinson I 
to meet primary and secondary education standards. Robinson II, under the motto Yo Si 
Puedo Seguir (Yes, I can keep going), is responsible for providing primary education (up 
to 6th grade) to graduates of Robinson I and those Venezuelans who were never able to 
complete their primary education for whatever reason. The third phase, Robinson III, also 
known as Circulos de Lectura (Reading Circles), has the goal of promoting the reading 
habit in the participants through articles of “political, economic, social, cultural, and 
national interest.”208  
B. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT: BOLIVARIAN INSPIRATION, 
SOCIALIST IMPLEMENTATION 
The original conception for the mission also resulted from three other specific 
motivations. The first was the fact that the existing education plan, Educación para 
Todos (Education for All) designed and executed by the Ministerio de Educación, Cultura 
y Deportes (Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sport or MECD) in 2002, did not 
adequately provide for educating the Venezuelan population excluded from the education 
system. The second was an “urgency on behalf of the National Executive”209 (read: 
Chávez) to instill basic literacy to no less than one million Venezuelans in no more than 
two months. And the third was a desire by the national government to meet Goal 4 of the 
2000 World Education Summit held in Dakar, Senegal: to achieve a fifty per cent 
improvement in adult literacy levels by 2015, especially for women, and facilitate 
equitable access to basic and continuing education for all adults.210 Essentially, Misión 
Robinson was created in June 2003 as a result of these motivations. 
                                                 
208 Fundación Samuel Robinson, “Fundación Samuel Robinson—Misión Robinson.” 
209 Yolanda D’Elia, Las Misiónes Sociales En Venezuela: Una Aproximación a Su Comprensión y 
Análisis, Instituto Lationamericano de Investigaciones Sociales (ILDIS), October 2006). 
210 Ibid. 
 84 
In addition, according to its promoters Misión Robinson is the response to the 
“darkness” in which the population lived, thanks to the incompetence of previous 
governments, under which just seven thousand citizens became literate annually.211 
Facing these long-lasting inequalities, the Chávez government created the mission, 
invoking Articles 102, 103 and 107 of the Venezuelan Constitution that define education 
as a human right and a social duty that must be accessible to everybody.212,  
Additional impetus for the mission stems from the October 2000 Energy and 
Social agreement signed by Cuba and Venezuela, the Convenio Integral de Cooperación 
(Integral Cooperation Accord), essentially a barter-style program in which Cuba exports 
“technical support in the fields of education, health care, sports, and science and 
technology,”213 in return for much-needed oil from Venezuela. This agreement provided 
the support necessary, in terms of manpower, expertise and material, to establish the 
initial operation of the mission, especially given such an ambitious timeline for 
increasing literacy by at least one million Venezuelans in less than two months (as 
previously mentioned).  
The Cuban support aided a “mobilization” of resources by the Chávez 
government to achieve the ambitious timeline. Indeed, the composition of the 
“Presidential Literacy Commission” announced by Chávez in Decree number 2,434 
reflects a national interagency effort. The commission was chaired by Captain (Ret.) 
Eliézer Otaiza, a longtime Chávez loyalist, but the most interesting aspect of it is the 
breadth of government agencies on it: the Vice-Minister of Culture; the Vice-Minister for 
Communications Management; President of the National Youth Institute; Director 
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Policies, Ministry of Higher Education; the 31st Infantry Brigade; the Unified Command 
of the Fuerzas Armadas Nacioneles (National Armed Forces or FAN); and the Director of 
the Bolivarian Ecological School “Simón Rodríguez.”214 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND CONFIGURATION 
As with all of the missions, Robinson seems to occupy a space within the 
organizational structure of the Venezuelan government that is at once parallel to its 
corollary ministry, in this case the Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Educacion 
(Ministry of Popular Power for Education), and subordinate to it at the same time. 
Indeed, it appears the mission was originally conceived as a foundation in order to fit into 
the organizational structure of the ministry. What sets the mission apart from its 
supporting ministry is its unique focus on the “traditionally excluded classes” within 
Venezuela, especially the indigenous populations and the poorer classes. The mission is 
run by the Ministry of Education through the Fundación Samuel Robinson, and its Office 
for Adult Education, and of course a presidential commission exists to oversee the 
mission as well, which is the same board as described in the previous section.  
The mission is structured into three phases as previously described, as well as 
three supporting components: Robinson Productivo (Robinson Productive), Fondo de 
Apoyo Solidario (Solidary Support Fund or FAS), and Robinson Internacional (Robinson 
International). The purpose of Robinson Productivo is to integrate real-world work 
opportunities, something akin to internships, into the mission in order to support the new 
socialist economic model of the country. The purpose of the FAS is to provide health care 
and social assistance support to students, facilitators, and administrators of the mission, 
and it was created by order of President Chávez in December 2004. The purpose of 
Robinson Internacional is to provide a mechanism for cooperation and interchange in the 
areas of education and sport, with Latin America countries which could benefit from such 
programs in the areas of literacy and comprehensive education. 215 
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Each individual class in the Robinson I program is composed of an average of 
twenty students, and for each class there is one facilitator. Beyond that there are few 
requirements for a class to take place, other than the actual location, which could be 
“someone’s home, a school classroom, a shed, or any other space which complies with 
the minimum requirements.”216 These minimum requirements are: it is a covered space, a 
facilitator is available, a VHS, a television, electrical power, and a blackboard, and of 
course the educational materials themselves. The members of the mission staff, or 
facilitators, are called Ejercito de la Luz (the Army of the Light) and the students (the 
participants) receive the title Patriotas (Patriots).217 Requirements for Robinson II and III 
are similar, albeit with smaller average class sizes.  
The website for the NGO Fundación Pedagógica Latinoamericana (Latin-
American Pedagogic Foundation) includes a series of videos that illustrate this concept in 
action.218 In fact, the lead video on the page, “Alfabetizacion: Yo Si Puedo” shows the 
process of a classroom taking shape, as the students bring the required components 
together in one student’s home: the TV, the media player, the reading materials, etc. 
Although in Spanish, it is a clear and informative look at the “Yo Si puedo” process that 
Misión Robinson uses as well. Other interesting aspects of the video are: it is a clip 
originally from Telesur, which is the broadcast company founded by the Bolivarian 
government; the video clearly makes reference to los Cubanos (the Cubans), and the 
location of the video is from Pasto which is in southwest Colombia, close to Ecuador. 
D. RESOURCES AND CAPABILITIES  
1. Budget  
Reliable budget figures are difficult to come by. However, some researchers’ 
findings account for 50 billion Bolivares (approximately $36 million according to 2003  
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exchange rates) assigned as the initial budget of the program in 2003,219 supplemented by 
30 billion more a bit later (approximately $21.5 million) that was obtained through 
banking taxation.220  
In addition, the website for the state oil company of Venezuela, PDVSA, cites a 
figure of $72 million dollars allocated to support the mission, ostensibly directly from 
PDVSA.221 This apparently reflects the total allocation toward the mission from PDVSA 
from 2004 until 2011, as the initial funding was apparently replaced by the funding 
directly from PDVSA beginning in 2004. In other words, the funding for the mission just 
from these figures provided above amounts to a bit over $16 million dollars per year, for 
the years 2003–2011. 
2. Facilities / Infrastructure and Staff / Personnel.  
To demonstrate the extent to which Cuba supported the mission, it is important to 
describe some of the components of the previously mentioned Cuban-Venezuelan 
cooperation agreement of 2000, the Convenio Integral de Cooperación (Integral 
Cooperation Accord). In the education field, the agreement covered four main points: 
deployment of advisors, educational video-rooms, educational techniques, and social 
media communications. The first point encompasses the quantity and quality of advisors 
in pre-school, special, elementary, middle, technical and professional schools, including 
the disposition of teachers destined for the project, “Bolivarian Schools.” The second 
point refers to the actual shipment of educational video-rooms produced in Cuba as well 
as the communication of Cuban experiences through the materials shown in the video-
rooms; this includes a specific emphasis on sharing the Cuban experience with “Youth  
 
                                                 
219 D’Elia, Las Misiónes Sociales En Venezuela: Una Aproximación a Su Comprensión y Análisis, 88. 
220 “Aprueban Recursos Para El Plan Robinson,” El Universal, July 13, 2003. 
221 “Misión Robinson: Yo Si Puedo I y II,” Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA), 
http://www.pdvsa.com/index.php?tpl=interface.sp/design/readsearch.tpl.html&newsid_obj_id=1501&news
id_temas=0 (accessed March 17, 2013). 
 88 
Computation Clubs.”222 The third and fourth points, educational techniques, and social 
media communications, refer to the education and training on communication via mass 
media.223  
By the end of 2005, around 234,000 ambientes (environments), the name given to 
each location where the classes take place, were installed in 2005 throughout Venezuela, 
with the support of 74 Cuban technicians and 50,000 volunteer members of the 
Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB).224 Essentially, the ambientes are created 
when the Cuban-provided educational materials are installed in any given location that 
meets the minimum requirement detailed previously in this section. In all, almost two 
million books, thousands of TVs, videos, and even reading glasses were brought from 
Cuba in order to set up the mission.225  
E. MISSION ACTIVITIES  
Regardless of whether or not the mission is well-organized, or whether the 
funding comes from taxation or from deviation of oil revenues, the results of the mission 
have been described as nothing short of outstanding. The biggest goal attained was the 
declaration of the country as “a territory free of illiteracy,” as announced by President 
Chávez on 28 October, 2005, due to the success of the mission in bringing literacy to 1.5 
million previously illiterate Venezuelans. However this claim is believed to be 
exaggerated (see Chapter III, Section E). It is reasonable to say that the mission did in 
fact provide an opportunity for education to many of the “historically disadvantaged” 
groups across Venezuela, from diverse Indian communities in nine states, to inmate 
populations, to the blind through provision of Braille books.226 
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Regardless, Misión Robinson is far from perfect. Some analysts forecast an 
uncertain future for the mission regarding its activities, proficiency and efficacy; 
particularly the benefits that the mission purports to provide to the general welfare of the 
country. Some of the problems with the mission are the low quality of the program 
presented by ill-trained facilitators and advisors, high truancy rates, and high rotation of 
personnel. These factors contribute to a climate of instability within the program. Besides 
the problems with human resources, there is also a problem with scarcity of teaching 
materials, and the poor condition of teaching facilities (the ambientes). This poor 
condition stands to reason as the requirements for an ambiente are so minimal, as 
mentioned in the previous section, and as seen in the videos referenced therein. Another 
problem is a lack of effective mechanisms for supervision and evaluation of teaching 
results.227 Corruption within the mission is another serious problem, given that several 
students migrate to different missions that offer higher scholarships such as Misión Che 
Guevara, or the number of scholarships is exaggerated by administrators in order to 
receive additional funds (although this problem is more prevalent in Misión Ribas than in 
Robinson).228  
Other issues in the mission seem not to be unique to it, but rather are symptomatic 
across many of the missions. Yolanda D’Elia and Francisco Cabezas point out quite 
concisely some of these flaws: 229   
1. The Missions evolved from a device for confronting political and 
economic adversity, to a mechanism for imposing institutional, political, 
and social control to advance the goals of the revolution. 
2. Educational missions, like Robinson, are vulnerable to influence by 
recognized revolutionary practitioners, rather than organizations dedicated 
[solely] to generate educational policies. 
3. The ideological and political character of the missions creates systemic 
vulnerabilities, and jeopardizes their continuity. 
At the end of the cited document, the analysts suggest that the only option to save 
the missions from failure is by abandoning their political-ideological commitment; 
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however, they cast doubt on this possibility, given the course the government chose in 
2006, actually reinforcing the political-ideological character of the missions.230  
F. MISIÓN ROBINSON: OVERT VERSUS COVERT PURPOSES 
At the beginning of this chapter we asserted that this mission is not only intended 
for purely educational purposes such as improving literacy in Venezuela, but that it is 
also used to for the ideological and political purposes of reinforcing Bolivarian ideology 
and strengthening the PSUV, Chávez’s political party. Our assertion is supported by 
Chávez’s own words:  
Every classroom or environment, as we call them, […], in each one of 
them, the students must build organization. The militants of the party, the 
Bolivarian circles, the reservists, the Francisco de Miranda Front, the 
facilitators in every classroom, the urban land committees, […] this is the 
strategic guidance and the fundamental frame for the new basic social 
order.231  
Although one could argue that these words are nothing extraordinary, or that they 
present no “hidden agenda,” but rather just legitimate presidential guidance for his social 
programs, the comments actually closely resemble descriptions of the cellular 
organization of the bolshevist party, of an underground organization, or even of a 
criminal network. The results of such a scheme are analyzed later on in this chapter. 
As previously mentioned, multiple official sources from the Venezuelan 
government publicize activities of Misión Robinson in countries like Nicaragua and 
Bolivia. Less publicized, if at all, are the efforts of the mission to support foreign citizens 
in other countries, and the circumstances under which these activities have been 
developed. We talk specifically of Colombia. 
A remarkable example is the Venezuelan behavior in 2010, when Colombia 
denounced Venezuela in the Organization of American States (OAS), accusing the 
Bolivarian government of providing safe haven in Venezuela to the Colombian terrorist 
groups FARC and ELN. The immediate consequence of this was that Chávez ordered the 
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freezing of diplomatic relations and militarization of the shared border.232 In the midst of 
this tense situation, Misión Robinson claimed more than three thousand displaced 
Colombian citizens in the Venezuelan state of Táchira became literate thanks to it. Edgar 
León, at that time the Venezuelan Vice-Minister of Education, asserted that “this is the 
response to those who have been trying to divide our countries with lies, because the 
diplomatic rupture is with the government, not with the people.”233 Almost 
simultaneously, in August 2010, Misión Robinson invited people from the two countries 
to participate in discussions about the political situation between Colombia and 
Venezuela, in order to “demonstrate to the world that the missions are not only for the 
Venezuelans. We have no discrimination to any nationality,”234 said Fredy Arana 
effusively, the coordinator of Misión Robinson in the municipality of Paez, Apure state. 
G. MISIÓN ROBINSON IN COLOMBIA: OBSERVATIONS FROM 
FIELDWORK 
Results of our fieldwork suggest that Mission Robinson is active in the 
Colombian education sphere. The noteworthy component of this activity is that it is 
accomplished via official Colombian governmental channels, and not on a covert basis, 
as we will demonstrate in this section. We first discuss an educational NGO in Colombia, 
which traces its roots to Cuba, and uses the same Cuban-developed teaching program that 
Mission Robinson does; then we discuss interviews we conducted in Colombia. 
1. Fundación Pedagógica Latinoamericana (Latin American Pedagogic 
Foundation) 
Through our research and fieldwork in Colombia, we came across a literacy 
program that is carried out via an agreement between several department-level 
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governments (equivalent to U.S. states) in Colombia, and the Cuban government. The 
implementation of the agreement and the execution of the literacy programs is carried out 
by an NGO called Fundación Pedagógica Latinoamericana (Latin American Pedagogic 
Foundation),235 which headquarters is located in one of the most exclusive 
neighborhoods of Bogotá, Colombia’s capitol city. (Both the Colombian and Cuban flags 
hang from the office’s walls.) The names of the foundation’s programs are the exact same 
names as the phases of Misión Robinson: Yo si puedo (Yes, I can), which corresponds to 
Robinson I; and Yo si puedo seguir (Yes, I can keep going), which corresponds to 
Robinson II.  
The foundation’s magazine, Ambito Pedagógico (Pedagogic Scope) includes 
information and articles that detail the sources for the foundation’s literacy programs, as 
well as the philosophy behind its particular pedagogical principles.236 Among the most 
important observations about this foundation is that its programs in Colombia Yo si puedo 
(Yes, I can), which corresponds to Robinson I; and Yo si puedo seguir (Yes, I can keep 
going), are Cuban programs; that is to say, they were developed in Cuba by the Cuban 
Ministry of Education. 
An interview in the magazine of Mario Lujan, a delegate of the Cuban Ministry of 
Education reports that approximately seventy-five thousand Colombian citizens in at least 
five different departments have graduated the Yo si puedo program.237 The Foundation’s 
Executive Director reports that the program has been successfully implemented in 
Bogotá, Boyacá, Cundinamarca, Santander, Cesar, and Nariño departments in 
Colombia.238 Lujan also states that this is a world-wide initiative that employs more than 
fifteen thousand Cuban instructors throughout the world.239 The Foundation describes 
itself as a “private, non-governmental and non-profit organization created in June of 2009 
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to support social pedagogy programs […] through agreements signed with the Cuban 
Ministry of Education and [Colombian] Department Governments.”240  
The foundation does not cite nor mention Venezuelan involvement in the 
programs, nor does it mention Misión Robinson. However, there are strong similarities 
between the foundation’s literacy programs in Colombia, and those of Misión Robinson. 
In addition, the content of the literacy programs and their teaching materials include 
material that is political or ideological in nature. We discuss the similarities and the 
content of the programs in the following paragraphs. 
The similarities between Misión Robinson and Fundación Pedagógica 
Latinoamericana are striking. As previously mentioned, Misión Robinson uses the very 
same names for its programs as do the foundation’s programs in Colombia. Another 
strong similarity is the description of the “educational environments” is exactly the same 
as the ambientes of the Robinson missions, and the structure of the classes and their 
sequencing is identical. Moreover, some of the videos that show the Foundation’s 
achievements are produced by Telesur,241 the channel created by the Bolivarian regime 
to support its political agenda and to which we referred to previously (see Chapter II). 
The content of the magazine Ambito Pedagógico (Pedagogic Scope) implies a 
pro-Cuban political-ideological agenda that is instilled through the educational programs 
already mentioned, which is doctrine that contradicts the regular texts and teaching 
procedures in Colombia. The magazine is replete with articles written by Cuban 
specialists and advisors, articles that praise the Cuban revolution and its leader, Fidel 
Castro, and simultaneously criticize countries and doctrines opposed to the Cuban 
Revolution.  
One of the Cuban Advisors, Jesús Martinez, quotes Fidel Castro regarding which 
social factors contribute to illiteracy, and then follows that with regrets that the goals of 
the program were not fully achieved in Honduras “…due to the coup against President 
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Zelaya.”242 Another contributor, Maria Dolores Abad, who is referenced as a pedagogue 
of the Instituto Pedagógico Latinoamericano y Caribeño (Pedagogic Institute for Latin 
American and the Caribbean or IPLAC),243 comments that the program must follow the 
logic of “… the dialectical materialism [that] evolved as a general method to analyze the 
relationship [of] nature-society.”244 She adds that “…the philosophical focus of this 
program is given by the materialistic idea.”245 The article finishes by summarizing that 
the program’s context must respond to globalization trends, providing the students with a 
critical view of the world to “…understand how they are negatively affected by the 
organization of the geographic space in relation to the hegemonic interests of 
Capitalism.”246   
Another teaching (pedagogic) expert from Cuba, Guillermo Roig, praises the way 
Cuba has prioritized education since the triumph of the revolution in 1959, keeping intact 
the basic revolutionary principles that have supported the educational policies since then. 
He also comments on the success of the literacy programs in the Venezuelan Bolivarian 
Revolution and 28 more countries, including Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Bolivia.247 The 
end of the article states that “Cuba develops constantly [despite] the many negative 
things, often exaggerations, and sometimes pure lies”248 against the country. Another 
example of the global extent of the literacy program comes from Australia, wherein “The 
Cuban government awarded literacy certificates to a second group of Australian 
Aborigines who learned to read and write thanks to the Cuban “Yes I Can” [i.e., Yo si 
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puedo] method.”249 The report also states that “The “Yes I Can” method was developed 
by the Cuban Institute of Pedagogy for Latin America and the Caribbean, or IPLAC, and 
in 2006 received the UNESCO King Sejong Literacy Prize.”250 In sum, the materials 
from the Ámbito Pedagógico magazine are written almost exclusively by Cuban 
pedagogic experts, and the instruction method used by the foundation in Colombia was 
developed by IPLAC, an institution of the Cuban Ministry of Education. Thus, the 
philosophical background of the program is Cuban, and therefore its intent is suspicious. 
2. Interviews in Colombia Regarding Misión Robinson 
Although the Latin American Pedagogic Foundation has been officially operating 
in Colombia since 2009, activity similar to it has been going on prior to then. In an 
interview with Fernando Londoño, former Colombian Minister of the Interior and Justice 
from 2002 to 2004, and currently an analyst and journalist, he described a discussion 
between himself and the Colombian Minister of Education at the time, Cecilia Maria 
Velez. The discussion was about the presence of Cuban advisors in Colombia who 
provided literacy programs, advisors that the Minister of Education considered as 
“awesome educators.”251 Londoño, in turn, contested Velez’ perception as “naïve,” 
arguing that behind these programs was a very simple but efficient platform for 
advancing [communist] ideology, simplified to one fundamental idea: “Hatred toward all 
those who have a penny.”252 According to Dr. Londoño, the simple idea of “hatred 
towards those who have something” via the literacy programs is the most effective 
method for the Cubans to transmit their ideas. Questioned about why Uribe’s government 
would allow the presence of Cuban advisors in Colombia, despite the public rivalry 
between Uribe and the Castro-Chávez axis, Dr. Londoño justified this discrepancy as  
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simply due to too many other pressing problems when President Uribe took office.253 Or 
in other words, as politicians across the world are all too familiar, there were simply 
“bigger fish to fry” for President Uribe.  
Although previous discussion focused on the Fundación Pedagógica 
Latinoamericana and its literacy programs in Colombia that use a method developed in 
Cuba, these programs are linked to Misión Robinson by the fact they both use the Cuban-
developed methods and programs, and by other interviews with average citizens, 
intelligence officials, and political analysts. Cúcuta citizen Señor Martinez said in an 
interview that Mission Robinson is very popular among the community because the 
mission awards a bachillerato (roughly equivalent to a high school degree) in just 6 
months to the attendants, even granting scholarships to Cuba to students who demonstrate 
above average performance.254  A Colombian intelligence official also describes that, 
according to credible human intelligence sources, Misión Robinson is intended to teach 
revolutionary education in order to create a “revolutionary army.” Referring to San 
Cristóbal, the large Venezuelan city close to Cúcuta, the intelligence official stated that 
several Colombians have been invited to attend revolutionary talks in a club located 
there.255  
Carlos Sierra, a Colombian political analyst and vice-president of the Truth 
Colombia Federation, asserts that the missions are a “concerted effort to gain the support 
of the population,”256 arguing that the Socialism of the 21st Century is promoted through 
the missions and led by the Sao Paulo Forum. The educational programs, Robinson 
included, fit a pattern of entrenching themselves into a society in order to transform its 
thinking.257 
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In addition to the interviews, public documents establish a pattern of political 
interference conducted by the Cuban-Venezuelan alliance on Colombian soil, closely 
associated with educational programs. Citing the Colombian magazine Cambio,258 Sierra 
described how, during the Central American and Caribbean Games that took place in 
Cartagena, Colombia, in 2006, Venezuelan and Cuban officials from their country’s 
respective sports delegations were tasked to promote revolutionary values in poor 
neighborhoods of the city, rather than attending to official sports delegation business. A 
specific example of this is the Venezuelan Vice-Minister of Culture and Sport, Eduardo 
Esteban Alvarez, who, accompanied by Cuban delegates, carried out political 
proselytizing throughout the city, recruiting a group of young Colombians to travel to 
Venezuela and receive sports training.259   
Another controversial case occurred in 2007 when Jose Luis Pirela, a 
Congressman from the Venezuelan State of Zulia, and Victor Hugo Merino, Director of 
the Bolivarian University of Venezuela, were expelled from Colombia because they were 
accused of illegal interference in domestic politics and unauthorized political 
proselytizing. The situation took place in the city of Baranoa (south of Barranquilla on 
the Caribbean coast), where these two Venezuelan officials were invited to sign 
cooperation agreements on medical attention and medicine between the local government 
and the Venezuelan government.260 The problem arose when the Venezuelan guests 
declared that:  
Here in Colombia we have to begin from the bottom to the top, from the 
locals and regionals, to allow the Bolivarians to reach the Presidency...We 
are here because of that, because we trust these leaders to lead local and 
regional governments in a revolutionary manner...We want revolutionary 
local and regional governments.261   
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The following anecdote alludes to the real motivation behind the Venezuelan 
government-sponsored educational programs writ large, and not just Misión 
Robinson. The article follows Gabriel Guerrero, a Colombian citizen eager to study 
medicine, who was selected along with 32 other applicants to study in the Escuela 
Latinoamericana de Medicina Alejandro Próspero Reverend (Latin American School 
of Medicine “Alejandro Próspero Reverend,” or ELAM), an institution located in the 
Venezuelan state of Miranda which was founded in 2005 as part of the Sandino 
agreement between Venezuela and Cuba.262 Guerrero was unhappily surprised when 
he realized that instead of medical training, he was receiving revolutionary 
indoctrination that included the study of “Latin American thinkers” like Che Guevara 
and Tirofijo, the founder of the FARC. Thoroughly disenchanted and feeling cheated, 
he dropped out of the program and returned to Colombia in order to avoid 
“brainwashing,” where he has subsequently received threatening calls for being “a 
traitor to the revolutionary cause.”263     
H. CONCLUSIONS 
Misión Robinson is touted by the Venezuelan regime as one of its flagship 
missions with an outstanding track record of achievements. The reduction of the illiteracy 
rates to apparently record lows, the fact the mission is free of charge, its wide coverage 
throughout much of Venezuela, and its concentration on service to “traditionally 
excluded classes,” are at first glance, definitely worthy of applause, and apparently free 
from any ideological bent. It is extremely difficult to argue against the merits of a free, 
nationwide, literacy program. Furthermore, it is reasonable that the Venezuelan 
government would include such an apparently successful mission as part of a foreign 
policy program to “export” successful missions to neighboring countries.  
However, upon closer inspection, the reality of Mission Robinson appears to be 
quite different. A myriad of factors negatively affect the performance of the mission in 
                                                 





pursuit of its stated mission, factors that range from bureaucratic ambitions, to its 
undeniable ideological and political character, to ill-trained facilitators. Despite its 
problems, it is being still exported to different countries, including Colombia. 
Also, similar to the other missions, the Bolivarian regime uses Robinson as a tool 
to advance socialism and its ideals, both within Venezuela and abroad. In effect, the 
mission strayed from a single focus on providing a literacy program, to a mixed focus of 
providing a literacy program and advancing an ideological agenda. The interviews and 
secondary sources referenced within this chapter attest to the ideological agenda within 
the mission, as well as related literacy programs in Cuba that use the Cuban-developed 
methodology.  
From the evidence collected about the presence of Misión Robinson in Colombia, 
we may conclude that the Cuban literacy program, if not the mission itself, has an 
established presence in Colombia. That 75,000 people taught through the Cuban-
Colombian agreements in many departments throughout Colombia is significant. The 
socialist-leaning political-ideological orientation in the Cuban-developed method and 
material is evident. This orientation is worrisome considering that Colombia has been 
fighting a terrorist threat from the FARC for the last five decades, which is ideologically 
aligned with the revolutionary ideals promoted from Cuba and Venezuela. Behind Misión 
Robinson exists a clear intention to instill revolutionary ideals, or at least sympathy 
thereunto, in the people made literate by the program. This doctrine is completely 
contradictory to the long-standing democratic values intrinsic to Colombia. 
The examples of Cuban and Venezuelan activities from public media accounts 
also suggest covert intent of education-related activities that are otherwise overt, 
specifically with respect to using events such as international sporting events to engage 
with youth. This type of activity is made more suspicious by the fact that it was 
apparently Venezuelan and Cuban officials working together at the 2006 Central 
American and Caribbean Games in Cartagena, Colombia.264 The personal account of 
Gabriel Guerrero, a Colombian who travelled to Venezuela ostensibly for medical 
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training, is also persuasive, especially with his reference to feeling “duped” and 
“brainwashed” regarding the true nature of the education he had signed up for.265 
We conclude that the activities of Misión Robinson within Colombia are a 
component of a larger activity of teaching literacy that is inspired by, or actually is 
composed of, the Cuban-developed methodology of the Yo si puedo literacy program 
promulgated in Colombia by the NGO, Fundación Pedagógica Latinoamericana (Latin 
American Pedagogic Foundation). And that furthermore, although the foundation asserts 
that it is an NGO without any government ties, the almost exclusive reliance on Cuban 
contributors to its magazine, its connection to Instituto Pedagógico Latinoamericano y 
Caribeño (Pedagogic Institute for Latin America and the Caribbean or IPLAC), a 
component of the Cuban Ministry of Education, and the fact that the Yo si puedo literacy 
program is developed in Cuba all imply a strong ideological component of the program. 
This is reinforced by the observations of D’Elia and Cabezas, when they stated that in 
2006, the Venezuelan government reinforced the political-ideological character of the 
missions.266 Thus, the activities described in this chapter actually align more closely with 
hypothesis three from the introduction chapter: the Cuban and Venezuelan governments 
use the legitimate status of Bolivarian missions in Colombia for both legitimate and 
illegitimate state activities to support Venezuelan and Cuban foreign policy. 
 
                                                 
265 En El Lugar Equivocado. 
266 D’Elia and Cabezas, Las Misiónes Sociales En Venezuela, 13. 
 101 
VII. MISION GUICAIPURO: THE POLITICS OF INDIGENOUS 
MOBILIZATION 
Cacique is the Spanish word to designate the chief of an Indian tribe; he is the one 
who holds authority, governance, and even supernatural powers. Waica Epuro is the 
name of the most famous Cacique of what is now Venezuela, who ferociously defended 
the motherland against the Spanish conquistadors.267  The word Guicaipuro is the 
hispanicized version of Waica Epuro, and it is also the name given to the Bolivarian 
Mission established in order to support the indigenous tribes in Venezuela, as well as 
throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.  
The argument of this chapter is that Misión Guicaipuro was created by the 
Chavista government in order to pursue two specific purposes: first, solidify a grass roots 
organization composed of the indigenous tribes to perpetuate Bolivarianism in power; 
and second, to expand the influence of the Bolivarian Revolution to other countries, by 
indoctrinating indigenous communities abroad with the ideology of Chávez’s Socialism 
of the 21st Century.  
Through the description of its mission, origins and development, organizational 
structure and configuration, resources, capabilities, and activities, we demonstrate how 
Misión Guaicaipuro helps the Bolivarian regime in achieving the purposes stated above, 
including the expansion of its revolutionary ideology to its neighbor Colombia.  Before 
we continue, definition of some terms used throughout this chapter is in order. The 
Spanish words, pueblos or etnias are used interchangeably to refer to Indian communities 
and indigenous tribes both within Venezuela and abroad. These definitions are necessary 
for understanding this chapter. This concept of one “people” (i.e. the pueblo, or one 
“ethnic group,” e.g., the etnia) is how these communities see themselves: as pueblos 
without borders. This means—for instance—that members of the etnia Wayúu, or the 
Wayúu tribe, born either in Colombia or in Venezuela, do not recognize the political 
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border in between the two countries and embrace, instead, ethnic linkages that make them 
members of one and the same pueblo. (A corollary within the United States is the Navajo 
Nation, which crosses state borders; although the Navajo Nation is spread across borders 
with sub-groups and sub-tribes, all members recognize themselves as members of the 
Navajo Nation.) The promoters of Bolivarianism, aware of this cross-border construct, 
take advantage of it, as we will show in this chapter. 
A. OVERT PURPOSE OF THE MISSION  
The overall purpose of Guicaipuro, according to the government, is to promote 
“the active and comprehensive inclusion”268 of the Indian communities in the socialist 
transformation of the country, thus accomplishing the constitutional mandate of officially 
recognizing these pueblos. The specific objectives of the mission are stated as follows:269  
1. To demarcate and properly title the lands of indigenous peoples and 
communities. 
2. To promote harmonious and sustainable development of the indigenous 
peoples, through a vision that respects their different conception of 
development.  
3. To promote the integral development of the indigenous peoples, ensuring 
the effective enjoyment of their social rights (health, education, housing, 
water and sanitation), and economic, cultural and political rights enshrined 
in the Bolivarian Constitution. 
4. Promote, develop, and execute the Bolivarian policies intended to settle, 
with the entities of the national government, the historic debt owed to the 
organized indigenous communities, by enforcing the Simon Bolivar 
National Plan, through the perspective of a single Bolivarian revolution 
and a single Commander President. 
B. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 
Facing the possibility of an electoral defeat and harassed by economic and fiscal 
restrictions, the Venezuelan government presented the missions in order to speed up the 
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revolution and deepen the implementation of the Socialist program.270 Thanks to this 
adroit political move, the Chávez regime survived the referendum that attempted to oust 
him from power in 2004. Misión Guicaipuro benefitted from the “New Strategic Plan” 
conceived by the government to confront the critical situation in order to maintain 
popular support. The first attempt to create this mission was made in 2003 during the 
celebration of the Day of Indigenous National Resistance,271 but Guicaipuro was not 
formalized until 2004, through Presidential Decree 3040.272 
Initially, the mission was a component of the Ministry of Environment and 
Natural Resources; in 2005 the mission was moved to the Ministry of Social 
Development and Participation, where it remained until 2007. In 2007, when Chávez 
created the Ministry of Popular Power for Indigenous Peoples as he began to fully 
implement his Socialism of the 21st Century, and the mission became aligned with this 
ministry.273 An interesting component of the Socialism of the 21st Century is the increase 
in the number of government ministries. Under Chávez, ministries increased from 
thirteen to 27,274 and there are currently 25 ministries according to the Venezuelan 
Embassy in the U.S., as of April 2013. 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND CONFIGURATION 
Similar to several other missions, Guicaipuro’s organization is as eclectic as the 
Bolivarian ideology. The CEIMS website states there are two lines of action within 
Guicaipuro: the first is titled “Social Assistance,” with a focus on health and registration 
of the population, or in other words, cedulación, the issuance of the national ID cards. 
The second line, “Project Development,” focuses on implementation of productive 
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community-based projects.275 There are also four components that constitute a 
“fundamental axis” of the program, as Viet Juan Felix posits. They are:276   
1. Ethno-development: Financial support, education, health services, etc. 
2. Strengthening of community management: Incorporating the pueblos into 
the economic and governance activities of the country. 
3. Providing care to indigenous homeless and migrants: return these citizens 
to their place of origin. 
4. Demarcate and properly title the lands of indigenous peoples and 
communities: return ancestral lands back to their historical owners. 
In order to accomplish these objectives, the mission functions as a mediator or 
coordinator between the indigenous peoples and the other missions, in order to connect 
the services of the other missions to the 36 etnias throughout Venezuela.277 In other 
words, Misión Guicaipuro acts as a “solution provider”, connecting the various ethnic 
communities with the services offered by its sister missions or government institutions. 
For instance, to support the etnia Chaima in October 2012, three different institutions 
converged, not only Misión Guicaipuro, but also the PSUV,278 which is somewhat 
curious given that the PSUV is not a governmental institution, but rather the political 
party of President Chávez. The important pattern, however, is that Guicaipuro serves to 
connect the various indigenous communities with the social services available via other 
institutions, even if it itself doesn’t necessarily deliver the services. However, it is 
important to place this in context, because the function of connecting often-isolated 
indigenous communities with government services is itself a service, given the many 
geographic barriers that exist throughout Venezuela, especially the lack of services in the 
vast and sparsely populated south of the country. For example, although approximately 
50 per cent of Venezuela’s land area lies south of the Orinoco River, this region is  
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extremely sparsely populated, and this is the region where many of the indigenous 
communities that Misión Guicaipuro is charged with connecting to the rest of Venezuela 
reside.279 
D. RESOURCES AND CAPABILITIES: MISIÓN GUICAIPURO AS A 
MOBILIZATION STRUCTURE 
Misión Guicaipuro is an integral part of the Bolivarian mobilization structure, 
with its particular focus the indigenous population. A mobilization structure is, “…the 
most effective form of organization...based on partly autonomous and contextually rooted 
local units linked by connective structures, and coordinated by formal organizations.”280 
Although generally speaking these types of structures are associated with pre-
revolutionary processes, the Bolivarian government of Venezuela uses it [the Bolivarian 
mobilization structure] to perpetuate itself in power and to expand the revolutionary 
process beyond the Venezuelan borders. Likewise, the constant references to revolution 
by the Chávez regime, now the Maduro regime, imply that they see themselves as within 
the process of a revolution that is still ongoing, and therefore the need for a mobilization 
structure to mobilize their supporters. 
Some political theorists concur that mobilization structures provide the basis for 
what is called a “social insurgency.”281 Three crucial traits of the mobilization structure 
are necessary in order to create a social insurgency: the level of organization or readiness, 
the collective assessment or insurgent consciousness, and the political alignment or 
structure of political opportunities.282 Through the use of these factors, we arrive at an 
improved understanding of Misión Guicaipuro.  
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1. Budget 
The PDVSA website reports that it supported Misión Guicaipuro with 11 million 
dollars from its inception until 2009,283 a relatively small amount compared with other 
missions published on the PDVSA website. However, given that the mission primarily 
operates as a coordinator between indigenous populations and other missions, the small 
budget is not necessarily a reflection of lesser importance of the mission, but rather a 
reflection of its role as a coordinator, and a smaller mission overall.  
E. MISSION ACTIVITIES 
Despite the apparent small size of the mission and its budget, its capabilities 
should not be understated. Since the mission’s founding through 2010, it has distributed: 
“710,635 ration kits; 151,336 school kits; 412,752 medical check-ups; 4,415 fishing kits, 
3,220 agricultural kits and 189,766 kilos of seeds.” In addition, 1,335 homes have been 
built through the Indigenous Community Councils, and 284 generators, 72 river 
transports, and 720 water tanks have been distributed.”284 The summary of achievements 
here suggests that much of the activity of Misión Guicaipuro is devoted to small-scale 
and achievable projects intended to improve the day-to-day life of the indigenous 
peoples. Given some of the immense geographic challenges associated with reaching 
much of the population, this is a prudent strategy. 
According to the 2011 Venezuelan census, approximately 700,000 Venezuelans 
are classified as indigenous out of a population of approximately 28.9 million, or 
approximately 2.8 per cent of the population is classified as indigenous.285 Although it is 
unknown how many of them are active electorally, we can assume that 60 percent of the 
indigenous population is of voting age, based on Venezuelan voting age 
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demographics.286 Using this estimate, 420,000 indigenous people are potential voters in 
Venezuela, a number roughly equal to five percent of the total votes that Chávez in the 
October 2012 presidential election.287 This gives an idea of the size of the electoral bloc 
within the indigenous population, assuming that all votes are mobilized.  
The aforementioned Bolivarian mobilization structure requires human and 
material resources; Misión Guicaipuro’s delivers these resources from within the 
indigenous population by convening, organizing, and mobilizing the indigenous 
population of Venezuela on behalf of the Bolivarian government. This mobilization is 
actually used by the Chávez regime to perpetuate itself in power, and subsequently to 
expand the Socialism of the 21st Century abroad, as we proceed to demonstrate. 
1. Political Activities of Misión Guicaipuro 
Domestically, the mission unabashedly posts political activities on its website, for 
example indigenous communities’ “getting out the vote” on behalf of Chávez’s political 
party, the PSUV.288 Many of the “latest headlines” profile activities within the 
indigenous communities that refer to the presidential election on October 7th 2012 
(nicknamed the “7-O Day”): “Indigenous Patrollers of the PSUV ready for 7-O;” 
“Indigenous Machinery Ready for the Battle of 7-O;” “Indigenous Pueblos in Bolívar 
State Celebrate Chávez Reelection.”289 The indigenous effort to support President 
Chávez by mobilizing voters during the elections is very similar—if not the same—as the 
effort described in the Identidad chapter (Chapter IV, Section F): “Red Dots,” the “1 x 10 
technique,” and “patrollers” are core elements of this effort that are common to both 
Misión Guicaipuro and Identidad.290  
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2. International Outreach and Conventions 
In the international arena, Guaicaipuro extends its role beyond Venezuela through 
related organizations and events. Principal among these is the “Abya Yala” or “Abya 
Ayala” international convention of indigenous peoples. The word is an indigenous word 
that means “Latin America.” It is also a “multicultural convention founded on strong anti-
imperialist and anti-hegemonic bases, which are recognized as actions and policies 
principally of the government of the United States.”291 The movement defines its 
geographic scope as, “from Alaska to Patagonia,” and its principal role as defending 
indigenous peoples against the aggressive policies of the “North American empire.”292 
The Ministry for Indigenous Affairs (the ministry that Misión Guicaipuro is aligned with) 
sponsors the Congreso Gran Nación de Pueblos Indígenas Antiimperialistas del Abya 
Yala (International Congress of the Great Nation of the Anti-Imperialist Indigenous 
Peoples), an event that has taken place annually in Venezuela since 2007, with the 
participation not only of the Venezuelan etnias, but also of communities from several 
countries, notably Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and the United States.293 
Parallel to the Abya Ayala convention is the Bolivarian Congress of Indo-
American Youth.  This is an initiative implemented by the Bolivarian government since 
2008 in order to solidify the revolutionary ideals and provide indigenous youth a means 
to participate in the development of Socialism of the 21st Century. This is a sizeable 
commitment by the Bolivarian government: the summits take place in Venezuela and, 
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congress enjoys international participation from multiple countries. For instance, the IV 
Congress that took place in Caracas in 2011 gathered more than 400 participants from 
Venezuela and seventeen other countries.295  
a. President Chávez and the Closing Ceremony of the First 
Bolivarian Congress of Indo-American Youth 
The Closing Ceremony of the First Bolivarian Congress of Indo-American 
Youth provides ample insight into the international aspirations and the overt purposes 
that Misión Guaicaipuro pursues through the Congress. The following key excerpts and 
quotes are from the transcripts of the closing speech by Hugo Chávez at the end of the 
First Congress.296 The closing ceremony was attended by President Chávez and President 
Evo Morales of Bolivia, conferring a high level of significance on the event simply by 
their presence.  
The ceremony begins with an invocation to the spirit of the buffalo by the 
Chief of the Cheyenne Tribe in South Dakota, Joseph Brint Plenting. He follows that with 
praises to Chávez, Evo Morales, Venezuela, and Bolivia. Following a presentation of 
traditional dances, President Chávez is introduced and in his opening remarks, praises 
Evo Morales, the indigenous Bolivian President who that very same day (August 11, 
2008) won crucial elections in his country. 
Later on during the closing ceremony, Manuel Mariña, President of the 
University Simon Rodriguez, reports on a project in Amazonas state (the southernmost 
state in Venezuela) and “home to 19 indigenous peoples,”297 to establish an Indigenous 
People’s University there. Chávez replies that Latin America is a name arbitrarily 
imposed, because the continent’s real identity is Indo-America.298 Chávez, citing the 
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Latin American writer Señor Galeano, opines that indigenous communities are socialist 
by nature, and that they have a lot of to offer to the Socialism of the 21st Century.299 He 
goes on to praise the relevance of Misión Guaicaipuro in its role of gathering these 
indigenous “warriors” against imperialism,300  and before swearing in the participants of 
the congress, he exhorts the attendees to become the power behind the movement to 
achieve revolutionary transformation from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego.301  
During his comments, President Chávez also invited the people to rebel 
against the cultural colonization imposed by foreign forces, demanding that the Congress 
become an annual event to renew the commitment to the fight against capitalism and 
imperialism.302 He also suggests that the annual Youth Congress become a center of 
debate, “and although you will disperse today around the continent, maintain the links 
among yourselves, and establish permanent organizations,”303 using all the technology 
and communication means available. The closing ceremony ends with an oath 
administered by President Chávez to the participants: 
Do you swear not to rest your arms nor your souls until we have the Great 
Homeland, united and free, and socialist; Do you swear to keep the flame 
alive and growing from this Indo-American Bolivarian Congress of 
Warrior Youth against poverty and imperialism and for socialism, do you 
swear my fellow Indians, do you swear?304  
The aforementioned activities—the partisan activities on the website, and 
the international outreach via conventions—suggest that Misión Guaicaipuro is a vehicle 
to promote Bolivarian regime’s power structure and ideology, and is perceived by the 
regime as a crucial instrument in promoting “social insurgency” among indigenous 
peoples. Going back to Tarrow’s definition of a mobilization structure previously 
                                                 







cited,305 the indigenous communities dispersed in Venezuela and throughout Latin 
America comprise the “local units” of the structure; the Congress and associated 
organizations are the “connective structures;” and the “formal organization” coordinating 
all of it is Misión Guicaipuro, and through it the Bolivarian government. 
In addition, the phases of social insurgency described by McAdams306 
previously referenced also apply to the case of Misión Guicaipuro. The congresses and 
the mission provide a level of organization and organizational readiness; an “insurgent 
consciousness” is created through the rhetoric of imperialism, poverty, oppression, and 
exclusion. In addition, the “American Empire” and its “lackey states” [read, Colombia] 
make for a convenient “ideal devil”307 for President Chávez to present to all of the 
indigenous peoples, and presented to the etnias through Guaicaipuro, as the foreigner 
responsible for all the hardships of the indigenous peoples. The last necessary element in 
McAdam’s model to generate insurgency is the structure of political opportunities. 
Within Venezuela, each election is that political opportunity, but internationally, the 
political opportunities vary by country. 
F. GUAICAIPURO: OVERT VERSUS COVERT PURPOSES 
1. Interviews 
Venezuela has always considered Colombia as a peer competitor, in fact its main 
rival, especially in military affairs. For planning purposes, virtually all of Venezuelan war 
plans are oriented against Colombia. Mission Guaicaipuro serves a strategic purpose in 
addition to a political-electoral purpose, because building a popular support base within 
Colombia via the mission is a component of Bolivarian military strategy vis a vis 
Colombia, as the below interviews demonstrate. 
Isidro Perez, a retired Venezuelan Colonel exiled in Colombia, stated that 
throughout his time in the Venezuelan Armed Forces, all of the war games were planned 
against Colombia. However, it was only after the Bolivarian government of President 
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Chávez assumed power, that a new concept to war plans against Colombia was added: 
“Chavismo imposed an ideological-political bias [on the war games] that called for using 
the FARC and ELN.”308  Col (ret.) Perez stated that he personally observed several 
FARC members in Venezuela, which he understood as part of the normal expansionist 
revolutionary process wherein the FARC and ELN are the points of contact in Colombia 
for the Venezuelan government.309 Perez’s arguments coincide, albeit unexpectedly, with 
the expression used by a member of the Venezuelan intelligence service who, despite 
vehemently defending the expansionist aims of Bolivarianism (this official rejected the 
term expansionism and recommended Latin Americanism, brotherhood, solidarity, etc. 
instead), referred to the relationship between the Venezuelan government and the FARC 
as, “something like alligators at the same well.”310 The unexpected convergence of the 
comments, one from an exiled Venezuelan Colonel currently living in Bogota, and the 
other from a current official of the Venezuelan intelligence service, is worth noting here. 
Doctor Carlos Sierra, Vice-President of Federación Verdad Colombia (Truth 
Colombia Federation), describes a similar relationship among the Venzuelan government, 
the terrorist groups FARC and ELN in Colombia, and the etnias that are served by Misión 
Guaicaipuro. Dr. Sierra has been studying this issue for many years, and one of the 
organizations within Federación Verdad Colombia, Colombian Cultural Identity, 
conducted an investigation in La Guajira. Specifically, the investigation was with the 
Wayúu community, one of the Colombian etnias that has been benefited the most from 
Misión Guicaipuro.311  
Sierra believes that Misión Guicaipuro’s efforts are facilitated by the pattern of 
neglect of the Wayúu population inside Colombia by the Colombian government, a 
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situation that is wisely exploited by the Venezuelan regime through the missions.312 
Colombian Cultural Identity conducted interviews in the Wayúu community which were 
recorded, and which led Sierra to the conclusion that many of these citizens prefer to be 
Venezuelans rather than Colombians, apparently influenced by the Venezuelan 
government through the missions.313  
Some of the videos are summarized in Sierra’s book when he cites Maria Luisa 
Ruiz, cultural and ethnic coordinator of the Wayúu community in La Guajira. She 
acknowledges that the benefits received by the Wayúu from the Venezuelan government 
“have initiated a public consultation process within the community about whether or not 
Colombian Guajira becomes part of the Venezuelan Guajira.”314  
The videos encompass comments from several Wayúu who talk about the support 
received from the Venezuelan government, specifically through Misión Guaicaipuro. For 
instance, Maria Luisa speaks about scholarships and transportation subsidies received, 
and other Wayúu women talk about their feelings and gratitude toward President Chávez, 
labeling themselves as Chavistas. Another community leader describes how the 
Venezuelan government is going to provide the equipment for a Wayúu  hospital, while 
another Wayúu woman explains how Misión Robinson provides literacy programs to her 
own family just across the border [in Venezuela] which is walking distance from her 
house.315   
One of the videos shows a teenager talking about a project called Wuayunakii, 
which is described as a bi-national integration venture for the Wayúu community, and 
which has a publication with the same name. The project also has a website316 and 
official locations in the Venezuelan state of Maracaibo and in the city of Maicao, 
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Colombia.  The website includes links to Wuayunakii publications317 which are generous 
in praise to the Bolivarian regime, including such rhetoric as “on our way to Indo-
American Socialism,” “Indian Resistance,” “Indigenous pueblos in revolution,” 
“rebellion, independence, and revolution,” and so forth. In sum, the video interviews are 
evidence of the effects of the Venezuelan government’s outreach through the 
Guaicaipuro mission. Specifically, the overall effect is an increase in trust and allegiance 
by the Colombia Wayúu to the Venezuelan government, as a result of assistance provided 
to them, especially assistance through Misión Guaicaipuro. 
Even though the Wayúu etnia seems to be the most influenced by the 
Guaicaipuro mission, the mission’s activities in Colombia are not limited to only the 
Wayúu . In an interview with a Colombian intelligence official, he mentioned that the 
indigenous people Motilón Bari, traditionally located along the border between the 
Venezuelan state of Táchira and the Colombian department of Norte de Santander, have 
also benefited from the mission.318 This official asserts that the most important goal of 
the mission is to create a dependency loop, whereby the Motilón Bari community 
becomes dependent on the mission. In addition, credible reporting indicates that the ELN, 
a Colombian terrorist group, uses the mission for safe haven within the Motilón Bari 
etnia on the Venezuelan side of the border. In return for the safe haven, the insurgent 
group facilitates transportation for the mission’s personnel and for the Motilón Bari 
themselves, to access the remote locations of the Motilón Bari.319  
Although we provide evidence that the covert purpose of the mission is to create a 
social insurgency using indigenous communities, other interviews suggest that other 
minority communities, beyond just indigenous communities, are also targeted by the 
mission. In 2007 Rafael Guarín, former  Colombian Vice-Minister of Defense and at that 
time a political analyst, interviewed a man named Juan Efraín Mendoza Gamba who 
introduced himself as the Secretary General of Federación Nacional Sindical Unitaria 
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Agropecuaria (Federation of National Agriculture Trade Unions or FENSUAGRO), an 
agrarian union association that advocates for small farmers and workers throughout 
Colombia. Guarín, who still has personal copies of that interview, was interested in 
learning about the mobilization processes in different parts of Colombia and he received 
Mendoza’s statement about how the Bolivarian missions supported a “mobilization 
process” that consisted of organization, indoctrination, and training in the southern part of 
Colombia with a myriad of rural, indigenous, peasant, and minority groups.320 
Two issues raised in the previous interview are worth highlighting. The first is 
that FENSUAGRO has a national profile and works with other organizations that work 
for minority interests, like Coordinacion Nacional Indigena y Campesina (National 
Indigenous and Peasant Coordination Committee or CONAIC)  and the  Consejo 
Nacional Campesino Negro e Indígena de Colombia  (Black and Indian National 
Congress of Colombia or CNI).321 Second is that the above mentioned Mendoza was 
captured by the Colombian Army in 2009, in an operation against one of the most 
notorious of the FARC’s leaders, alias Negro Antonio, when Mendoza visited the FARC 
leader’s camp on the outskirts of Bogota.322 Although neither Mendoza nor Guarín use 
the specific name of Misión Guaicaipuro during the interview, the connection between 
FENSUAGRO via its Secretary General, Mendoza, and the FARC, and FENSUAGRO 
with the Bolivarian missions, raises suspicion that the missions are using these 
organizations to extend Venezuelan government influence throughout Colombia.  
G. CONCLUSIONS 
Misión Guaicaipuro is the Venezuelan government’s outreach mission to the 
indigenous pueblos within Venezuela, as well as its coordinating organization for 
outreach to international indigenous communities. The mission, although apparently 
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smaller than other missions in terms of budget and size, occupies a unique niche role as a 
“point of contact” for the indigenous pueblos to connect with the other missions. Thus, 
the mission enjoys a relatively high profile, not only within Venezuela but also without, 
because in effect it is the “face” of the government to indigenous communities both 
domestically and internationally. The mission also reflects a high degree of politicization 
via its domestic and international activities. Examples of overt partisan activities abound 
in the press releases on the mission’s website, and the international outreach activities of 
the mission also reflect overt politicization.  
We observe in Misión Guaicaipuro a consistent pattern to create a strong social 
insurgency rooted in Venezuela, expanded to other parts of the region. The level of 
organization or readiness, its collective assessment or insurgent consciousness, and the 
political alignment or structure of political opportunities, are the necessary elements that 
enable this social insurgency, and which we have systematically described throughout the 
current chapter. Tarrow’s concept of a mobilization structure and McAdams’ concept of a 
social insurgency provide a framework to explain the organization and activities of the 
mission.  
Misión Guicaipuro serves the interests of the Bolivarian Revolution by creating a 
sympathetic population in support of the Venezuelan government, out of a disparate 
group of indigenous etnias spread across expansive areas. The Venezuelan government 
employed the “national folk hero,” the Indian Freedom Fighter Wayca Epuro to create an 
indigenous identity that all of the groups could relate to. Moreover, this process of 
identity creation is not only applicable within Venezuela, but also in international 
situations. Another tool in the identity creation process that Chávez employed is the 
presentation of the United States as a common “ideal devil”323 that serves as a device to 
unify the indigenous groups. To put this concept in other words, the U.S. served as a 
common enemy for Chávez to employ the principle of, “The enemy of my enemy, is my  
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friend.” He exemplified this in his fiery rhetoric during the Closing Ceremony of the First 
Bolivarian Congress of Indo-American Youth, to the extent of leading the attendees to 
swear an oath “against imperialism, and for socialism.” 
The comments made by Colonel (ret.) Perez demonstrate a new Chávez-era 
political-ideological bias to use the FARC in war planning against Colombia. This is an 
example of the strategic importance of developing an ideologically sympathetic 
population, not just a political or electoral importance. That his comments are reinforced 
by the Venezuelan intelligence official’s comments regarding Venezuela and the FARC 
is remarkable. The strategic importance of gaining a popular support base is reinforced by 
the series of videos produced by Colombian Cultural Identity, wherein Wayúu members 
speak of community debates about whether or not Colombian Guajira should become part 
of Venezuelan Guajira. 
Within Colombia, the mission initially interacted with, targeted, and benefitted 
the Wayúu and Motilón Bari etnias, which stands to reason given that both those 
indigenous groups straddle the Colombian-Venezuelan border. Evidence presented in this 
chapter strongly suggests that efforts by the mission toward these two etnias were made 
easier by the Colombian government’s pattern of neglect toward these communities. 
Therefore, gaining the sympathy of these etnias via the missions became feasible for the 
Bolivarian regime. The influence of this mission is extended into other geographic areas 
of Colombia through social and radical movements and organizations such as the 
FENSUAGRO. These links are all the more interesting given that these organizations are 
usually located in regions with a complex security situation, where illegal groups like the 
FARC and ELN are also present. The case of Juan Efraín Mendoza Gamba mentioned 
previously in the chapter is a strong example of a link between the Bolivarian missions in 
Colombia, social organizations, and terrorist groups.   
Chávez and his Bolivarian regime created Guicaipuro as a revolutionary response 
to fulfill the basic needs of the indigenous pueblos in Venezuela, historically neglected by 
the central government. This innovative mechanism provides the government opportunity 
to gain the electoral support of the indigenous communities in return. In addition, Misión 
Guicaipuro is a vehicle to invite indigenous communities in the region to join the 
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revolution, an invitation that has a significant influence in Colombia. Misión Guicaipuro, 
through its organization, capabilities, and activities, supports hypothesis two: The 
Venezuelan government of President Chávez used the legitimate status of Bolivarian 
missions in Colombia for both legitimate and illegitimate state activities to support 
Venezuelan foreign policy. 
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VIII. OVERT AND COVERT PURPOSES: THE MISSIONS AND 
THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR COLOMBIA 
Misiones Identidad, Milagro, Robinson, and Guicaipuro are the Bolivarian 
missions that are the specific case studies in this document. After an overview of the 
eclectic concepts of Bolivarianism, and an overview of the missions and their relevance 
in Venezuela, the case studies of these four missions constitute the body of this thesis. 
They are all active missions within Colombia, which is the focus of our thesis: the overt 
and/or covert nature of Bolivarian mission activity within Colombia. 
The series of Bolivarian missions are fundamentally a component of Venezuela’s 
domestic politics, and therefore are part of Venezuela’s sovereign right to self-
determination, or in other words are part of how Venezuela governs itself. This quality is 
regardless of their questionable methods of functioning, of funding, and their varying 
levels of performance.  
However, because the Venezuelan government itself created the mechanisms and 
the institution to internationalize the missions, the missions are no longer solely part of 
domestic Venezuelan government, but rather are also a part of Venezuelan foreign policy.  
This “exporting” of the missions is carried out in multiple countries including Colombia. 
Thus, it is impossible to limit the scope of the missions merely to the internal policy-
making of the Venezuelan government itself. The purpose of this chapter is to show that 
all four missions exhibit both legitimate and illegitimate state activity within Colombia, 
and that the activity is both Venezuelan and Colombian in origin. Furthermore, common 
to all four case study missions in Colombia are three main trends (or “themes”): political 
interference, ideological expansion, and affiliation with the insurgency. 
This chapter is organized into sections that consist of a comparison of the 
missions’ activities in Colombia in relation to the three hypotheses presented in the first 
chapter. 
1. H1: The Bolivarian government of Venezuela uses the legitimate status of 
Bolivarian missions in Colombia for legitimate state activities to support 
Venezuelan foreign policy. 
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2. H2: The Bolivarian government of Venezuela uses the legitimate status of 
Bolivarian missions in Colombia for both legitimate and illegitimate state 
activities to support Venezuelan foreign policy. 
3. H3: The Cuban and Venezuelan governments use the legitimate status of 
Bolivarian missions in Colombia for both legitimate and illegitimate state 
activities to support Venezuelan and Cuban foreign policy. 
This section is followed by a section that examines the three main trends, or 
themes, mentioned above: political interference, ideological expansion, and affiliation 
with the insurgency in Colombia. Throughout this chapter, we report evidence that is not 
necessarily linked to any particular mission, but rather are part of a pattern common to all 
or most of them. The “boundary lines” between these trends is often blurry, but this 
uncertainty is inherent to Bolivarianism itself, an eclectic mix of ideologies and form of 
government, as described in Chapter II: Chávez’s Eclectic Ideology.   
A. MISSION ACTIVITY IN COLOMBIA: OVERT OR COVERT, 
VENEZUELAN OR CUBAN? 
Of the four missions in our case study, we determined that none of the four 
missions exhibit only legitimate activity within Colombia, two of them (Identidad and 
Guaicaipuro) exhibit Venezuelan activity that is legitimate and illegitimate in nature, and 
two of them (Milagro and Robinson) exhibit both Venezuelan and Cuban activity that is 
legitimate and illegitimate in nature.  (See Table 2.) 
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Case Study Mission: Hypothesis I: Venezuelan legitimate activity 
Hypothesis II: Venezuelan legitimate & illegitimate activity 
Hypothesis III: Venezuelan & Cuban legitimate & illegitimate activity Identidad  X  Milagro   X Robinson   X Guaicaipuro  X  
Table 2.   Mission Alignment to Hypotheses Regarding Nature of Activity in Colombia 
One common trait among all of the missions is their gradual transition from 
“device[s] for confronting political and economic adversity, to a mechanism for imposing 
institutional, political, and social control to advance the goals of the revolution.”324 What 
all of the missions share is a trait of a parallel nature of government; that is, they are a 
component of the Venezuelan government “separate but equal” to the ministries they are 
affiliated with. This is or was apparently an attempt by President Chávez to bypass the 
bureaucratic and opposition obstacles within the traditional ministries, in order to more 
quickly implement his agenda of “participatory democracy.” The evidence we provide 
comports with that assessment of the missions as a whole, as the altruistic overt mission 
statements of the Bolivarian missions do not accurately describe the missions’ activity 
within Colombia.    
What differentiates the mission activity in Colombia regarding which hypothesis 
they support is directly related to whether the mission requires Cuban support to 
implement. If the mission requires Cuban support due to the subject area, the mission’s 
activity in Colombia demonstrates Cuban, in addition to Venezuelan, covert and overt 
activity. These missions are Mission Milagro and Mission Robinson, which require 
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Cuban support because they are in technical fields, health and education, respectively. 
These missions are implemented or enabled by agreements between Cuba and Venezuela: 
the 2005 Sandino Pact for Mission Milagro, and the 2000 Convenio Integral de 
Cooperación” (“Integral Cooperation Accord”) between Cuba and Venezuela signed in 
2000. Whereas, the Identidad and Guaicaipuro missions do not require outside support 
from Cuba, hence those missions do not demonstrate Cuban activity within Colombia.  
B. TRENDS COMMON TO THE MISSIONS IN COLOMBIA 
1. Political Interference 
International relations are political in nature and they are generally managed 
through diplomatic channels. Political interference is defined here as one state 
circumventing normal and official diplomatic channels, in order to push their specific 
political interests on another country via unofficial channels. These interests are 
commonly contrary to the ones of the affected country. Our thesis provides evidence to 
suggest that one of the themes common to the four missions studied is political 
interference.  
Within Colombia and Venezuela there are political parties and movements that 
stand for socialist ideas and defend ideologies traditionally labeled as leftist. On the 
Venezuelan side the PSUV, the governing party of Hugo Chávez, leads this political 
trend; on the Colombian side, the Polo Democrático (Democratic Pole) party is the most 
representative of the leftist parties. In the case of these two parties, evidence suggests that 
communication and relations between these two parties rises to the level of political 
interference within Colombia, and furthermore that one of the mechanisms for such 
interference is the Bolivarian missions. Solidarity between organizations which share 
common interests is to be expected and is logical, even natural. However, when such an 
alliance goes beyond simple solidarity and transcends to the imposition of political 
interests to the detriment of one of the countries, it calls into question Colombia’s ability 
to exercise effective sovereignty.   
Señor Martinez, the Cúcuta citizen cited in previous chapters, gives an account of 
how this political interference is evident in his city. His testimony can be considered as 
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common knowledge shared by the average citizens that inhabit the region, as we 
corroborated during our visit. Mr. Martinez asserts that the missions are a mechanism of 
political support in the region, and that the beneficiaries of this support are the 
Colombian political party Polo Democrático and more specifically Ramon Eli Tamara, a 
Polo member who currently is a deputy in the departmental assembly (Colombian 
department, or state, of Norte de Santander).325 He also said that the person behind the 
organization and funding of the missions’ operations in Colombia is “Becerra,” referring 
to Nelson Becerra, the mayor of the Venezuelan border town of Ureña directly across 
from Cúcuta, because “Ureña’s mayor supports all that is in opposition to the Colombian 
government.”326 One more insight contributed by Mr. Martinez is that one of the largest, 
if not the largest, unions in Colombia, Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (Central Union of 
Workers or CUT), functions in Cúcuta as a political party rather than a workers’ union. In 
sum, Mr. Martinez’s observations draw links between the Bolivarian missions, the 
Venezuelan mayor of Ureña (a member of the PSUV), the leftist Colombian political 
party Polo Democrático, and the CUT workers’ union.  
This same line of thought is followed by a former FARC operative interviewed 
for this thesis, who stated that during her time in the FARC, the Bolivarian missions were 
effective in recruiting and convincing people to oppose then-President Uribe’s 
government (of Colombia). She also stated that she received unambiguous guidance from 
Venezuela and from the FARC Secretariat to destabilize the government “by any means.” 
She recalls that they were directed to campaign during the 2002 Colombian presidential 
elections for Luis “Lucho” Garzon, the leftist candidate that unsuccessfully opposed 
Uribe in those elections. Moreover, this demobilized FARC operative pointed out the 
significant role of the CUT in managing what she calls “border policies,”327 even 
suggesting that Colombian authorities should more fully investigate workers unions and 
their links, apparently as a reference to organizations beyond what would be expected for 
a workers’ union. Similar to the summary of links described by Mr. Martinez in the 
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preceding paragraph, the former FARC operative’s comments describe links between the 
Bolivarian missions, the FARC, the Venezuelan government, leftist political campaigns 
in Colombia, and the CUT, the workers’ union in Colombia. 
There is also evidence that suggests that the scope of Venezuelan political 
interference goes beyond the local and regional examples cited above, that are centered in 
and around Cúcuta. A series of videos posted in a news article at Periodismo Sin 
Fronteras (Journalism Without Borders) show a meeting between members of the 
Colombian political party Polo Democrático and Venezuelan officials (one of whom is 
Ureña’s mayor Nelson Becerra), wherein the Colombian politicians are trying to gain 
support for the Polo party’s candidates for the Colombian Senate, House of 
Representatives, and the Andean Parliament.328 Ramon Eli Tamara, previously 
mentioned in Mr. Martinez’s comments, is apparently the liaison that made the meeting 
possible. Much of the conversation was devoted to creating mechanisms to mobilize the 
people with double cédula (those with both Colombian and Venezuelan ID cards) living 
in Venezuela to cross the border in order to vote in the Colombian elections. According 
to the journalist who authored the article, Ricardo Puentes Melo, the politicians who 
attended the meeting are “emissaries of Gustavo Petro Urrego,”329 the current mayor of 
Bogotá and one of the most prominent figures in Colombian leftist politics today. 
This constitutes an example at the local level of political interference from 
Venezuela into Colombian domestic political affairs. Mr. Martinez’s comments described 
links between the Bolivarian missions as a component of the Venezuelan government, 
Polo Democrático, and CUT, a prominent workers’ union in Colombia. In a similar vein, 
the former FARC operative’s comments describe links between the missions, the FARC, 
the Venezuelan government, leftist political campaigns in Colombia, and the CUT, the 
workers’ union in Colombia. Finally, the journalist Ricardo Puentes Melo’s article 
describes a lengthy meeting connecting Ramon Eli Tamara, a Polo Democrático party 
member in Cúcuta, to leftist political members in Bogotá, and the PSUV in Cúcuta. What 
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these connections demonstrate is that the Bolivarian missions are part of an active effort 
by the Venezuelan government and its governing party, the PSUV, to interfere with 
Colombian domestic politics. Although this evidence is drawn from a particular case, it 
does raise the question of the inability or unwillingness of the Colombian authorities to 
effectively oppose or at least object to such evident interference. 
2. Ideological Expansion 
Advocates of Bolivarianism portray this ideology as a revolutionary political 
process, and that one of their primary foci is assisting the poor and the traditionally 
excluded classes of the Venezuelan population. The Bolivarian missions fit into this 
ideology as the “operational arm” of the government that executes the ideology, day-in 
and day-out. Under the aegis of humanitarian assistance provided by the missions in 
Colombia, there is also a subtle, accompanying process of sharing Bolivarian and 
socialist ideology. This process of indoctrination, or attempted indoctrination, is intended 
to benefit the Bolivarian regime and the FARC and ELN in Colombia. It is important to 
note that this behavior of sharing Bolivarian and socialist ideology is explicitly stated as 
part of the purpose of the Venezuelan Comisión de Enlace para la Internacionalización de 
las Misiónes Sociales (Coordinating Commission for the Internationalization of Social 
[read: Bolivarian] Missions or CEIMS) office (see Chapter Two, Section B). The 
execution of the behavior suggests this process is not benign, but rather is intended to 
weaken the Colombian state, as we proceed to develop in the following paragraphs. 
In Colombia, the missions combine with many associations and NGOs that 
characterize themselves as altruistic or humanitarian in nature, but which objectives go 
beyond simple charity. This thesis has described consistently the links between the 
missions and many of those organizations such as Asociación Campesina del Valle del 
Cimitarra (Peasant Association of the Cimitarra Valley or ACVC), Asociación 
Campesina del Catatumbo (Peasant Association of the Catatumbo Region or 
ASCAMCAT), and Federación Nacional Sindical Unitaria Agropecuaria (Federation of 
National Agriculture Trade Unions or FENSUAGRO). These organizations provide easy 
access to various communities throughout Colombia. Despite their geographic 
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distribution, what these communities share is that they are generally in remote places of 
the country where Colombian state presence is scarce, and this situation makes the 
segments of the society that live in these communities particularly vulnerable to the 
instilling of radical ideas via the association and the missions, as there is less opportunity 
for counter-argument presented by either the state in deeds and words, or peers within the 
community with varying experiences.  
Rafael Guarín, the former Colombian Vice-Minister of Defense interviewed for 
this thesis, argues that in Colombia the ultimate goal of the missions is to consolidate a 
social base through clandestine work that aims to delegitimize the state and break apart 
the legal frame of the nation.330 Guarín regrets that the government does not see the 
missions as a [purposely] disruptive element in society.331 Carlos Sierra, a reputable 
Colombian analyst, vehemently asserts that the “missions are a tool for continental 
expansion of the Socialism of the 21st Century.”332 Similar views are shared by Fernando 
Londoño, former Colombian Minister of Defense and Interior, who sees the missions as a 
component of expansion of socialism and communism. He denounces the missions as 
having permeated social associations and non-governmental organizations to align the 
population with the Socialism of the 21st Century “which is the very same as Cuban 
communism.”333 Londoño describes, for instance, the commitment of a couple of Jesuit 
priests—De Roux and Javier Giraldo—in using the missions to advance the 
indoctrination process within communities where they have influence.334   
The NGO advisor interviewed for this research provided a clear opinion that, to 
her, the missions are an instrument of ideological expansion. This woman, who has first-
hand experience with many of the rural and isolated communities in areas where the 
missions operate, asserts that the role of the missions is not necessarily destabilizing the 
state per se, but that they are effective as mechanisms for “ideological influence, change 
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of thought, and psychological persuasion.”335 Isidro Perez, Colonel (ret.) of the 
Venezuelan Army who was involved in the initial development of the missions, stated 
that all the missions have an intelligence component within them, with the specific task 
of enabling “the internationalization of the revolutionary process.”336  
Another topic of shared concern among some of the interviewees is the link 
between the Bolivarian missions and the current FARC peace talks, especially the 
proposed Peasant Reserve Zones (in Spanish, Zonas de Reserva de Campesinos or 
ZRCs).337 Guarín, Londoño, and Sierra share the opinion that the missions are effective 
in persuading vulnerable Colombian populations to support the Peasant Reserve Zones. 
The missions operate in many remote places of Colombia, and part of their message is 
intended to convince the inhabitants of those regions that the central government is 
illegitimate and incapable of assisting its own citizens, an absence that has been filled by 
the missions. Given this state absence, some of the peasant associations and the missions 
supporting them, advocate for an increase in the number of Peasant Reserve Zones, 
seeking a protected status, land rights, and administrative autonomy. According to 
Londoño “the [additional proposed] zones represent more than 9.5 million hectares 
[roughly 37,000 square miles, or the area of Indiana] in more than 50 places of 
Colombia.”338  
The reasonable and justified concern of the interviewees is that the Peasant 
Reserve Zones may substantially increase the number and land area of the PRCs, and 
therefore increases the land area vulnerable to becoming co-opted by anti-Colombian 
organizations, such as FARC or the Bolivarian missions. This is reminiscent of the 
Switzerland-sized area FARC enjoyed autonomy in from 1998 to 2002, as a result of 
previous peace talks with the Colombian government. It also calls to mind Che Guevara’s 
                                                 
335 NGO Consultant, interview. 
336 Isidro Perez, interview. 
337 For a concise overview of the issue of Peasant Reserve Zones in the FARC peace talks, see “Land 
in Colombia: Reserved for Whom?” The Economist, April 6, 2013, 
http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21575801-peasant-farmers-and-peace-talks-reserved-whom 
(accessed May 3, 2013). 
338 Fernando Londoño, interview. 
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insurgency concept—focos—to perpetuate violence against the state. In addition, another 
concern was raised by Rafael Guarín, who mentioned how the current spokesman of 
Asociación Nacional de Zonas de Reserva Campesina (National Association of Peasants 
Reserve Zones or ANZORC), Cesar Jerez, is simultaneously the international 
representative of ACVC, the peasant association that has raised suspicions because of its 
links with the FARC.339 It seems that the indoctrination process has been very effective 
within these communities to the extent that many of the communities have mobilized—
whether voluntarily or through coercion—to support the creation of the zones. 
The missions in Colombia serve as platforms for promoting Bolivarian ideology. 
This section described relationships with Colombian associations that assist the missions 
“extend their reach” within Colombia. It also described concerns by interviewees for this 
thesis that characterize the missions as platforms for advancement of socialism and 
communism. Finally, there is concern that the missions are, in conjunction with some 
peasant associations, attempting to build support for expansion of Peasant Reserve Zones 
in the current peace talks with the FARC, which could potentially be used to “advance 
the Bolivarian revolution” within Colombia. The evidence presented suggests that the 
missions, although providing education, literacy programs, health, and other services 
within Colombia, do so, at least in part, in order to influence vulnerable populations 
within Colombia to identify with the values of the Bolivarian revolution, and ultimately, 
against the Colombian government. As Venezuelan Colonel (ret.) Perez stated, the 
missions are in Colombia to “advance the revolutionary process.”340  
3. The Missions and their Relationship to Insurgency 
We have consistently described the links between every one of the missions 
studied as case studies and the terrorist groups in Colombia, either the FARC or the ELN. 
This raises a quandary: what are the implications of the seemingly paradoxical  
 
 
                                                 
339 Rafael Guarín, interview. 
340 Isidro Perez, interview. 
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relationship between the missions, apparently humanitarian in nature, and terrorist groups 
that are inherently violent? And furthermore, what does this this phenomenon bring to 
Colombia as a sovereign state?  
One proposed explanation is given by Venezuelan Colonel (ret.) Isidro Perez, 
who describes the missions as a “transnational project which has in Colombia a point of 
contact: the FARC.”341 Perez also asserts that this is not an isolated phenomenon, but is 
the Colombian manifestation of an international terrorism network that the FARC has 
connections to, from Iran and Syria, and lamenting that in his opinion, both Santos (the 
current Colombian President) and Obama are blind to this emerging threat.342  
The persistent pattern that we observe throughout our research shows a 
relationship of reciprocity and mutual interest between the Venezuelan government via 
the Bolivarian missions, and the insurgent groups FARC and ELN. On the one hand, the 
missions support the insurgency by providing them with services and necessary supplies, 
including health care, for the FARC and ELN operatives. The missions are also helpful in 
an ongoing process to legitimize the insurgency and delegitimize the state, as Rafael 
Guarín describes,343 particularly in rural areas where Colombian state absence is high. 
On the other hand, the missions receive easy access to regions and people traditionally 
influenced by the insurgency, opportunity that gives to the missions—and to the 
Venezuelan government—public recognition, admiration, sympathy, and and support.  
The lynchpin of this symbiotic relationship is the shared ideology, as the 
Venezuelan intelligence official asserted: “the Bolivarian project is mutually shared,”344 
between the Venezuelan government and the Colombian insurgency. The missions, 
introduced as Bolivarian, fit perfectly into the rhetoric of these two actors. One 
Colombian intelligence official, an expert on the ELN, says that the missions equally  
 
 
                                                 
341 Isidro Perez, interview. 
342 Ibid. 
343 Rafael Guarín, interview. 
344 DIM Official, interview. 
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benefit honest people and terrorists, highlighting that his analysis has led him to the 
conclusion that the Venezuelan government project is utterly essential and necessary to 
the ELN’s campaign plan.345  
In addition to the shared ideology, some have argued that there is also a material 
commitment between the two parties, one example of which is the aforementioned 
material support from the missions to the insurgent groups. However, the missions have 
apparently received some monetary funding from the Colombian insurgency, money that 
is likely part of the revenue from the “300 metric tons of cocaine that pass through 
Venezuela to be exported to the U.S and Europe, money that supports the FARC and a 
corrupt military leadership in Venezuela.”346 This bold hypothesis was posited by the 
former Colombian Defense Minister Fernando Londoño during his interview with us. 
However, additional analysis of this potential revenue source and its origin is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
Common to all four missions studied in this thesis was evidence of both covert 
and overt activities within Colombia. However, what differentiates whether or not the 
missions are associated with only Venezuelan activity, or Venezuelan and Cuban activity, 
is the status of a formal agreement between Cuba and Venezuela for assistance within the 
subject area of the particular mission. Both the missions with Cuban influence required 
Cuban expertise in order to implement them. Mission Milagro requires Cuban medical 
professionals to implement, to the extent that the program is known colloquially in 
Cúcuta as “lost Cubanos” rather than as a Venezuelan mission. This mission is facilitated 
by the 2005 Sandino Pact between Cuba and Venezuela. Mission Robinson requires 
Cuban literacy professionals, and employs a literacy program developed in Cuba. This 
mission is facilitated by the Convenio Integral de Cooperación (Integral Cooperation 
Accord) between Cuba and Venezuela instituted in 2000. 
                                                 
345 ELN Intelligence Analyst, interview.  
346 Fernando Londoño, interview. 
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The Bolivarian missions bring to Colombia more than just the scope of their overt 
mission statements suggest, more than just cooperation, humanitarian assistance, and 
solidarity between the sister nations of Colombia and Venezuela. Consistent evidence 
from fieldwork in Colombia lead us to the conclusion that there are three core themes 
common to the missions’ activities in Colombia: first, clear political interference that 
aims to intervene directly and improperly in Colombian politics by sponsoring candidates 
and creating electoral maneuvers on behalf of candidates aligned with the socialist and 
revolutionary Venezuelan process. Second, an ideological expansion aimed at co-opting 
citizens to favor the revolutionary cause, a goal that may be achieved through the 
educational and literacy programs as well as “revolutionary talks.” This ideological 
expansion is larger than just Venezuelan-based Bolivarianism, but also includes Cuban-
based programs that advance Cuban interests. Third, the support to the insurgency with 
different resources has enabled these groups to survive the Colombian government 
offensive during the Uribe regime. Currently, support to the insurgency is ostensibly 
through the peace process, which is seeking an agreement favorable to the insurgent 
groups, in order to maintain the insurgents as a viable partner for the Venezuelan and 
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IX. CONCLUSIONS 
The Bolivarian missions are a grand experiment in an alternative system of 
governance and providing services to a population on a national scale. They also 
represent the promotion of a top-down change in structure of government. Chávez sought 
to bypass the existing bureaucracy of the Venezuelan ministries, and install the missions 
as a “parallel form of government” which he could more directly control and thus 
consolidate power in the presidential office. They are a component of an eclectic and 
ambitious “Socialism of the 21st Century” that in Chávez’s mind was a vision for a 
completely new form of government, a “participatory democracy.” As such, the missions’ 
role in this new vision is the execution of delivery of services to the population, the day-
to-day provision of government services necessary for government function. The scope of 
the missions, then, is comprehensive, and in a sense is equal to the scope of Venezuelan 
federal government, as the parallel structure of the missions seems intended to gradually 
replace the ministries within the government.  
A. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH AND FINDINGS 
This thesis has focused on Bolivarian missions in Colombia that are sponsored by 
the Venezuelan government. Bolivarian missions, often referred to as “social missions” 
as well, are essentially a series of social assistance programs established by the 
Venezuelan government beginning in 2003, in order to confront poverty within the 
country, and to provide basic services and support to Venezuelans, especially the 
“traditionally excluded” classes. Beginning in 2005, the Venezuelan government began to 
establish the missions internationally as a component of its foreign policy through the 
Comisión de Enlace para la Internacionalización de las Misiones Sociales (Coordinating 
Commission for Internationalization of Social [read: Bolivarian] Missions, CEIMS), a 
part of the Venezuelan Ministry of Foreign Relations.  
Through the execution of the research, we sought to understand the purpose and 
scope of the Bolivarian missions conducting activities within Colombia. While the 
missions have clear and overt mission statements that focus on activities and subject 
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areas in civil society, a debate exists as to their true nature. Do the missions act only 
within the parameters defined by their mission statements, providing social services 
within Colombia, or are they acting in other ways as well, such as legal covers for 
Venezuelan government-sponsored illicit or illegal activities? The thesis, then, addresses 
the following question: what is the purpose of the Bolivarian missions in Colombia 
sponsored by the Venezuelan government? We found through our research that the 
Venezuelan-sponsored Bolivarian missions in Colombia engage in both legitimate and 
illegitimate activity in Colombia.  
This research employed the comparative case study methodology, and was 
augmented by fieldwork that consists of interviews of people with direct and indirect 
contact with the missions, conducted in Bogotá and Cúcuta, Colombia, which is the main 
border-crossing city on the Venezuelan-Colombian border. The four Bolivarian missions 
selected as case studies for this research are as follows: Misión Identidad (provision of 
cédulas, or Venezuelan ID cards), Misión Milagro (ocular health care), Misión Robinson 
(literacy programs), and Misión Guaicaipuro (support to indigenous peoples).  Of the 
approximately 40 missions created since the inception of the Bolivarian missions in 2003, 
at least seven are active in Colombia. Of those, we selected the four most active missions 
in Colombia as case studies for this thesis. In addition, these four missions are 
representative of four different “areas of action” within the Bolivarian missions: 
government / administrative services, health services, education, and social services.  
The case studies were also augmented by Chapter II which examined the 
particular phenomenon of Hugo Chávez’s eclectic ideology of Bolivarianism, because it 
became clear that a thorough understanding of the missions is not possible without an 
understanding of the unique ideology that informs and underpins them. Thus, in the 
chapter that explained the ideology of Bolivarianism, we found that one of its principal 
components are Socialism of the 21st Century, a Chávez-developed “new socialism” that 
seeks to install a “participatory democracy” where Venezuelans have a direct hand in 
self-government rather than a representative democracy. Chavismo is the promotion of 
Hugo Chávez by individuals, supporters, organizations, and movements to near-mythic 
proportions, as a larger-than-life leader. The other essential components are a devotion to 
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a Simón Bolívar-inspired ideal of Latin American unity, and a transition from a capitalist 
based economy to a socialist based economy that consciously promotes the well-being of 
the “traditionally excluded” classes of Venezuela. The ideology inspires an active foreign 
policy that seeks to develop Bolivarianism beyond Venezuela’s borders, and the missions 
are a component of Venezuela’s foreign policy.  
Chapter III studied the phenomenon of the missions as a comprehensive program, 
in order to arrive at an improved understanding of the missions selected for case studies 
and provide context for them. The chapter addressed the conditions in Venezuela at the 
time of their initial establishment, the political pressures Chávez faced at the time, and 
how the missions constituted part of his response to those pressures, in order to assure 
himself victory in the 2004 presidential referendum election. In addition, the chapter 
examined financing of the missions, provided an overview of all of the missions, as well 
as a review of how some of the missions were incorporated into the foreign policy of 
Venezuela and exported throughout the region, including Colombia.  
Perhaps the most instructive insight into the origin and development of the 
missions came from Chávez himself, when he explained that the missions were 
developed in response to polling indicating he would lose in the upcoming presidential 
referendum of August 2004. Therefore he developed the missions in order to “attack from 
the bottom,” and in so doing, enlisted the help of his staunch ally, Fidel Castro, who 
provided resources for the missions, primarily doctors, teachers, and other experts 
necessary for development and implementation of the missions. The funding of the 
missions is accomplished primarily through funds from PDVSA, via a variety of national 
funds that are essentially non-budgetary mechanisms tightly controlled by the executive 
branch of government. Thus, accurate funding figures are difficult to ascertain.     
B. SUMMARY OF CASE STUDY FINDINGS 
In Chapter IV, Misión Identidad, we studied the mission responsible for issuance 
of the Venezuelan national ID cards, the cédula, and its activities in Colombia. Although 
there is a legitimate reason for Colombians to be issued Venezuelan cédulas due to both 
countries allowing for dual citizenship, the findings demonstrate the mission is 
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manipulated by the Bolivarian regime in order to increase the electorate of pro-Chávez 
voters. We documented via first-hand research manipulation of the Venezuelan-
Colombian border to ensure pro-Chávez voters were able to cross prior to the April 2013 
election, but not anti-Chávez voters. In addition, the mission supports terrorist groups in 
Colombia, principally FARC and ELN, by provision of cédulas to them in order to 
provide them safe haven in Venezuela. The groups are also granted influence over other 
Colombians through their role as an intermediary between the mission and other 
Colombians who desire Venezuelan cédulas; in exchange for their help, they are able to 
“ask” for assistance from the recipient of the cédula. 
Chapter V examined Misión Milagro. We determined that the mission rests on 
three principles: Cuban support, government affiliation, and party affiliation with 
Chávez’s party of the PSUV. We also found that the mission is enabled by Cuban 
support, to the extent that the mission is colloquially known in Colombia as los Cubanos, 
Spanish for “the Cubans.” This stands to reason, as the mission was formalized by the 
Sandino Pact of 2005 between Venezuela and Cuba, which specifically calls for 
cooperation between the two countries to address ocular health care, not only in 
Venezuela, but throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. We also found a 
relationship between the mission and the FARC and ELN, wherein the mission provides 
health care to members of these organizations, in return for increased access to rural areas 
within Colombia with heavy FARC presence. As with Identidad, we see a role for the 
FARC and ELN wherein they increase their influence over populations in Colombia due 
to their ability to choose who may receive medical care from the missions. This influence 
is in conjunction with Asociación Campesina del Valle del Cimitarra (Peasant 
Association of the Cimitarra Valley or ACVC), and Asociación Campesina del 
Catatumbo (Peasant Association of the Catatumbo Region or ASCAMCAT). 
In Chapter VI, we studied the activities of Misión Robinson, the literacy mission, 
in Colombia. We found that the mission’s literacy programs are based on a Cuban 
literacy program developed by Instituto Pedagógico Latinoamericano y Caribeño 
(Pedagogic Institute for Latin America and the Caribbean or IPLAC), a component of the 
Cuban Ministry of Education. We also found that the mission is popular and well-known 
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in and around Cúcuta. The Cuban literacy program is also instituted throughout Colombia 
via an NGO that has Cuban support: the Fundación Pedagógica Latinoamericana or Latin 
American Pedagogic Foundation. The mission’s activities in Colombia fit into a larger 
pattern of Venezuelan and Cuban interference in Colombian politics, to include public 
media reporting on incidents in which Cuban and Venezuelan diplomats in Colombia 
were found to be “politically proseletyzing” together at the Central American and 
Caribbean Games that took place in Cartagena, Colombia, in 2006. Another instance is of 
a 2007 incident in which two Venezuelan officials were expelled from Colombia due to 
interference in domestic politics in the Barranquilla suburb of Baranoa. 
In Chapter VII, Misión Guaicaipuro, we studied the mission responsible for 
support to indigenous peoples, and its activities in Colombia. We conclude that the 
mission operates as a mobilization structure, intended to mobilize the indigenous peoples 
within Colombia as supporters, and thus voters, for the Bolivarian government of Hugo 
Chávez. We also found that the mission serves to “internationalize the Bolivarian 
revolution” by sponsoring and hosting international congresses for indigenous peoples 
from across the Americas, to include the United States, interestingly enough. These 
congresses, such as the Bolivarian Congress of Indo-American Youth and the 
International Congress of the Great Nation of the Anti-Imperialist Indigenous Peoples 
enable Chávez an avenue from which to communicate his views to an international 
audience.  
Within Colombia, the mission serves a strategic function as well as a political-
electoral function. The mission not only engages with indigenous peoples within 
Colombia in order to try and gain their votes via provision of Venezuelan cédulas, but 
through the mission attempts to gain their sympathy and thus create an ideologically-
aligned population. In Colombia, the mission’s primary involvement is with the Wayúu 
people in the La Guajira peninsula in northern Colombia, and the Motilón Bari people 
further south along the Colombian-Venezuelan border, in the vicinity of the Venezuelan 
state of Táchira and the Colombian department of Norte de Santander. We also found 
extension of Misión Guaicaipuro’s influence beyond the border region through 
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association with groups such as Federación Nacional Sindical Unitaria Agropecuaria 
(Federation of National Agriculture Trade Unions or FENSUAGRO). 
C. SUMMARY OF COMMON TRENDS ACROSS CASE STUDIES 
Common to all of the missions’ activities in Colombia is a combination of both 
overt and covert activity. Whereas all of the missions execute activities based on their 
respective mission statements, our fieldwork which consisted of firsthand research and 
experience demonstrates that the missions are involved in promoting the “Bolivarian 
Revolution” in Colombia through covert activities. The main themes or trends that are 
common to all of the studied missions in Colombia are: political interference, ideological 
expansion, and cooperation with insurgents groups FARC and ELN.  
In addition, there is also evidence of Cuban-sponsored legitimate and illegitimate 
activity in Colombia through the missions in Colombia. This is due to the direct Cuban 
involvement in two of the four missions, Misión Milagro and Misión Robinson. Misión 
Identidad and Misión Guaicaipuro do not have a need for Cuban expertise in order to 
operate, and thus they do not demonstrate in Cuban-sponsored activity.  
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Areas for further study are based on the identification of links, networks, and 
relationships between the Bolivarian missions in Colombia, the FARC and ELN, and 
peasant associations. Possible areas for further study include network analysis on the 
Bolivarian mission—Colombian insurgent group—peasant association linkages shown in 
this research. 
Another area for further study is the analysis of public policy in areas where 
insurgent groups and peasant associations are both present, principally areas where two 
peasant associations in particular are active: the Asociación Campesina del Valle del 
Cimitarra (Peasant Association of the Cimitarra Valley or ACVC), and Asociación 
Campesina del Catatumbo (Peasant Association of the Catatumbo Region or 
ASCAMCAT). These areas are the Cimitarra river valley and the Catatumbo region in  
 
 139 
the north of the Department of Norte de Santander. Study should focus on what public 
policies in these areas would promote development and reduce conditions that create a 
need for services provided by the Bolivarian missions. 
We recommend for the mechanism of the Comisión Binacional de Fronteras (Bi-
National Border Commission between Colombia and Venezuela or COMBIFRON) to 
establish rules and limitations on the activities of the Bolivarian missions in Colombia to 
act only in accordance with their explicit mission statements. The COMBIFRON was 
established in 1994 by Colombia and Venezuela in order to coordinate for the sharing of 
military intelligence between the two countries’ militaries, and since then has functioned 
off and on as a coordinating mechanism, often dependent on the status of diplomatic 
relations between Colombia and Venezuela. Our recommendation is for a more formal 
agreement to be implemented with a regular meeting schedule, in order to implement 
each government’s authorized activities within the other country. With respect to the 
Bolivarian missions, the COMBIFRON could be used as a legal mechanism to ensure the 
missions are operating solely within the intent of their overt mission statements. This 
would alleviate concern regarding their connections to the FARC and ELN, and would 
have the added benefit of incorporating Venezuelan government agreement on such 
management of the missions’ activities in Colombia.  
Concomitant with the need for a renewed military coordination mechanism, a 
need exists for the Colombian government to better understand the behavior, attitudes, 
and objectives of civic associations and NGOs. Currently, the Colombian Constitution is 
extremely protective of civil rights and liberties, so any interference in these associations’ 
activities from the government could be seen as intrusive violations of constitutional 
rights, and rightly so. However, the Colombian government at the same time has an 
obligation to protect its citizens and its sovereignty from international political 
interference. Hence, the implementation of a trusted and transparent process is necessary 
in order to exert Colombian sovereignty over domestic issues and prevent political 
interference and external support to insurgent groups, principally FARC and ELN. This 
includes mis-use or co-option of NGOs for self-serving means. 
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The government of Colombia should pay special attention to traditionally ignored 
regions of the country and specific populations in order to mitigate risk that such neglect 
could lead to continued insurgency. Specifically, special attention and additional 
resources and programs should be developed toward the remote, rural areas of the 
Catatumbo region and the Cimitarra river valley. Additional resources and programs 
should be developed towards the Wayúu and Motilón Bari indigenous peoples.  
With respect to Cuba and its participation in the missions, specifically Misión 
Milagro and Misión Robinson, in-depth analysis and investigation of the nature of 
continued Cuban involvement in the missions in Colombia should be conducted. The 
point of such research is to determine whether Cuban involvement in the missions 
follows proper diplomatic protocol, and whether such involvement is beneficial to 
Colombia. Colombian Ministry of Education experts could undertake a study of the value 
of the literacy programs offered within Colombia by the Cuban-sponsored NGO 
Fundación Pedagógica Latinoamericana or Latin American Pedagogic Foundation, in 
order to determine the educational value of their activities and whether or not such 
literacy programs could best be executed by Colombian institutions (to include 
Colombian NGOs), instead. Realistically, Colombian capacity for literacy programs 
already exists domestically; therefore we submit that programs literacy programs run by 
the Fundación Pedagógica Latinoamericana that have a Cuban-developed content should 
be replaced with domestic programs. One such program with a proven track record is the 
Integral School Literacy Program,347 an NGO-government partnership.      
Finally, the Colombian government is currently in the midst of peace negotiations 
with the FARC in Cuba, a process wherein the countries of Cuba and Venezuela are 
moderators. The government should undertake a thoughtful evaluation of the role of these 
two countries and their objectivity in the peace process. Different moderators not 
ideologically aligned with the FARC nor with the government of Colombia should be 
sought. An impartial, recognized organization such as the OAS is an ideal moderator for 
the next phases of the FARC peace talks.  
                                                 
347 “Effective Literacy Programmes › I,” UNESCO Institute for Lifelong Learning, 
http://www.unesco.org/uil/litbase/?menu=16&programme=123 (accessed May 28, 2013). 
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APPENDIX A.   SUMMARY DESCRIPTION OF THE BOLIVARIAN 
MISSIONS348 
Table 3.   List of Missions in Chronological Order of Establishment: Mission Logo and 
Brief Summary Description 
Mission Logo 
Mission Name & Brief Summary Description 
 
Barrio Adentro I / Inside the Neighborhood I: This 
mission is the first of the missions established in 
Venezuela. It is a health care mission and its 
mission is to provide basic health  care clinics 
throughout Venezuela. Primarily staffed by Cuban 
medical professionals. 
 
Robinson I: This mission is the first of the education 
missions, and is one of the best known of the 
missions. The primary mission of Robinson I is to 
provide basic literacy education to all Venezuelans, 
with the primary aim to eliminate illiteracy in 
Venezuela. 
 
Sucre: This mission is the second of the educations. 
It is named after Antonio José de Sucre, one of the 
leaders for Venezuelan independence, and one of 
Simon Bolivar’s closest peers. The mission’s 
primary purpose is to provide an alternative path to 
university-level education, especially aimed at those 
students who are not otherwise able to afford it. 
 
Robinson II: This mission is the third education 
mission established, and the second in the Robinson 
series. The primary aim of Robinson II is to provide 
primary education to all Venezuelans, especially to 
non-traditional students who for whatever reason 
never had access to, or never finished, their primary 
education (defined as a 6th-grade education). 
                                                 
348 Mission images and information compiled primarily from “Gobierno De Venezuela: Misiones,” 
Centro Nacional de Tecnologías de Información, http://www.gobiernoenlinea.ve/home/misiones.dot 
(accessed April 15, 2013), and also, Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, “Misiones Bolivarianas,” 
Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, 
http://ceims.mppre.gob.ve/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=527&Itemid=66 (accessed 
September 9, 2012). 
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Mission Logo 
Mission Name & Brief Summary Description 
 
 
Frente Francisco de Miranda, or the Francisco de 
Miranda Front, is named after a Venezuelan 
revolutionary figure. It is a militia composed of 
Venezuelans who receive training in Cuba. 
Estimates range from 10,000 to 15,000 members. 
The members support the activities of other 
missions by providing personnel to support their 
work. The Miranda Front reports to the Office of the 
President, and not the Venezuelan Armed Forces. 
 
Ribas: This mission is named after Venezuelan 
independence hero José Félix Ribas. The main 
objective of the mission is to provide remedial high 
school education to Venezuelans who for whatever 
reason, were unable to complete high school 
education through normal channels. 
 
Mission Miracle is intended to provide ocular health 
care services, free of charge, to all Venezuelans 
regardless of socio-economic background. The 
mission is made possible through the Sandino Pact 
of 2005, signed by Presidents Chávez and Castro, 
which enabled for Cuban health professionals to 
travel to Venezuela to staff clinics to conduct minor 
eye surgeries, as well as for Venezuelans to travel to 
Cuba for such services. Also, probably the most 
high-profile mission internationally.  
 
Mission Market aims to provide subsidized food 
and basic goods to Venezuelans, especially 
Venezuelans of the lower socio-economic classes. 
This mission traces its roots to the government 
response to the national and oil strike of 2002, when 
the government used the military to assure supplies 
of basic foodstuffs after most food companies 
joined the strike. 
 
Mission Identity’s primary aim is to provide 
national identification cards (cédulas) to all 
Venezuelans, as well as foreign legal residents 
residing within Venezuela. Part of the mission’s aim 
is accomplished through mobile ID card units to 
provide coverage to isolated regions of the country.  
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Mission Logo 
Mission Name & Brief Summary Description 
 
Mission About Face was intended to encourage 
domestic sustainable local development via 
cooperatives and “endogenous development nuclei.” 
Its purpose is to transform the basic economic 
structure of the country from purely a capitalist-
based system, to one that is “nationalist and 
Bolivarian,” all with the aim of providing a 
dignified quality of life for Venezuelans, through 
“the participation of the creative force of the people 
in the production of goods and services.”  
 
Mission Habitat is a housing mission under the 
Ministry of Housing. Its focus is on new housing 
construction. The mission also takes advantage of 
Venezuela’s wealth in petroleum products by 
building homes using petroleum-based building 
products. This mission is apparently only active 
within Venezuela, as it is not listed on the CEIMS 
website. 
 
Mission Guicaipuro is the mission dedicated to the 
development of the indigenous peoples of 
Venezuela, as well as to the inclusion of the 
indigenous peoples into the rest of Venezuela, as 
historically they had been excluded and 
discriminated against. Guaicaipuro functions as a 
“solutions provider,” connecting the indigenous 
peoples with the services of the other missions, and 
the rest of the Venezuelan government. 
 
Mission Piar is one of the smaller missions. Its aim 
is to “include the small-scale miner in the 5 planned 
axes of the National Economic and Social 
Development Plan: economic, social, political, 
territorial, and international...with the final aim of 
elevating the civic, social, and political conscience 
[of the small-scale miner].”349  
                                                 
349 Gobierno De Venezuela: Misiónes. 
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Mission Logo 
Mission Name & Brief Summary Description 
 
Mission Zamora’s primary subject area is land 
redistribution within Venezuela. “The objective is to 
reorganize the tenancy and use of idle agricultural 
lands in order to eradicate large estates, promote 
rural development in the strategic axes of the nation, 
and guarantee agricultural and food security of the 
population through development of sustainable 
agriculture.”350 
 
Mission Inside the Neighborhood II. Phase II of this 
mission takes the activity of Phase I a step further 
by moving beyond the provision of basic health care 
in neighborhood health clinics. Phase II provides 
Centers of Advanced [Medical] Technology, 
Comprehensive Diagnostic Centers, and 
Comprehensive Rehabilitation Clinics. 
 
Mission Culture is intended to provide the resources 
for Venezuelans to exercise their creative rights 
through development of their creative spirit. The 
idea is to offer the necessary legal protections and 
other necessary measure to develop, protect and 
preserve the culture, the tangible and intangible 
national legacy, and the collective memory of the 
nation. 
 
Inside the Neighborhood III provides modernization 
and updating to the national hospital system in 
Venezuela. Unlike the two primary phases which 
are outside the traditional medical system in 
Venezuela, Phase III consciously seeks to bring this 
system into the mission. The first component of 
Phase III is updating medical equipment within 
hospitals, and second is the improvement of the 
hospital buildings themselves through remodeling 
and new construction.  
                                                 
350 Gobierno De Venezuela: Misiónes. 
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Robinson III: Reading Circles. This mission is the 
extension of Robinson I and II, and is intended to 
provide a medium through which graduates of I and 
II may continue in the habit of reading and 
education. The Reading Circles are primarily 
focused on “political, economic, social, and cultural 
readings of national interest.”351 
 
Ribas Technical and Social. This mission is based 
on the original Mission Ribas, but this particular 
iteration of it is intended to provide technical high 
school equivalent education for development of 
skills that are applicable for employment in the 
petroleum industry within Venezuela. 
 
Mission Negra Hipolita. This mission is named after 
“Negra Hipolita,” a slave of the Simon Bolivar 
family who personally cared for the young Bolivar 
and thus became a mother figure to him.  The 
mission is focused on providing services to 
homeless Venezuelans and those in “extreme 
poverty,” to include those Venezuelans who are 
drug addicts.   
 
Mission Science. The aim of the mission is to model 
a new scientific and technological culture for 
Venezuela that supports collective organization of 
the sciences, scientific dialogue, and participation of 
diverse actors in the scientific-technological arena, 
with the ultimate aim of arriving at higher levels of 
knowledge.  
 
Mothers of the Barrio. This mission is directed at 
supporting mothers, especially mothers who are 
heads of household, and classified as living in 
poverty. The mission consists of cash 
disbursements, but also programs designed to assist 
the mothers to prepare for moving beyond poverty. 
                                                 
351 Fundación Samuel Robinson, “Fundación Samuel Robinson—Misión Robinson,” 
http://www.misionrobinson.me.gob.ve/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=14&Itemid=45 
(accessed February 2, 2013). 
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Mission Tree. This mission is an environmental 
mission that has as its principal aim the protection 
of the Venezuelan environment. The Bolivarian 
influence with this mission is the use of the mission 
as a new model of development that takes into 
account participation of the community in the 
recuperation, conservation, and sustainable use of 
the Venezuelan forests.  
 
Inside the Neighborhood IV. This mission is for 
advanced and specialized health care, especially for 
health care specialties for which there is a shortfall 
in Venezuela. For example, the mission kicked off 
with the inauguration of the Pediatric Cardiologic 
Hospital “Gilberto Rodríguez Ochoa” in August of 
2006. 
 
Revolutionary Energy. This mission is focused on 
promoting the efficient use of energy in daily life in 
Venezuela. The most well publicized activity of the 
mission is replacement of incandescent bulbs with 
fluorescent bulbs on a national scale.  
 
Mission Smile. This mission is focused on 
correcting dental problems, especially those 
problems that require oral surgery, or dental 
prostheses. 
 
Villanueva. This mission is named in honor of 
Venezuelan architect Carlos Raúl Villanueva. The 
mission is focused on urban planning with an 
emphasis on the problems in the poorer barrios of 
Venezuelan cities. It is intended to complement 
Mission Habitat and Mission Housing, which have 
achieved poor results in the housing sector, due to 
problems with bureaucracy and corruption. 
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Mission Alma Mater. This mission is focused on 
creation of new universities in Venezuela, with the 
vision of transforming the Venezuelan university 
system in line with the National Project Simon 
Bolivar, thus guaranteeing the right of higher 
education for all.352  
 
Mission Music. Mission Music has a history that 
predates the creation of the Bolivarian missions as a 
comprehensive program. The mission incorporated 
what was previously known as El Sistema, or “The 
System.” The roots of the program go back to 1975, 
when  José Antonio Abreu established a youth 
orchestra. Today, El Sistema has inspired similar 
programs worldwide, including the U.S.  
 
Che Guevara. This mission replaced Mission About 
Face, and its subject area is essentially the same as 
Mission About Face. Essentially, the mission is to 
transform the national economic model in 
Venezuela from one based on capitalism, to one of 
socialism, and in so doing, guarantee the social 
well-being and labor of the participants in the 
National Economic and Social Development Plan 
for 2007-2013, as a part of the supreme objective of 
achieving “Mission Christ: Zero Poverty by 2021.” 
 
Mission José Gregorio Hernández is focused on 
providing services to Venezuelans with disabilities. 
It is named for José Gregorio Hernández, a pioneer 
of medicine and public health in Venezuela. The 
mission, as with most of the missions, is offered at 
no charge for those who qualify for the mission’s 
services.  
                                                 
352 Misión Alma Mater: Educación Universitaria Bolivariana Y Socialista (Caracas: Ministerio Del 
Poder Popular Para La Educación Universitaria, 2009), 
http://www.mppeu.gob.ve/web/uploads/documentos/documentosVarios/pdf21-12-2009_07:30:40.pdf 
(accessed March 15, 2013). 
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13th of April. The objective of 13th of April Mission 
is to strengthen popular power through the creation 
of social communes. The mission is named in honor 
of the date in 2002 when Chávez returned to power 
after the short-lived coup against him. The first 
stage is to make “superhuman” efforts to improve 
the lives of those living in the barrio, and the second 
stage is to construct entirely new communes and 
“socialist cities” that guarantee quality of life.  
 
Great Mission AgroVenezuela’s vision stems from 
President Chávez’s call for a fight against global 
hunger. The mission consists in support to small- 
and medium-scale farmers to enable them to 
harvest, with the idea that ultimately, the overall 
output will increase.  
 
Baby Jesus. Mission Baby Jesus was categorized as 
a “sacred” mission by President Chávez upon its 
founding in 2009. The mission is aimed at 
improving maternal health and infant health, from 
pre-natal stages through to pediatric health. 
 
Great Mission Venezuela Housing. The ultimate 
aim of this mission is to end the housing shortage in 
Venezuela. The mission offers financing programs 
for middle-class Venezuelan families to purchase 
their own homes. The three avenues to participate 
are: home purchase, purchase in a new 
development, or financing for construction on land 
already owned. 
 
Great Mission Love for the Elderly Venezuela. This 
mission is roughly equivalent to social security in 
the United States. It is intended to provide for those 
Venezuelans who don’t have Venezuelan social 
security, or otherwise didn’t qualify for it. The 
mission is open to women 55 or older, men 60 or 
older, and foreign citizens with at least 10 years fo 
legal residence within Venezuela. 
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Great Mission Children of Venezuela. The vision of 
this mission is to assist children in extreme poverty. 
There are four categories of youth it is intended to 
assist: pregnant teenagers in poverty; pregnant 
women in poverty; children under 17 living in 
poverty; and people with disabilities, without any 
age limit.  
 
Great Mission Knowledge and Work. This mission 
is intended to combat unemployment and 
underemployment, with a particular emphasis on 
youth and women. There are four components to the 
mission: 1) a system of registration of needs, and 
offers of employment; 2) a new revolutionary legal 
and institutional framework; 3) system of formation 
for  production based on three axes: early education, 
technical education, university education; and 4) a 
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AND VENEZUELA 
 
Figure 5.  Reference Map: Key Features, Colombia and Venezuela 
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